AFGHAN PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION

National Corruption Survey 2014

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ABOUT INTEGRITY WATCH AFGHANISTAN

Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) was founded in October 2005 and established itself as an independent civil society organization in 2006. IWA’s aim is to evolve into a reference actor related to understanding, analysing and acting for transparency, accountability and anti-corruption issues.

IWA’s Mission

The mission of Integrity Watch Afghanistan is to increase transparency, integrity and accountability in Afghanistan through evidence-based research, citizen-oriented monitoring and capacity empowerment.

About IWA’s Research Unit

IWA’s Research Unit undertakes research and advocacy on crosscutting themes. Its first objective is to develop new empirical research on corruption. Its second objective is to consolidate current knowledge on corruption, accountability, transparency and integrity. Thirdly, it aims to enhance research capacity for anti-corruption issues. Together, these objectives work to influence decision-makers, increase civil society engagement and raise public awareness of corruption issues.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Integrity Watch Afghanistan would like to express utmost appreciation and gratitude to the team involved in a collective effort to produce this report. Our special thanks go to Dr. Yama Torabi for defining the methodology and developing the survey questionnaire, to Shahim Kabuli for the data collection, analysis, administration of the survey and production of the tables, graphs and maps and to Dr. Marine Durand for reviewing the report and finally to Mohammad Isaqzadeh for authoring this report. The research project was the fourth wave of IWA biannual survey of corruption and based on IWA’s National Corruption Survey 2007, 2010 and 2012.

Colleagues from Integrity Watch Afghanistan extended efforts that went well beyond the call of duty in order to produce this work. Our special appreciation goes to our colleagues Dr. Marine Durand, Shahim Kabuli and Marie Huber who took part in the editing process and read the first and second drafts diligently.

The survey could have not been accomplished without the dedicated work of the 72 surveyors, who in many cases took the risk of conducting interviews in insecure areas. Some preferred to stay anonymous for their own safety. We are grateful to all of them.

Finally, the management and support staff of Integrity Watch Afghanistan provided the necessary administrative and logistics assistance that allowed the project to run smoothly. This report has benefited the most from the invaluable comments and expertise of both internal reviewers Dr. Yama Torabi, Dr. Marine Durand, Daniel Munzert, the IWA Board, Lorenzo Delesgues and external reviewers, Aislin Baker and Fredrik Galtung. The guidance and contribution of these reviewers is greatly appreciated. While the contributions of others are acknowledged, the findings, interpretations, and conclusions in this report are those of Integrity Watch Afghanistan.

For further clarification and queries please contact IWA team at info@iwaweb.org
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARD</td>
<td>Consortium of German public broadcasters</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>American Broadcasting Company</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<td>CDC</td>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
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<td>CSIS</td>
<td>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Central Statistics Organization</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Growth Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HOO</td>
<td>High Office of Oversight</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>IWA</td>
<td>Integrity Watch Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development</td>
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<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
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<td>NRVA</td>
<td>National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment</td>
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<td>NSP</td>
<td>National Solidarity Program</td>
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<td>OS</td>
<td>Original Sample (for the figures)</td>
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<td>PC</td>
<td>Provincial Council</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
<td>Personal Data Assistant</td>
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<td>PII</td>
<td>Provincial Integrity Index</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAF</td>
<td>The Asia Foundation</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>UN Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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1 USD = 54.4Afs¹

Please note: if the sample number is not specifically mentioned, n=7798 or 100% of the respondents

¹ Rate as of the March 2014.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Bank-e-Melli - National bank
Bribe - A sum of money or other inducement offered for having the state officials to act in one’s favour
An offer or receipt of any gift, loan, fee, reward or other advantage to or from any person as an inducement to do something which is dishonest, illegal or a breach of trust
Bribery - An offer or receipt of any gift, loan, fee, reward or other advantage to or from any person as an inducement to do something which is dishonest, illegal or a breach of trust
Brisha - Electricity in Pashto - the state-run enterprise providing electricity
Commissionkar - Professional commission taker that is an intermediary between a bribe taker and a bribe giver
Corruption - Abuse of entrusted authority for illicit gains
Court tempering - Attenuating court decisions in one’s favour
Embezzlement - Illegal use or misappropriation of money or property under one’s authority
Is a form of blackmail where one party makes threats against another party of adverse consequences unless the demands, usually for payment, are met? Sometimes the threats may involve threats of physical harm.
Extortion - Unfair preferential treatment given to one person or group at the expense of another
Favoritism - The act of falsifying documents for personal or group gains or interests
Household - A domestic unit consisting of the members of a family who live together under the same roof, share food and cooking arrangement and have a common budget
Jerib - Unit of land measurement roughly equal to 1/5 hectare
Jirga/Shura - Gathering of elders/villagers to resolve a local question or handle issues of common concern
Kuchis - Nomad
Mawlawi - Religious scholar
MerAb - Water-manager in the village
Meshrano Jirga - Upper house of Afghanistan parliament
Milli Bus - The state-run enterprise providing public bus transportation
Mujahideen - Anti-communist armed organized groups that resisted the soviet invasion and remained active in Afghan politics
Mullah - Preacher of a mosque
Nepotism - Abuse of authority for according advantages to one’s own family members or relatives in recruiting or promoting
Pashtanay Bank - State-run bank
Reshwat - Bribe
TasadiKhanaSazi - The state-run enterprise that builds housing especially for civil servants
Ulema - The body of Muslim scholars recognized as having specialist knowledge of Islamic sacred law and theology
Wasseta - A connection, a recommendation or a relationship illegally and illicitly used for obtaining a service from the state
Wolesi Jirga - Lower house of Parliament
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Afghanistan is ranked as one of the three most corrupt countries in the world.² This 2014 survey finds there has been no improvement in reducing corruption compared to last year. In a country that faces major challenges as the state is expected to take full responsibility for providing security and public services in 2014, corruption could gravely undermine the prospect of successful transition. Corruption is detrimental to social equality and leads to an increased gap between the rich and the poor, as the poor are excluded from access to the state and public services, which in turn can contribute to increased support for insurgent groups and political instability.³ In addition, corruption leads to rent-seeking opportunities and weakens the rule of law and protection of property rights, which in turn deters investment and challenges economic growth and development.⁴ Given the deleterious effects of corruption on political stability and economic growth, understanding the nature and scope of corruption and taking fight against corruption is urgent and crucial for the future of Afghanistan, which this survey tries to contribute to.

This report represents the findings of a countrywide survey on Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption and assessment of how corruption impacts their lives and communities. Since 2007, this is the fourth biannual survey of its kind by Integrity Watch Afghanistan, with the first survey published in and further waves such published in 2010 and 2012. The current survey is particularly important since it is being conducted at a time when the country is facing two major milestones: transition of power and responsibilities to the Afghan state and the first presidential elections in which the country must attempt peaceful transition of power to a new president. The survey aims to offer insights to political leaders and public officials about Afghans’ perception of corruption and their expectations from the state and political leaders.

This survey focuses on administrative corruption such as bribery, obstruction and nepotism. Administrative corruption has the most direct effects on the citizenry since they directly bear its financial burden and it impacts their access to pubic goods and services. Studying grand corruption (including political corruption and embezzlement) falls beyond the scope of this survey.

The findings of this survey are presented in three parts. The first part depicts a general picture of corruption in the country. The second part explores individuals’ and households’ perceptions and experiences of corruption, and the third part focuses on corruption on the police and the justice sector.

² Transparency International reported Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia perceived as equally corrupt and as the most corrupt countries in the world in 2012 and 2013. For more details, refer to www.transparency.org/cpi.
Method and research approach

This fourth cross-sectional survey was designed and the data collected by IWA in August 2013. The fieldwork and data collection was completed in November 2013. In total, 7,798 respondents (with an equal number of men and women) were interviewed across the country. Respondents were selected from all 34 provinces. The number of respondents in each province is proportional to the province population, with the exception of 19 provinces that were intentionally oversampled. For a list and breakdown of the number of respondents selected in each province, please refer to the Methodology section in Appendix I. Roughly 24% of the respondents were selected from urban areas while 76% came from rural areas in order to reflect the demography of the country.

The rural sample was divided between remote villages and villages near cities. The survey respondents also represent Afghan demographic diversities based on age, marital status, socio-economic status, income, literacy and ethnicity. The sampling method was a stratified random walk sampling.

Any survey can be affected by biases, particularly confirmation bias, and this survey is not an exception. Confirmation bias refers to the tendency of people to favour information that confirms their beliefs or beliefs of surveyors or to selectively recollect or interpret information. Hence, it is possible that respondents under-reported or over-reported their experiences of corruption.

Primacy effect is another possible source of bias. The primacy effect refers to the tendency of respondents to choose the first few answers from a long list of responses. Although the surveyors were required not to read the responses to open-ended questions, the possible impact of primacy effect cannot be ruled out completely.

In order to strengthen reliability of the data, a number of different indicators for measuring each variable were devised in the questionnaire to allow triangulation of responses to different questions and obtain a more accurate measure of variables. Such analysis is discussed and reflected in the relevant sections in the findings.

Key findings from the 2014 survey

The findings of this survey show that Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption have deteriorated compared to 2012. While respondents believed corruption to be the third biggest problem in the country in 2012, they held that it was the second biggest problem after security in 2014. Although there have been some improvements in a few sectors in terms of reducing corruption, respondents did not find improvements satisfactory. Respondents held that corruption helps the expansion of the Taliban; nevertheless, they still have strong belief in the ability of the political leaders, particularly President Karzai, to fight corruption. The international community was believed to have performed weakly in addressing corruption.

The experience of corruption and amount of bribery increased in 2014. Although the provision of public services by the state improved and more citizens had access to basic services, corruption undermined equal access of citizens to these services. Afghans frequently had to pay bribes for obtaining public goods and services. A substantial proportion of respondents felt they had been deprived of access to certain public goods and services due to corruption.

Transition is the next challenging task ahead of the nation. Compared to 2012, respondents were slightly more optimistic about transition this year. Only 50% of respondents, nevertheless, believed that the government would be able to ensure successful transition of power from international military forces. 45% of respondents believed that Afghan security forces would not be able to ensure
security after transition and viewed lack of resources and corruption as the two top reasons why Afghan security forces would not be able to ensure security.

The key findings from 2014 survey are summarized in the following subsection.

Corruption has become the second biggest concern for Afghans

Perception of corruption further deteriorated in 2014 as it was ranked as the second biggest problem for the country after insecurity. In the 2012 survey, respondents reported the three biggest problems facing the country to be insecurity (51% of respondents), unemployment (16% of respondents), and corruption (13% of respondents). In the 2014 survey, however, equal percentages of respondents (36%) ranked corruption and unemployment as the biggest problem in the country after insecurity (45%). Perception of the most detrimental problem in Afghanistan varied across gender and place of residence. Men, in general, viewed insecurity and corruption and women saw unemployment as the biggest problems facing the country. More urban residents (20%) than rural dwellers (17%) believed corruption to be the biggest problem. On the contrary, the rural respondents seemed to be more concerned about insecurity. 47% of rural residents viewed insecurity to be the biggest problem, compared to 42% of urban residents.

1. Bribery is the most common form of corruption and has doubled since 2010.

Bribery remains the most common form of corruption, and the amount of bribery has almost doubled over the past four years. While 18% of respondents in 2012 faced corruption within the last 12 months, 21% of respondents had faced corruption in the 2014 survey. 65% of those who experienced corruption in the 2014 survey paid a sum of money, and the remaining in non-monetary corrupt practices (offering gifts, relying on nepotism, etc.).

According to the 2014 survey, an estimated total of 105 billion Afghans (105,646,837,150 = 1,942,037,448 USD) was paid in bribes within the last 12 months. Compared to the 2010 survey, this number shows an increase of 55% (43,064,170,030 Afghans or 687,494,058 USD of increase in total). While in the 2012 survey, the average bribe reported was 9,528 Afghans or 191 USD, this amount increased to 13,080 Afghans or 240 USD in the 2014 survey. Furthermore, in the 2014 survey, considerably more adults (370,898) reported they had paid bribes compared to the 2012 survey.

There were geographic differences in experiences of bribery. The average bribe paid by urban residents was 16,363 Afghans or 301 USD while the average bribe paid by rural residents amounted to 11,075 Afghans or 204 USD. Furthermore, urban residents, on average, reported to have paid bribes less frequently (3.7 times) than rural dwellers (4.2 times) but in larger amounts.

2. There was further increase in the institutionalization of corruption.

In comparison with the 2012 survey findings, there has been a slight reduction in relying on commission-takers as intermediaries for bribe-taking while there has been a sizable increase in depending on relatives, acquaintances and civil servants as intermediaries in bribery. Place of residence does not have an impact on whom individuals rely as intermediaries in bribery. A slightly larger proportion of urban respondents (30.6%) compared to rural dwellers (28.2%) reported that commission-takers are most often intermediaries in bribery. Both groups equally reported (11%) relying on customers with experience of corruption as intermediaries in bribery.

Most of the respondents who paid a bribe had confidence in under-the-table transactions, demonstrating institutionalization of corruption. Only a small proportion of respondents in 2012 (10%) and 2014 (14%) stated that they were not confident that the bribe they were paying would
ensure receiving the service they needed, while 34% of respondents whose households had paid a bribe said that they were highly certain that the bribe would help them obtain service. In comparison with 2012, the proportion of those who expressed high certainty has increased (by 3%) while those who expressed some or little certainty has declined (also by 3%), which shows that in general there has been a slight increase in the certainty that bribe would ensure access to public services.

3. **The justice institutions and the police are viewed as the two most corrupt public institutions.**

Courts were viewed as the most corrupt public institution (34% of respondents), followed by the Ministry of Interior (26% of respondents) and the Ministry of Education (20% of respondents). Based on perceptions of Afghans, the courts and the Ministry of Interior remain the top two most corrupt institutions as in 2012 although the Ministry of Interior showed slight improvement with the reduction of 3%. The Ministry of Education showed an increased perception of corruption since it became the third most corrupt institution in 2014 while it was the seventh most corrupt institution in 2012. Respondents believed that there were improvements in terms of addressing corruption in the Directorate of National Security, the Ministry of Water and Energy and the Ministry of Transport.

4. **Corruption is viewed to undermine access to many key public services, including access to electricity, higher education, justice and police.**

Respondents believed that corruption in most public sectors undermined their access to services. For instance, a large proportion of respondents (28%) believed their households were deprived of access to public electricity, 18% of access to higher education, 17% of justice by courts, and 16% of security provided by the police.

Perception of deprivation from government services differed between rural and urban residents. In general, 6.6% of urban residents stated that they were deprived of government services due to corruption while 17.5% of rural dwellers believed so. The perception of deprivation of government services has a provincial dimension: in Ghor, Daikundi, Bamyan, Khost, Wardak, and Uruzgan a much larger proportion of residents reported that they had been deprived of government services due to corruption.

Although 9% of the interviewed households reported having directly faced corruption in courts, 26% of respondents believed that corruption in courts had negative impacts on their households’ access to justice. Furthermore, 17% of respondents reported that they were prevented from using justice by courts due to corruption. It shows that the negative impacts of corruption in courts touch not only those who seek justice through courts but many more households who may feel deprived of judiciary services due to corruption.

5. **Although corruption has become highly common, acts of corruption are still seen as unethical by the overwhelming majority of respondents.**

Although corruption has become prevalent and more widespread over the past few years, those who engage in corruption and pay bribes often do so out of desperation for obtaining services and in fact have strong negative feelings about paying bribes. 77% of respondents said that a corrupt person is viewed as a sinner, guilty or nasty in their communities. Only 6% believed that corrupt individuals are viewed as clever or powerful individuals. Furthermore, 65% of those who said that they would protect their interests through bribery if needed reported that they felt guilty, as sinner or sad when paying bribes.

It also seems that people’s feelings about corruption have an impact on whether or not they engage in corruption. 89% of the respondents, who reported to feel relieved, honoured or powerful when paying bribes, stated that they would pay bribes to protect their interests if needed. On the contrary,
only 71% of those who stated to feel guilty, as sinners, or sad when paying bribes, admitted to protect their interests through bribery.

6. Personal, ethnic and political connections matter.

When asked what the most common type of corruption is in the present political system, 57% of respondents stated that ethnic, personal, family and party relations are the most common basis of corruption. The rising importance of relationships and connections (ethnic and family relationships) for access to the state has resulted in the increased acceptance of use of connections for securing jobs. In comparison with the 2012 survey, a larger proportion of respondents in the 2014 survey admitted that they would rely on nepotism if it were necessary for securing jobs.

Using ethnic connections for corrupt practices is not a new phenomenon in the country and it cannot be attributed to the Karzai government. In the periods when Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban and the Mujahidin, there was also widespread criticism of the predominance of ethnic relationships as a means of connecting citizens with the state. Nonetheless, ethnic relationships remain crucial for access to the state although the new political system is formally based on democratic principles such as social justice citizens’ equality before law and in terms of access to the state. 5

7. Corruption imposes a heavy financial burden on households.

Approximately 29% of respondents stated the financial burden on their household from corruption remained the same over the twelve months prior to the survey, while a large number of respondents (57%) stated the financial burden on their households had increased. Respondents who paid high amounts of bribes reported more frequently than other respondents that the financial burden of corruption on their households had increased in the twelve months prior to the survey.

The higher the amount of bribe, the heavier the burden it imposed on the household. For instance, 77% of those who had paid between 10,000+ in bribes; 64% of those who had paid between 2,001-10,000, and 59% of those who had paid between 500-2000 Afs in bribes, stated that the financial burden of corruption has increased on their households. 6 Respondents who stated that the financial burden of corruption on their household had decreased in the past twelve months also stated that the general impact of corruption on their household was small.

More urban respondents (61%) than rural dwellers (56%) stated that the financial burden of corruption on their households had increased in the past twelve months. This corresponds with the higher perception amongst the urban population that corruption is a major problem in the country. Respondents with more education (high school and university education) also more strongly agreed that the financial burden of corruption on their household had increased (65%) than those with no literacy or primary schooling (54%). This may be because more educated respondents were more likely to interact with government agencies and to be aware of laws and their rights when they are violated.

8. Corruption undermines the state legitimacy and is viewed to fuel insurgency.

Looking at the prevalence of political instability in 1950s and 1960s, in his seminal work ‘Political Development and Political Decay’, Samuel Huntington argued that corruption was conducive to

5 Article 4 of the new Constitution declares all citizens to be Afghan while Article 6 asserts that all tribes and people are equal and instructs the state to serve all citizens equally.
6 Based on cross tabulation of Q18 and Q21.
“degeneration” and “political decay”, leading to riots, armed coups and insurgencies. In 2014, around 35% of respondents also believed that corruption facilitated the expansion of the Taliban. The respondents in more insecure provinces were in general more pessimistic and viewed corruption helping the Taliban expansion. People in Farah, Uruzgan, Daikundi, Logar, Nangarhar, Kunar and Badakhshan had the highest perceptions of corruption helping Taliban’s expansion. Urban and rural dwellers almost equally reported believing that corruption help Taliban expansion. More women than men viewed corruption as helping the Taliban expansion. Respondents with more education more commonly believed that corruption within the state facilitated the expansion of the Taliban.

9. Fighting corruption: Expectations are unmet.

The state’s performance in terms of fighting corruption was rated low. A relatively small percentage of respondents (27%) believe that the government has done enough to address corruption although there is a slight improvement compared to 2012 (22%). Nevertheless, the majority of respondents (67%) are not satisfied with the government’s efforts to address corruption. In general, men were more critical of the government’s job in addressing corruption than women. Comparatively, a higher proportion of men (67% of men versus 63% women) believe that the government has not done enough to address corruption.

10. The international community is not seen committed to fight corruption.

Afghans, in general, are not optimistic about the commitment of the international community to fight corruption in Afghanistan. Although there was a slight improvement compared to 2012, only 36% of respondents in 2014 believed that the international community is committed to fight corruption. An equal proportion of the respondents (36%) believed that the international community lacks the commitment for fighting corruption while the rest of the respondents were undecided. In addition, 32% of respondents stated that the international community does not support the honest local officials. This lack of trust is perhaps reinforced by the perception that the international community does not speak out against corruption. An overwhelming majority of the respondents (71%) stated that they have not heard the international community speak out against corruption in Afghanistan. Those who have heard the international community speak out against corruption also more commonly believed that the international community wants to fight Corruption. Likewise, this group of respondents were also more likely to state that the international community support honest officials in their local area.

11. Respondents’ Individual commitment to fight corruption still seems strong.

An overwhelming majority of respondents (95%) stated that they would not vote for someone who they believe is corrupt. Only less than 2% said that they would vote for such an individual. Slightly more urban dwellers (96%) than rural residents (94%) reported they would reject voting for a corrupt politician. Furthermore, a high proportion of respondents (63%) stated that they would not protect their interests through bribery if they had an opportunity. A similar proportion of the respondents expressed such attitude in 2012 as well. It is promising that in spite of increased corruption since 2012, the predominant majority of respondents prefers not to use bribery for protecting their interests. Once again more people in the urban areas (69%) than rural residents (61%) reported that they reject using bribery for protecting their interests.

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8 Cross tabulation of Q60 and Q92.
12. Corruption is viewed to undermine successful transition and provision of security.

Almost a majority of Afghans (50%) believe in a successful transition and the capacity of the national security forces to resume the responsibility of security the country. Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of respondents (35%) were pessimistic about a successful transition and another 15% did not know whether or not the transition would be successful. People living in urban areas (58%) were more optimistic about a successful transition than those living in rural areas (47%).

Those who doubted a successful transition were asked the reasons why they thought the Afghan security forces would not be able to ensure security after transition. Lack of resources (22%) and corruption (21%) were cited as the top two reasons undermining the capacity of Afghan security sources to ensure security.

13. Possible impact of people’s perception of corruption on their optimism about the future of Afghanistan

The majority of respondents were not certain that 2014 presidential elections would make their life better. Only 43% were optimistic while 12% believed that elections would make their life worse, 19% believed that it would make no difference, and the remaining 25% did not know what impacts 2014 presidential elections would have on their lives. The respondents, who considered government had done enough to address corruption more frequently (47%), than those who believed otherwise (41%), thought the result of the Presidential elections would make their lives better.

Recommendations for action based on survey findings

IWA has developed the following recommendations based on the survey findings and IWA’s advocacy work and research:

- Access to information is crucial to the fight against corruption. The Afghan government should establish the legal foundation for citizens to access information held by the state based on article 50 of the Afghan Constitution. The government and the parliament should develop laws regulating citizens’ access to information. Both civil society and the government should raise the public’s awareness in regards to their rights to accessing information.

- Given the importance of security and administration of justice to the political stability of Afghanistan, addressing corruption in the judicial system and the police needs to become a policy priority for the government.

- The participation of civil society and the public in court hearings should be encouraged. The government should facilitate involvement of civil society in court hearings while civil society needs to take a proactive approach in this regard.

- Lengthy bureaucratic procedures are conducive to corruption within the public administration. Simplifying and streamlining administrative procedures for obtaining public goods and services is necessary for reducing petty corruption. This would also reduce the citizens’ need to rely on commission-takers for obtaining services, which would in turn reduce corruption.

- Complexity of bureaucratic procedures and citizens’ lack of information about these procedures contributes to the spread of bribery and other types of corruption. In addition to simplifying administrative procedures, citizens’ understanding of bureaucratic procedures needs to be improved through media and public awareness campaigns.

- A hotline that is viewed as independent and trusted should be provided so that public service users may report bribes paid to civil servants. The existing hotline has been substantially utilized but has failed to gain public trust in achieved results. Government would need to
investigate the reported cases of corruption seriously and prosecute corrupt officials in order to encourage public participation in reporting and fighting corruption.

- Given the importance of land for investment and economic growth in general, addressing corruption in this sector is urgent. The procedures for registering and transferring land and the responsibilities of related government departments need to be clarified. Distribution and transfer of land by the government agencies and officials should be transparent.

- Corruption allows illegal accumulation of wealth by public officials. The declaration, publication and verification of assets of the most senior public officials is mandated by the Afghan Constitution upon assumption of, and departure from their positions. The High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption is the responsible authority, but has never fully executed these tasks. The assets and incomes of the public officials, particularly those most prone to bribery, should be assessed on regular basis, and such information should be made public and verified.

- The institutions that are perceived as most corrupt must be required to take concrete actions in terms of reducing corruption. The Afghan government, and more importantly the parliament, should oversee the performance of these institutions in terms of addressing corruption. The High Office of Oversight should take the lead in monitoring improvements in these institutions.

- The High Office of Oversight should prioritize addressing corruption in institutions that are supposed to provide key basic goods and services to the citizenry, where access is limited due to corruption, such as police and judiciary.

- Corruption, in general, undermines state legitimacy and political stability while increasing support for insurgent groups. Corruption in some institutions, however, is viewed as more responsible for these negative effects. Designing effective anti-corruption programs for these institutions should be a high priority for the government.

- Corruption has a provincial dimension and its perception varies across regions and provinces. The government should prioritize fighting corruption in the provinces where corruption is viewed to be the most prevalent and deleterious.

- Corruption allows accumulation of wealth through rent-seeking opportunities by investors, instead of investing in productive economic activities. By improving transparency in processing major contracts and making the related information open to the public, the government should change the calculations of investors and provide incentives for investment in industrial and agricultural sector instead of rent-seeking activities.

- The international community needs to demonstrate stronger commitment to addressing corruption by supporting honest public officials and rewarding integrity through provision of more support and funds to the institution that are viewed as least corrupt or successful in addressing corruption.

- Corruption is seen as the second highest reason for doubts about the success of transition and provision of security by Afghan military forces. The government should appreciate the interdependence of insecurity and corruption and see addressing corruption as a national security priority.

- In spite of its prevalence and spread, corruption is still viewed by overwhelming majority as an unethical act. The government and civil society groups should utilize an ethical discourse and raise public awareness about the detrimental effects of corruption. Since the clergy is seen as one of the most efficient institutions in fighting corruption, the government should invite the clergy to take a more active role in raising public awareness about corruption and encourage individual efforts to fight corruption.
• A strong political will and commitment by the statesmen and political leaders are essential for fighting corruption and successful implementation of these recommendations. For instance, simplification of bureaucratic procedures, establishing a hotline for reporting corruption by citizens or requiring asset declaration by officials cannot reduce corruption if there is no strong political will on the side of state leadership to utilize these measures for fighting corruption.
INTRODUCTION

This report is based on a nationwide survey of corruption as experienced and perceived by Afghans. In spite of the detrimental effects of corruption on security and economy of the country, corruption is understudied and poorly understood in Afghanistan. Since 2007, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) has conducted a biannual survey of perceptions and experiences of corruption in Afghanistan. This 2014 survey is based on the three previous waves which were published in 2007, 2010 and 2012.

The focus of the National Corruption Survey is investigating how corruption impacts provision of key public goods and services and citizens’ access to them and how, in turn, these affect state legitimacy, political stability and insurgency. The objective is to clearly examine the state-society relationship.

The focus of this survey is to understand administrative corruption such as bribery, obstruction, and nepotism. Nepotism refers to the abuse of authority or public office in order to protect the interests of one’s family members or relatives. Bribery is defined as giving or taking a sum of money or other inducement offered for enjoying preferential treatment in terms of access to public goods or resources. Administrative corruption has the most direct impact on citizens through undermining equal access to the state and by imposing direct financial burdens on households. Grand corruption, however, has less direct impacts on households and requires more in-depth qualitative study. The concentration of this survey, therefore, is on administrative corruption, rather than grand corruption.

Studying corruption involving the private sector or international actors has not been the objective of this survey since corruption in the public sector has the most direct impacts on citizens. Nevertheless, the survey provides a basic understanding of corruption in the private sector and the role of international community. It also offers an insight into grand corruption, particularly as it relates to the sale and management of land.

The key objective of this survey is to present a better understanding of:

- Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of administrative corruption and how corruption impacts citizens’ and households’ welfare and access to key services,
- Which institutions are viewed as more corrupt and which ones have showed improvement in terms of addressing corruption,
- The effects of perceptions and experiences of corruption on citizens’ views of state legitimacy, public institutions and insurgent groups,
- The dynamics of Afghans’ perceptions and experiences over time.

The findings of this survey are presented in three parts. The first part depicts a general picture of corruption in the country. The second part explores individuals’ and households’ perceptions and experiences of corruption, and the third part focuses on corruption in two sectors – police and the judiciary.
PART ONE: GENERAL TRENDS

This section investigates the general trends of Afghans’ perception and experience of corruption. In order to provide a general overview of corruption in the public sector, this section reports the prevalence, size and frequencies of corruption. It also provides an overview of Afghans’ expectations from the government and international community with regard to fighting corruption.

There has been a major change in the perception of corruption in Afghanistan. While corruption was seen the third biggest problem from 2007 to 2012, Afghans ranked corruption as the second biggest problem in 2014 survey. In spite of slight variations, corruption had been ranked as the third biggest problem after security and unemployment in 2007, 2010 and 2012. In 2014, however, corruption and unemployment were viewed as the second biggest problem facing the country, after insecurity. Afghans also saw corruption as the worst problem that they expected the government to address after insecurity.

In addition, Afghans’ perceptions of corruption have evolved since 2007 when IWA produced its first nationwide survey of corruption. More people experienced corruption in 2012 than in 2007, and even more people in 2014 survey compared to 2012 survey. Heightened experiences of corruption have coincided with lower levels of satisfaction with government performance and increased criticism of the government’s attempts to address the issue. Compared to 2007, not only has the rate of corruption experienced by Afghans increased, but also corruption has become rampant and has infiltrated a wider range of activities and services.

Similar to the trends in 2012, corruption in the public sector was the main source of experiences of corruption for Afghan citizens in 2014. Like 2012, Afghans reported the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education to be the most corrupt public institutions. The Ministry of Education and the National Directorate of Security (NDS) were seen the most successful institutions in addressing corruption.

Bribery remained the most common form of corruption although there were trends showing more reliance on nepotism, ethnic and family relations for obtaining jobs or public services. In spite of the further institutionalization and spread of corruption, social values and public morality stood strongly against bribery. Citizens often commit corruption out of necessity, rather than voluntarily, to obtain public goods and services.

I.1 Corruption: The second biggest problem after insecurity

In 2014, corruption was viewed as even bigger a problem than it was perceived to be in 2007, 2010 and 2012. Respondents saw corruption and unemployment as the two biggest problems, as an equally important problem facing the country after insecurity (Figure 1). While 45 percent of the respondents stated insecurity to be the biggest problem in Afghanistan, 18 percent held that corruption is the biggest problem and another 18 percent viewed unemployment to be the biggest problem.
Afghan’s perception of corruption as the biggest problem after security is reaffirmed in another large-scale national survey conducted by the Asia Foundation in 2013. When asked in the Asia Foundation survey why Afghanistan was going to the wrong direction, the respondents reported corruption to be the second reason, after insecurity and followed by unemployment. Similarly, when asked to identify the biggest national problem, the respondents identified corruption to be the second biggest national problem after insecurity with unemployment coming the third.9 Afghans’ concerns about corruption and their perception of it as the second biggest problem is rooted in the prevalence and pervasiveness of corruption in this country. Unfortunately, there was no significant improvement in fighting and reducing corruption in Afghanistan, as will be discussed in Part II. Afghanistan remained one of the three most corrupt countries in the world for two consecutive years (2012 and 2014) as ranked by Transparency International.10

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10 Transparency International reported Afghanistan, North Korea and Somalia perceived as equally corrupt and as the most corrupt countries in the world in 2012 and 2013. For more details, refer to www.transparency.org/cpi.
Afghans’ perception of the biggest problem varies according to factors such as age, sex, education, and whether a respondent lives in a rural or urban area. In general, women had a less pessimistic view of insecurity and corruption and a more negative perception of unemployment than men. As depicted in Figure 2, a higher percentage of men than women saw insecurity and corruption to be the biggest problem in Afghanistan while a higher percentage of women than men held that unemployment was the biggest problem. Due to cultural sensitivities in Afghanistan, women usually stay home and rarely work outside home. While 77% of male respondents worked outside home, only 11% of female respondents worked outside home. Perhaps men’s higher exposure than women to insecurity and corruption in their daily activities outside the home makes their perception of insecurity and corruption more negative than women. At the same time, more limited employment opportunities for women may explain women’s more negative view of unemployment.

As shown in Figure 3, slightly more urban residents than rural residents believed corruption to be the biggest problem: 20 percent of urban residents compared to 17 percent of rural residents. This might reflect greater exposure of urban residents than rural residents to corruption since slightly more urban (43%) than rural dwellers (37%) reported having sought government services in the past twelve months. In contrast, the rural respondents seemed to be more concerned about insecurity. Forty seven percent of rural residents viewed insecurity to be the biggest problem, compared to 42 percent of urban residents.
Respondents between the ages of 36 and 45 more commonly believed that corruption is a common occurrence in the country than younger or older respondents (Figure 4). A roughly equal percentages of the between the ages 26 and 35 and those older than 45 believed that corruption is the biggest problem in Afghanistan. Likewise, more people with a middle income than those with lower or higher incomes viewed corruption as a common occurrence, a trend similar to the 2012 survey. More people with higher education than less educated people believed in corruption as a common occurrence. Perhaps people with higher education are more aware of their rights and, consequently, resentful of paying bribes. In addition, considerably more educated respondents (52%) than illiterate or semi-illiterate respondents (33.5%) reported having sought government services in the past 12 months. The greater interaction of educated respondents with civil servants could also explain their worse perception of corruption.

Depending on province of residence, the order of the top three problems, namely— insecurity, corruption and unemployment — differs. For instance, while insecurity remains the number one problem for a majority of the provinces, corruption surpasses lack of employment as the second largest problem in Uruzgan, Zabul, Paktiya, Khost, Wardak, Kabul, Parwan, Bamyang, Ghor, Badghis, Faryab and Jawzjan. This pattern is similar to what was observed in 2012 survey although a much higher percentage of the respondents viewed corruption as the biggest problem in 2014. As shown in Map 1, people in Bamyang, Uruzgan and Zabul were more concerned about corruption than all other provinces. The highest rate of perception of corruption as being the biggest problem was reported in these three provinces while the lowest rate was reported by the residents of Farah, Daikundi, Paktika, Logar, Nangarhar, Kunar, Kapisa, Nooristan and Takhar.

In provinces where security challenges are more prominent, people were less concerned about corruption. A possible explanation for this is that lack of security hampers employment opportunities. In more secure provinces, it is not employment but corruption that is viewed as a bigger problem, as can be observed from the following maps and the above list.
Map 1: Corruption the biggest problem in Afghanistan

Map 2: Insecurity as the biggest problem in Afghanistan
Perceptions of corruption as an issue in the country are linked with perceptions of corruption associated with particular actors. In other words, the rampant corruption rates are attributed to the corruption within the state sector rather than private sector or NGO community. Similar results were observed in 2007, 2010 and 2012 surveys although there has been some variation over the past four surveys. In the 2007 survey, 77% (versus 72% in 2010) considered the public sector to be the most corrupt actor. There was improvement in 2012 as 55% of the respondents believed in state corruption. This trend, however, seems to have reversed in the 2014 survey as 63% viewed corruption as related to government agencies and the public sector. Although it shows improvement compared to 2007 and 2010, state corruption still remains dominant.

In 2007, 14% of all respondents considered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations as corrupt. This figure fell to less than 5% in 2010, rose to 6% in 2012, but once again fell to less than 4% in 2014. Notwithstanding the slight variation, this survey shows that Afghans believe the private sector and NGOs to be less corrupt than the state. This decline in perception of corruption in the NGO sector since 2007 might reflect the fact that the international community channelled more aid through the Afghan government and the NGO sector received a smaller portion of international assistances over the past few years. The flow of more aid through the government at the same time provided more opportunities for corruption in the public sector. The fact that the focus of this research is on petty corruption compared to other forms of corruption such as embezzlement—which can be more sector-dependant—might bias these results more towards state institutions.
1.2 Addressing Corruption: Perception of anti-corruption performance

The perception of problems the government needs to address introduces citizens’ priorities for Afghan government and people’s expectations of their state. Corresponding to the perception of corruption and the order of issues facing the country, approximately 22% of respondents believe that corruption is the biggest problem the government must address (Figure 5). This shows a deterioration of perception of corruption compared to 2012. In 2012, insecurity and unemployment exceeded corruption as the top issues to be addressed by the government. Following security, unemployment was seen as the biggest problem that the government was expected to address. 21% of the respondents viewed as the biggest problem that the government needed to address while 16.7% saw corruption as the biggest problem. In 2014, however, corruption was seen the biggest problem after insecurity that the government needed to address, 22% viewed corruption as the biggest problem that the government needed to address, and 21% saw unemployment as the problem that required government attention.

Expectations for the government to address corruption are high since a relatively small percentage of respondents (27%) believe that the government has done enough to address corruption although there is a slight improvement compared to 2012 (22%). Nevertheless, the majority of respondents (67%) are not satisfied with the government’s efforts to address corruption (Figure 6).

In addition, men were in general less optimistic than women about government performance in terms of fighting corruption. While 63% of women believe that the government has not done enough to address corruption, a higher proportion of men (67%) had a negative perception.

While respondents were more satisfied with government’s performance in addressing security, they were less satisfied with government’s performance in terms of fighting corruption or addressing unemployment (Figure 6).
In comparison with 2012 survey, respondents were more satisfied with government’s performance in addressing insecurity (27% in 2012 compared to 31% in 2014) and corruption (24% in 2012 vs. 27% in 2014). Public perception of government performance in addressing unemployment has remained the same. Nevertheless, the overall public satisfaction of government performance in dealing with these issues has been limited since less than one third of respondents were satisfied with government’s performance.

**International community**

Opinions about the intentions and actions of the international community in terms of addressing corruption have improved slightly. A considerable percentage of respondents (36%) believe that the international community is committed to fight corruption, which shows an increase of 7% compared to last year (29%). As shown in Figure 7, an equal percentage of the respondents (36%) believe that the international community lacks the commitment for fighting corruption, which is roughly the same as in 2012 (37%). The rest of the respondents were undecided. Furthermore, 32% of respondents stated that the international community does not support the honest local officials. This lack of trust is perhaps reinforced by the perception that the international community does not speak out enough against corruption. A majority of respondents (71%) stated that they have not heard the international community speak out against corruption in Afghanistan. More respondents who have heard the international community speak out against corruption also believed that the international community wants to fight corruption.
Respondents’ perceptions of the position of the international community regarding corruption differed by factors such as sex and residence. Fewer women and rural dwellers than men and urban dwellers said that they have heard the international community speak out against corruption. Considerably fewer women were than men (21% of women vs. 37% of men) had heard members of the international community speak out against corruption (Figure 8).

In addition, it seems that anti-corruption messages do not reach the population evenly. Of urban residents, roughly 37% heard the international community speak against corruption, while this was only 29% for the rural dwellers (Figure 8). Those respondents who heard the international community denounce corruption said they heard it from United Nations officials (33%), the US government (11%), and officials of international organizations (17%) as the top three sources. This survey showed a decline in the perception of UN and the US government speaking out against
corruption compared to 2012 as more Afghans said they heard the UN officials (36%) and US officials (19%) denounce corruption in that year (Figure 9).

Q71. Have you heard any member of the international community speaking against corruption in Afghanistan over the last twelve months?
Yes, n=(36 OS)

- United Nations officials: 33
- Officials of other international organizations: 17
- Foreign officials, but the respondent is not able...: 14
- Other foreign government officials: 11
- United States government officials: 11
- European government officials: 4
- NGOs: 3
- Foreign military: 2
- Other, specify: 2

**Figure 9: International community institutions speaking against corruption**

**Taliban**
Respondents were also asked if they heard the Taliban denounce corruption. Approximately 24% of respondents stated that they had heard the Taliban speak out against corruption while around 73% stated that they had not heard the Taliban denouncing corruption. Comparing with last year, the survey shows that there is a decline in the Taliban’s denunciation of corruption, which was 8% higher (32%) for 2012.

In general, the findings in this section indicate the prevalence of corruption in the public sector and a high demand for the government to address corruption. What determines people’s attitudes towards corruption and how and where people experience corruption will be discussed in the section that follows.
This section investigates Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption in more detail. It looks at which institutions they have paid the largest and most frequent bribes and how corruption impacts households’ economy and access to public goods and services. Respondents viewed the public sector as the main source of corruption in the country with the civilian part of the public sector ranked worst in terms of prevalence of corruption with further deterioration compared to 2012 (Figures 10 and 11). Courts, the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Education were viewed as the most corrupt public institutions (Figure 12). In general, corruption of the management team and lack of civil servants’ interest in common good are viewed as the main reasons for the prevalence of corruption in the public sector (Figure 14). Nevertheless, there have been improvements as well. Respondents believed that there were improvements in addressing corruption in the National Directorate of Security, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defense (Figure 16). It must be highlighted that in spite of improvement in the Ministry of Interior, this ministry is still viewed as the third most corrupt institution.

II.1 Perceptions of corruption according to the institutions and the citizens

![Which sector has the most corruption?](image)

*Figure 10: Perception of the most corrupt sector*
As shown in the figures above, despite some improvements, the public sector is still perceived as the sector with the most corruption (44%) compared to the private sector (5%), aid community (4%), political parties (3%), and foreign militaries (3%). The presence of the government in an area increases the interaction with civil servants and perceptions of corruption. 87% of the respondents who saw corruption as the biggest country in the country also stated that the government was present in their area and only 12% stated that the government was not present in their area.
As Figures 12 and 13 shows, the respondents viewed courts (34%), the Ministry of Interior (26%) and the Ministry of Education (20%) as the three most corrupt public institutions. In comparison to 2012, both the courts and the Ministry of Interior remain the top two most corrupt institutions although the Ministry of Interior showed slight improvement with the reduction of 3%. The Ministry of Education, however, showed a setback and increased perception of corruption since it became the third most corrupt institution in 2014 while it was the 7th most corrupt institution in 2012.

It must be highlighted that the perception of corruption in public institutions as depicted in the above graph simply shows perception, rather than actual experience, of corruption. For instance, only 15% of those who viewed police as the most corrupt institution actually paid bribes to police in the past 12 months. Similarly, only 16% of those who viewed courts to be the most corrupt actually reported having paid bribes to courts. This reflects that citizens’ perceptions of corruption in public institutions are formed not only based on personal experiences of corruption; in fact, friends or relatives’ experiences of corruption, and even the general public perceptions about corruption in a specific public institution can have an impact on an individual’s perception of corruption in that institution. For a more detailed discussion of these points and a comparison of experiences of
corruption versus perceptions of corruption with the police and courts, please refer to Part Three of this report.\(^{11}\)

Improvements in perceptions can be observed in the Directorate of National Security, the Ministry of Water and Energy and the Ministry of Transport. In comparison, slightly more respondents in this wave of survey than in 2012 identified the Parliament and the Ministry of Health as the most corrupt institutions. Afghans’ perception of Municipality, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development and the Ministry of Defence remained roughly the same.

Respondents’ perceptions of corruption in the public sector institutions differed by age, area of residence, sex, and education. First, more younger people (respondents between 18 and 25 years) than other respondents believed that the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance, banks, courts, the Parliament and Office of President are the more corrupt public sectors. The respondents in age group 26-35 believed that the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and Ministry of Transport are the most corrupt public institutions. On the contrary, the respondents who were 36 to 45 years old reported the Ministry of Agriculture Irrigation and Livestock, Directorate of National Security, Ministry of Defense, state-run Enterprises, Ministry of Transport, and Ministry of Water and Energy as the most corrupt institutions. Finally, the respondents older than 45 were more critical of the Ministry of Justice, High Office of Oversight, President’s Office, Ministry of Commerce, and State-run Enterprises as the most corrupt.

The perception of corruption in specific public institutions also differed by gender and place of residence. Male respondents held the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Interior, courts, and Ministry of Finance were the most corrupt institutions while female respondents viewed Election Commissions, Ministry of Labor Social Affairs Martyrs and Disabled, and Office of President as the most corrupt. Furthermore, urban residents viewed the courts, Ministry of Finance, and Ministry of Interior as the most corrupt institutions while rural dwellers had a more negative perception of corruption in courts, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Interior, and Ministry of Justice.

There was little difference in perception of corruption within public institutions by education level. Respondents with different education backgrounds (no literacy, elementary education, high school and university education) all identified the Ministry of Interior and courts to be two of the three most corrupt institutions. However, respondents’ view of the third corrupt institution was different among respondents with different education levels. Respondents with no literacy or with elementary schooling identified the Ministry of Education as the third corrupt institution while those with high school education reported the Ministry of Justice and interviewees with university education described the Ministry of Finance as the corrupt institution after courts and Ministry of Interior.

\(^{11}\) Although the surveyors were instructed not to read the responses for this open-ended question (Which public institution do you consider the most corrupt?), the possibility of ‘primacy effect”—wherein respondents have a tendency to choose the first few answers from a long list of response, cannot be ruled out completely. In other words, since Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Interior appear at the top of the list of answers, their likelihood of being selected by the respondents becomes higher. Primacy effect as a source of bias is more likely in a mailed survey questionnaire rather than an interviewer administered questionnaire, which is the case for this study.
Explaining the corruption within the state institutions, respondents have expressed different views. The largest group of the respondents (30%) felt that the management teams' corruption is responsible for the corruption within institutions. Government officials' lack of interest in public interests was viewed as the second top reason explaining corruption within state institution (Figure 14). Absence of effective monitoring of the staff and low salaries of the government officials were viewed as equally important in the occurrence of corruption in the government.

![Figure 14: Explaining corruption within public institutions](image)

**Figure 14: Explaining corruption within public institutions**

Do you believe there have been some improvements in reducing corruption in any public institution during the last twelve months?

![Figure 15: Improvement in public institutions](image)

**Figure 15: Improvement in public institutions**
The perception of prevalent corruption in the public institutions was coupled with the public view of lack of progress in reducing corruption in public sector. Although there was a slight improvement, only 14% of respondents in 2014 survey (compared to 10% in 2012 survey) believed that there was progress in reducing corruption in the public sector. The predominant majority of respondents (70%) believed that there was no progress in reducing corruption in the public sector (Figure 15).

Figure 16 shows a breakdown by sector of improvements made in the last year according to the 14% respondents who believe some improvement has occurred:

Respondents held that the most progress in terms of reducing corruption in 2014 survey was made in the National Directorate of Security, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defence. Other sectors viewed with considerable improvements were the Ministry of Interior, Elections Commissions, and the banks. Similar to 2012 survey, the President’s Office and the Parliament were among the institutions believed to have had the least progress in terms of reducing corruption.
Respondents were also asked what reasons explained the progress in the institutions that experienced success in reducing corruption. While corruption of the management team was seen to be the most important reason for corruption within public institutions, the integrity of management team was also viewed by the largest share of the respondents (30%) as the reason explaining improvement in public institutions. After the integrity of the management team, public officials’ caring about citizens’ interests and sufficient salaries for officials were viewed equally important for progress in reducing corruption within public institutions.

The private sector was not viewed as being without corruption. As discussed earlier, around 5% of respondents viewed the private sector as the most corrupt. In order to further explore public perception of the private sector, the survey investigated respondents’ views of corruption in the banking sector, which is a major part of the private sector in terms of offering services to a large number and wide range of citizens. Respondents were asked whether they trusted private banks. Approximately 35% of the respondents stated that they did not trust private banks with their money. This year’s findings show that there has been significant improvement in Afghans’ trust in private banks as the percentage of those who do not trust private banks has fallen by 15%. Those who do not trust private banks were asked the reasons for their lack of trust in banks, which is captured in the following graph.

![Figure 17: Reasons for lack of trust in private banks](chart.png)

As can be observed from Figure 17, 37% of respondents who stated they did not trust the private banks with their money stated the reason for this lack of trust was the risk of loss of money. Corruption within the private banks is another important reason for lack of trust in the private banks. The Kabul Bank scandal in 2010 whereas fraudulent lending of over 900 million dollars nearly led to the collapse of the bank and even threatened the Afghan economy eroded the trust in the Afghan banking system does not seem to have improved since then. The respondents expressed more contentment with the introduction of Islamic banking and financial management and leadership over the past 12 months.

II.2 Personal experiences of Corruption

This section investigates respondents’ personal experience of corruption. It explores the type of services that respondents had to pay bribes in order to obtain, the frequency and size of bribes and the role of nepotism and family or ethnic relations for obtaining these services. Personal experience of corruption has varied and fluctuated over the past 4 years. In 2010 survey, 23% of the respondents reported to have personally experienced corruption. The percentage of those who personally experienced corruption fell to 18% in 2012 but once again rose to 21% in 2014 survey. With this increase in personal experience of corruption in 2014 survey, corruption also was perceived to be the second biggest problem in 2014 survey while it was viewed as the third biggest in 2012 survey. It is not surprising, therefore, that people still believed corruption remained a major issue and that improvements that had been made were not significant.

Comparison of 2014 survey with the previous year shows that there has been a substantial change in terms of personal experience of corruption depending on gender place of residence. As Figure 19 shows, urban and rural residents had similar personal experience of corruption in 2012 (18% of
urban residents and 17% of rural dwellers). This small gap (1%) has increased notably in 2014, when 27% of urban dwellers personally experienced corruption and just 18% of rural inhabitants. Similar increasing gap can be observed in the personal experience of corruption between men and women. Considerably more men than women experienced corruption as found in 2014 survey. This increasing gap reflected the more limited access of rural dwellers and women to government services at the time of 2014 survey due to increase insecurity in the rural area, which is discussed in more details in Part Three. While 51% of men sought government services in the past 12 months, only 22% of women sought government services in the same period. Likewise, 43% of all urban residents (compared to 35% of rural dwellers) sought government services in the same period. With more access to government services and, therefore, more interaction with public institutions, more urban residents and men personally experienced corruption.

Figure 20: Sought government services in the last 12 months

The slight increase in the personal experience of corruption has occurred despite the fact that the percentage of the people who sought government services over the last twelve months has decreased. As Figure 20 shows, a small percentage of the population (around 5%) had frequently sought government services (seven times or more). The percentage of those who sought government services three times or less has decreased drastically compared to 2012 survey. It would be sensible to assume that as people seek government services less frequently, the personal experience of corruption by the population should decrease as well. The absence of decline in the personal experience of corruption over the last 12 months, however, could point to further institutionalization of corruption.
People who have experienced corruption more often paid bribes in form of cash payment (57%) than any other form of corruption (Figure 21). The other most commonly experienced form of corruption was offering a gift or sherene\textsuperscript{13} (16%). In comparison with 2012, there was no noticeable change in the prevalence of different forms of corruption in 2014. The three common forms of corruption (paying sums of money, offering gifts and paying commission-takers) and their prevalence were roughly the same in both years.

\textsuperscript{13} Sherene\textsuperscript{e} literally translated means sweets, but in this case it can be any goods as gifts.
The above chart gives a detailed breakdown on forms of corruption and gender. As Figure 22 shows, more men were than women paid bribes in cash more women had offered gifts, in kind or paid professional commission-takers when they experienced corruption. The percentage of those who relied on nepotism was roughly the same regardless of gender. Perhaps, with controlling the household finance, men had open hand in making cash payments for receiving public goods and services while women, with less mobility compared to men, may be more likely to rely on commission-takers.

The past few years show a further monetization of corruption in Afghanistan. 57% of all corruption transactions in 2014 had involved exchange of money, showing steady increase over time (43% in 2010 and 55% in 2012). This indicates the monetization of corruption, as non-monetary forms of corruption have traditionally been more prevalent in the country. However, since 2001 with the flow of money into Afghanistan in the absence of transparency and accountability, bribery over time has become the predominant form of corruption. Although, in the past, nepotism and use of tribal ties for gaining access to the undermined social justice and citizens’ equal access to public resources, those forms of corruption were built on community and tribal obligations. With the monetization of corruption, however, the limited obligations community and tribe members felt towards one other was eroded: access to the state resources and services is now determined by citizens’ ability to pay money as bribes.

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Figure 14 is based on Q15 which includes only the respondents who personally experienced corruption in the twelve months prior to the survey.
Figure 23: Last time a bribe was paid

As Figure 23 shows, 40% of the respondents who experienced bribery had paid at least once bribe within three months prior to the survey. In the 12 month period prior to the survey, 45% of those who experienced corruption were forced by corrupt officials to pay bribes once, 28% paid bribes twice, and 11% paid bribes three times. As Figure 24 shows, the proportion of those who paid bribes has decreased slightly (from 18% in 2012 to 17% in 2014), but the proportion of those who paid bribes three times or more has increased.

Q16. If yes, how many times have you been forced by corrupt officials to commit corruption?

(n=17% OS)
More households experienced corruption in 2014 than in 2012. As Figure 25 shows, 32% of households faced some sort of corruption for obtaining state services over the past 12 months while 28% had reported such experience in 2012. More urban residents than rural residents had paid a bribe or other materials to obtain government services. This trend was observed in 2010 and 2012 as well.

However, it should be noted that this survey—like any other survey—is not immune to ‘confirmation bias’. Confirmation bias is referred to the tendency of people to favour information that confirms their beliefs or when they recollect information selectively or interpret information. Hence, it is possible that respondents under-reported or over-reported their experiences of corruption. Furthermore, it is possible that the interviewee may not recall or even know about all bribery experiences of all household members.
One of the goals of this survey is to map for which public services Afghans have to pay bribes and how much. Figure 26 shows for which services respondents had to pay bribes, with the frequencies and sizes of these bribes. In comparison with 2012 survey findings, most institutions collected bribes more frequently and in larger amounts. Although there were some changes in the bribes collected by different institutions, the three categories of services that were reported to receive most bribes in 2012 and 2014 surveys were the same: justice by courts, issuance of ID cards and passports and security by police. Among all institutions, the most notable changes were observed in bribes collected by the police for providing security. In comparison with 2012, there was 2% increase in those who paid bribes of less than 2,000 Afs to the police and 2% increase in those who paid bribes between 2,001 and 10,000 Afs. For obtaining justice by courts, there was 1% increase in those who paid bribes of less than 500 Afs and 1% increase in those who paid bribes of more than 10,000 Afs. For obtaining ID cards and passports, those who paid bribes of less than 5000 Afs and those who paid bribes between 2,001 and 10,000 Afs each increased by 1%.

### Figure 26: Percentage of households paying a bribe, by the amounts exchanged

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Not paid</th>
<th>Less than 500 Afs</th>
<th>Between 501 Afs and 2,000 Afs</th>
<th>Between 2,001 Afs and 10,000 Afs</th>
<th>More than 10,000 Afs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security by Police</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice by Courts</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID cards &amp; passport</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals or health services</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport services including driving license</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary and secondary education</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of taxes to Ministry of Finance or...</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hajj services</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity provided by the government</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of duties to Customs</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land and property registry, sale and purchase</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martyrs and disabled services</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction permit</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbab of village or wakil-e-guzar of town</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing or resettlement service</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment and social affairs</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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84% 86% 88% 90% 92% 94% 96% 98% 100%
The figure above shows the proportion of households in each income level who paid bribes over the last 12 months. As Figure 27 shows, more households with an income between 10,000 and 30,000 Afs than households with lower income had paid bribes over the last 12 months. Households with higher income can afford more bribes in order to get obtain public goods or services. What is surprising is that this group of households more frequently reported paying bribes than the households with an income higher than 30,000 Afs. Perhaps wealthier households are more likely to rely on social networks such as family and acquaintances with high-level officials in order to get services than paying bribes.

II.3 Reliability of bribery transactions

Most of the respondents who paid a bribe had confidence in under the table transactions, and the level of confidence seems to have increased. Only a small proportion of respondents in 2012 (10%) and 2014 surveys (14%) stated they were not confident that the bribe they were paying would ensure receiving the service they needed, while 34% of respondents whose households had paid a bribe said that they were highly certain the bribe would help them obtain the service (Figure 28). In comparison with 2012 survey, the proportion of those who expressed high certainty has increased (by 3%) while those who expressed some or little certainty has declined (also by 3%), which shows that in general there has been further increase in the certainty that bribe would ensure access to public services.
The certainty of whether a bribe could guarantee service varied based on the size of bribe. The lowest level of certainty was for ensuring service was reported for bribes of less than 100. Perhaps, such bribes are too small to provide sufficient incentives for the provision of service by officials. The middle range bribes between 100 and 500 Afs, followed by those between 500 and 2000 Afs, were felt to be more effective in obtaining service while bribes larger than the middle range, with which respondents felt slightly less certainty in receiving the desired service. As shown in Figure 24, the middle range bribes are common to be paid for services that are common and prevalent such as obtaining a national ID or passport or securing services at hospitals. Larger bribes (2000+ Afs) are demanded for complex cases or where involvement of, and coordination among, many officials is needed such as obtaining justice by court, haj service, and tax evasion. In such cases, large bribes may not guarantee the service requested since even larger bribes may be demanded in the middle of the process or the official may fail to get the agreement of other officials for delivering the service. That is why large bribes may not necessarily secure the desired service.

It must be highlighted that corruption whether certain or uncertain to ensure access to public services is highly detrimental to economic growth. If there is a high degree of certainty that corruption allows access to public services, this is a sign of institutionalization of corruption. In such a case, public officials create “red tape”, avoiding or delaying provision of service to clients in order to make them pay bribes and then guarantee clients’ access to service once they pay bribes. Imposing red tape and delaying provision of service is, in fact, waste of time and energy of clients as well as public officials. The accumulation of wasted time of all clients and public officials means the waste of huge amount of time and resources from the society, which would lead to higher economic growth if this amount of time is not wasted and used, instead, for productive activities by clients and public officials. In addition, with the institutionalization of corruption, public officials try to maximize their earnings through creating red tape and corrupt practices instead of working hard and better provision of services to the society.15

When there is uncertainty and corruption does not ensure receiving service, investing in such an economy entails high levels of risk and unpredictability, which deters investment and economic activities. Investors would not be able to predict costs associated with production and profits earned in such an economy. In addition, corruption would undermine rule of law and protection of property rights, which would also deter investment.16 Therefore, corruption highly undermines economic growth and economic development although in different ways, depending on whether it guarantees access to public services or there is uncertainty about it.

II.4 Factors and the social relationships that sustain corruption

Respondents’ perception of the factors causing corruption has roughly remained the same over the past few years although there has been a slight change in the importance of each factor. Like in 2012, respondents reported weak law enforcement, low salaries of civil servants, a large influx of donor money, and absence of oversight over public administration as the four main factors causing corruption. These four factors were also identified in 2007 and 2010 as the main causes of corruption. The perception of importance of these factors in causing corruption, however, has increased significantly since 2012. As Figure 29 shows, the proportion of respondents who

considered these factors to be most important in causing corruption has risen significantly. The largest change was observed in the perception of importance of weak law enforcement (Figure 29).

**On a scale of one to three where one is the least important factor so three is the most important in causing corruption, how do you assess the following factors? (Q56)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
<th>40%</th>
<th>50%</th>
<th>60%</th>
<th>70%</th>
<th>80%</th>
<th>90%</th>
<th>100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weak law enforcement and government control</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low salary of civil servants</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large influx of donor money</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration is not monitored by civil society and the Parliament</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of sanctions and discipline of civil servants</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No objection of the state beneficiaries of state services to corruption</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of political will at the highest level of the state</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servants feel protected and are indeed supported by superiors or political leaders</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 29: Important causes of corruption*

Although bribery remains the most common form of corruption, reflecting the monetization of corruption discussed earlier, ethnicity and personal and family relationships are slowly becoming more important (Figure 30). The increasing importance of ethnic relations in corruption reflects the rise of ethnic-based patron-client networks that have become crucial for mobilizing political support and access to the state in post-Taliban politics. Ethnic-based political factions and networks have become major vehicles for obtaining jobs, political offices, and access to the state in the current political system. The risk inherent in this system is that those citizens who lack connections to ethnic-based networks would be excluded from the state and access to public resources and may, therefore, seek the support and service of non-state agents like the Taliban and insurgent groups. This would, in turn, undermine state legitimacy and security while strengthening the insurgency.

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18 Ibid.
The rising importance of relationships and connections (ethnic and other relationships) for access to the state has resulted in the increased acceptance of respondents to use connections for securing jobs. In comparison, a larger proportion of respondents in 2014 admitted that they would rely on nepotism (ethnic and other forms of relationship) if it were necessary for securing jobs (Figure 30).

Using ethnic connections for corrupt practices is not a new phenomenon in the country and hence it cannot be attributed to the Karzai government. In the periods when Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban and the Mujahidin, there was also widespread criticism of the predominance of ethnic relationships as a means of connecting citizens with the state. Ethnic relationships continued to remain crucial for access to the state although the new political system is based on democratic principles such as social justice citizens’ equality before law and in terms of access to the state. A

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19 Nepotism was defined in the survey as abuse of authority for according advantages to one’s own family members or ethnic members in recruiting or promoting.

20 Article 4 of the new Constitution declares all citizens to be Afghan while Article 6 asserts that all tribes and people are equal and instructs the state to serve all citizens equally.
prominent difference between the Karzai government and previous governments is the extent of the monetization of corruption.

The study shows that the perception of importance of different forms of relationship for corruption under Karzai’s government varies among different ethnicities.

More Pushtuns, Tajiks and Nuristanis than other ethnic groups believed that family relations are the most common type of relationship relied upon in corrupt transactions. More Uzbeks and Baluch believed that a reliance on ethnic connections is a more prominent form of exploited relationships. A notably higher number of Hazaras, Aimaq, Pashai than other ethnic groups believe that party connections are the most common relationship used in corruption.

As shown in Map 4, respondents’ perceptions of corruption also have a provincial dimension. The perception that ethnic relations were the most common relationships used in corrupt practices was the highest in Faryab (69%), Takhar (53%) Laghman (50%), Ghazni (48%), Badakhshan (47%), and Kunduz (43%).

The survey shows that respondents’ perception of ethnicity as the primary basis of corruption did not seem to affect whether they are likely to engage in nepotism. In the provinces where respondents thought that ethnicity was the primary basis of corruption, the respondents did not necessarily also report relying on nepotism.21 The proportions of the respondents who admitted that they would rely

21 Based on Q43: “Would you rely on nepotism if this is necessary to secure a job?”
on nepotism for securing were 45% in Faryab, 17% in Takhar, 77% in Laghman, 7% in Ghazni, 16% in Badakhshan, and 12.5% in Kuduz (12.5%), which were, with the exception of Faryab and Takhar, below the average proportion for Afghanistan as a whole (22.3%).

Map 5: Money as the primary basis for corruption

Map 5 shows Afghans’ perception of money as the basis of corruption in different provinces. Money was viewed as the most common basis of corruption in Wardak (83%), Logar (77%), Saripul (73%), Kandahar (60%), and Jawzjan (59%).

Similar to ethnicity, the survey shows that respondents’ view of money as the primary basis of corruption does not seem to affect their likelihood of paying bribes. 22 The percentages of those who paid bribes over the last twelve months were 3% in Wardak, 20% in Logar, 4% in Saripul, 12.7% in Kandahar, and 7% in Jawzjan, which were not systematically higher than the average for the country as a whole (11.4%).

A corrupt transaction often involves more than the conventional actors of the corrupt official at the receiving end and a citizen who has no option but to pay for the service he gets. The prevalence of corruption has led to the emergence of a system in which intermediaries, commonly called “wasetar” or “commissionkar”, facilitate bribery for obtaining public goods and services. They act as intermediaries between public officials and citizens who seek government services. The reliance on

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22 Based on Q40: “Have your household paid bribes to government officials in order to maintain the main source of the revenue for the household over the last twelve months?”
commissionkar has become so common that it has become a profession and those engaging in it often pursue it as a full-time job, which is discussed in more details in the next section.

II.5 Facilitating bribery: the consolidation of the role of commissionkars
A commissionkar – literally a broker taking a commission (the Afghan kamissionkar or commissionkar comes from the English “commissioner” and refers to a person who acts as a broker between two parties and who aims at profiting from a transaction in a dispute) – is an intermediary between a state official and a public service user. A commissionkar is a person who knows the bureaucratic procedures well and also has established rapport with civil servants who trust him as an intermediary in corrupt transactions. A commissionkar collects a sum of money for delivering a service, while keeping part of the money and paying part of it as bribes to civil servants. The reliance on commissionkar as intermediary between citizens and civil servants has become institutionalized in some public sectors to the extent that citizens often seek these services exclusively through commissionkars.23

Although there has been a decline in the use of commissionkars, they still play an important role as intermediaries for access to public services. In 2014, 29% of the respondents who engaged in bribery used commissionkars as intermediaries while 31% in 2012 and 44% in 2010 relied on commissionkars. Slightly more urban residents (30%) than rural dwellers (26%) had relied on commissionkars when paying bribes. Likewise, almost equal numbers of men and women had relied on commissionkars. More respondents with university degree (38%) than those with no or less education (27%) had used commissionkars when paying bribes. Perhaps this reflects the higher likelihood of educated individuals to afford hiring commissionkars for obtaining public services. The average household income of those with university education was around 20,000 Afs while those with lower education earned around 13,000 Afs on average.

Q58. From you or your household’s experience, which type of individual is most often the intermediary in bribe-taking?

![Figure 32: Individuals who are most often intermediaries in bribe taking](image)

In comparison with 2012 survey, as shown in Figure 32, there has been a slight reduction in relying on commissionkars as intermediaries for bribe taking while there has been a considerable increase in

depending on relatives, acquaintances and civil servants as intermediaries in briberies. Whom individuals relied as intermediaries in bribery did not seem to differ by place of residence. A slightly larger proportion of urban respondents (30.6%) compared to rural dwellers (28.2%) reported that commission-takers are most often intermediaries in bribe taking. Both groups equally reported (11%) having relied on customers with experience of corruption as intermediaries in bribery.

**Q58. From your or your household’s experience, which type of individuals are most often intermediaries in bribe taking?**

- Civil Servant

![Map 6: Civil servants as intermediaries in bribe taking](image)

In 14% of cases of bribery, civil servants acted as intermediaries for facilitating bribery for obtaining public services. This practice was more common in Herat, Helmand, Uruzgan, Paktika, Paktiya, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Baghlan, Takhar and Kunduz (Map 6).
Map 7 shows the prevalence of using commissionkars for bribery in different provinces. Relying on commissionkars was more common in Ghor, Uruzgan, Maydan Wardak, Logar, Kabul, Khost, Nangarhar, and Baghlan. The reliance on commissionkar was least common in Samangan and Badakhshan.
II.6 Tolerance and attitudes toward corruption

This section looks at the most common forms of corruption and people’s attitude towards, and tolerance of, these practices. The following graph shows respondents’ views about the most common forms of corruption in Afghanistan.

**Q47. On a scale of one to five where one is the most common how would you rate the following forms of corruption in Afghanistan? (Highly, Relatively or most common)**

In comparison with 2012 survey, there has been no notable change in Afghans’ perception of most common forms of corruption. Bribery (89%) was believed to be the most common form of corruption, followed by favouritism (88%) and misuse of government property (79%). Only 39% of respondents believed that sexual exploitation was the most common form of corruption (Figure 33).
Since 2012 survey, there seems no change in respondents’ perception of the most unacceptable form of corruption. As in the 2012 survey, the most unacceptable form of corruption was viewed a civil servant creating undue difficulties as an indirect request for bribe (44%), followed by asking for money from the poor (41%) and asking directly for money (40%). On the contrary, approximately 34% of respondents viewed bribery as acceptable given that the income of the civil servant is very low. 32% of respondents stated that bribery is acceptable if it is for the purpose of reduction in taxes and customs.

In general, a predominant majority of respondents viewed all forms of corruption as unacceptable. However, they showed slightly more tolerance if bribery was for tax evasion purposes or for helping out the poor (Figure 34).
The survey shows that deterioration of people’s perception of corruption compared to 2012 is coupled with more engagement in corruption as well. While in 2012, only 16% of the respondents said that they would protect their interests through bribery, 23% of the respondents in 2014 admitted to doing so. Furthermore, only 12% of those who admitted to protecting their interests through bribery in 2012 had actually paid a bribe within the previous 12 months. In 2014, however, 25% of those who said that they would protect their interests through bribery had actually paid a bribe within the last 12 months (Figure 35).

In addition, as Figure 35 shows, attitude toward bribery seems to have an effect on actual engagement in corruption. Only 7% of those who stated that they would not protect their interest through bribery paid a bribe within the last 12 months, while 25% of the respondents who approved paying bribes for protecting their interests paid a bribe in the same period.

**Figure 35: Self-interest and bribery experiences**
II.7 Cynical Perceptions

The prevalent corruption in public institutions undermines public trust in these institutions and lead to cynical views about these institutions. Cynical perception refers to respondents’ perceptions that particular public institutions, government officials or political leaders are more interested in, and work for, their own private interests, rather than the public interest.

Figure 36: Institutions Working for the Benefit of All People

Figure 36 shows what percentage of respondents believed that specific state institutions worked for the benefit of all the people. Afghan National Army enjoyed the most positive popular perception and was believed by overwhelming majority of respondents (69%) to work for the benefit of all the people, although there was a slight deterioration of perceptions toward it compared with 2012 survey. The President was the second institution perceived favourably, although there had been notable decline since 2012 survey in the proportion of those who believed that the President worked for all the people. Among the state institutions and agencies, government judges received the least favourable ranking, as only 18% of respondents believed that government judges worked for the benefit of all the people. Even more cynical views were expressed about the foreign military forces (NATO, ISAF, American) and the worst perceptions were stated about the Taliban (Figure 36).
In your view, do the people mentioned here work for the benefit of all the people, for the benefit of some, or only for their own benefit?

- Taliban (For The Benefit of All People)

Map 8: Are the Taliban working for the benefit of all Afghans?

The above map shows the provincial breakdown of respondents’ perception of whether the Taliban worked for the benefit of all the people. There have been substantial changes in respondents’ views in different provinces since 2012 survey. The new provinces where a relatively larger proportion of the population in 2014 believed that the Taliban worked for the benefit of all Afghans were Hilmand, Zabul, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar, Khost, Takhar and Kunduz. It must be highlighted that even in these provinces only between 10 and 23 percent of the population had favorable views of the Taliban. On the contrary, the respondents in Kandahar, Paktiya, Laghman, Jawzjan, Samangan and Saripul had a more favorable perception of the Taliban in 2012, but this was no longer the case in 2014.
Map 9 shows respondents’ assessment of President Karzai’s work. There has been a considerable deterioration in respondents’ perception of President’s work. The number of provinces where less than 50% of the population believed that President worked for the benefit of all the people increased from 6 in 2012 to 12 in 2014 survey. Nevertheless, President Karzai still enjoyed a high level of popularity. In 22 provinces, more than 50% of the population believed that President Karzai worked for the benefit of all Afghans.

**Q53 and Q54. In your opinion, how is a corrupt person perceived in..**

**Figure 37: Institutions Working for the Benefit of All People**
The survey shows that those who engaged in corruption and paid bribes often did so out of desperation for obtaining services and in fact had strongly negative feelings about paying bribes. 65% of those who said that they would protect their interests through bribery if needed in an earlier question reported that they felt guilty, as a sinner or sad when paying bribes.

It also seems that people’s feelings about corruption did have in impact on whether or not they engaged in corruption. More respondents who reported less negative feelings about corruption reported protecting their interests through bribery. 89% of the respondents who reported to feel relieved, honoured or powerful when paying bribes also stated that they would pay bribes to protect their interests if needed. On the contrary, only 71% of those who stated to feel guilty, as sinners, or sad when paying bribes admitted to protecting their interests through bribery.

In addition, in spite of the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan in 2014, which led Afghanistan to be ranked as one of the three most corrupt countries, Afghans still strongly condemn corruption on moral grounds and detest it. As Figure 37 shows, 88 percent of the respondents reported that the Afghan society sees a corrupt individual as a sinner, guilty, nasty, venal or selfish. Only 6% believed that corrupt individuals are viewed as clever or powerful individuals.

The findings of this section point to the perception of a systematic corruption in the public sectors and services that are mostly affected by corruption. It also looked at personal and household of corrupt practices in these institutions. As it was discussed, the overwhelming majority of the respondents viewed the corrupt practices unacceptable condemned them on moral grounds. The following sections investigate how corruption in public sector institutions impacts households’ access to key public goods and services and households’ economy.
This section explores citizens’ access to public goods and services and how corruption impacts their access to these services in more detail. In general, citizens’ access to public services has improved, as more than 90% of respondents reported to have access to at least one public service. The most accessible public service was primary and secondary education (accessible to 92%), followed by access to security provided by police (with 88% accessibility rate). Nevertheless, respondents had to pay bribes for access to many public services as a result of which the financial burden of corruption on households increased from 52% in 2012 to 57% in 2014 survey.

The prevalence of bribery for access to public services varies in different sectors. For instance, it was more common, as reported by citizens, to pay bribes to the police and courts than to primary and secondary education institutions. On the other hand, the value of bribes paid to the police is generally smaller than those of bribes paid for other services, including courts. Bribery to the police and the judiciary not only has a negative financial impact on households, but also limits access to security and justice while increases the perception of insecurity and harassment by the state officials. However, bribery in the judicial system and the police can lead to the fear of police and extortion and, hence, can hinder serving justice. While the average bribes collected by the police decreased slightly in comparison to the 2012 survey, the agencies involved in providing justice, haj and customs services remained the top three recipients of the largest average bribes.

Being forced to give bribes was not limited to those who sought government services. Almost more than one third of the respondents who did not seek government services were forced to pay bribes within the last 12 months. Examples of such cases include respondents’ having been forced to pay bribes in order to avoid police harassment or passing checkpoints. On average, urban residents paid larger average bribe than their rural counterparts although rural dwellers paid, in total, more money as bribes for public services.

The 2014 survey shows that bribery has drastically increased since 2012 survey. The average reported bribes increased from 9,528 to 13,080 Afs; the number of Afghans who reported to have paid bribes increased from 1,621,800 to 1,992,698, and the total reported bribes increased from 62,582,667,120 to 105,646,837,150 Afs, which showed a total an increase of 54.8% in the total bribes paid. The scope and range of corruption is discussed in details in this section.24

III.1 Presence of the state and access to the main public services

There has been a noteworthy improvement in Afghans’ perception of government presence in some of the provinces and its deterioration in other provinces since 2012.25 The overall perception of government presence has not changed since 2012; in general almost 80% of the respondents in both years (2012 and 2014) stated that the government was present in their area. However, the survey shows that, according to respondents’ perception, the government presence has strengthened in some areas while weakened in others. In 2014, in a total of 21 provinces more than 80% of the respondents perceived the government to be present in their area, compared to 18 provinces in 2012. In addition, in those 21 provinces, the government was perceived to have a very strong

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24 The increase in reported bribes paid is substantial even controlling for the annual inflation rate of 6.4% for 2012/2013 as calculated by the World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview).

25 This is based on Q4, which asks “In your opinion, is the government present in your village or town?” The question does not make any distinctions on the level of government.
presence in 2014 (See Map 10). In 10 of those provinces, 80 to 90% of respondents felt the
government presence while in another 11 provinces between 90 to 94% of respondents confirmed
the government presence, which included Kabul, Parwan, Panjshir, Laghman, Kapisa, Nangarhar,
Badakhshan, Zabul, Nimroz and Badghis (Map 10). On the contrary, in 2012, in 16 out of 18 provinces
with strong government presence, 80 to 90% of respondents felt that the government was present in
their area while just in 2 provinces more than 90% of respondents stated so. This shows that the
government is perceived to have strengthened its presence in almost two third of the provinces.

At the same time, the government presence has weakened in a number of provinces. In 10
provinces, less than 70% of the respondents reported the government to be present in their area in
2014, while this was the case only in 5 provinces in 2012. Map 10 shows people’s perception of the
government presence in different provinces in 2014.

Q4. Is the government present in your village or town?
- yes

The perception of corruption seemed to vary according to the perception of government presence in
respondents’ area of residence. More respondents who believed that the government was present in
their village or city (77%) also believed that corruption is a common occurrence in the country than
those who reported that the government was not present in their area (70%). More people who had
more access to government institutions and interacted with them believed that corruption was a
common occurrence in the country.

In general, there has been considerable improvement in Afghans’ access to government services
since 2012. As in 2012, primary and secondary public education was the most accessible government
service in 2014, with more than 90% of the population having access to it. Two other key services
that were widely accessible to Afghans were police (88%) and health services (84%). The most significant improvements since 2012 have been reported in Afghans’ access to transport and traffic services, public electricity, and services offered by the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (Figure 36). NSP was the only service where respondents reported to have less access compared to 2012.

Figure 38: Access to government services

Q22. To which of the following government services does your household have access from the village or the town you live in?
Place of residence seems to impact households’ access to public services. In general, urban residents have more access to government services than rural dwellers as the latter group lives in places that are less secure and with weaker government presence.

The disparity between urban and rural populations’ access to public services varies as well. The least disparity was observed in access to primary and secondary education, followed by police and health services. The largest inequality was observed in respondents’ access to electricity provided by the government.
government and services offered by the Ministry of Employment, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (Figure 39).

The survey also showed that there was no notable variation in access to public services in terms of ethnicity. In general, more than 80% of almost all ethnic groups had access to some type of government services. The only exception was Nuristanis’ access to government services. Of all ethnic groups, Nuristanis reported substantially lower access to most of public services. In general, less than 50% of Nuristanis reported to have access to public services, with the exception of primary and secondary education, which was more accessible (75%). This may have been due to the lower government presence in Nuristan as only 40% of Nuristanis reported that government was present in their area.

III.2 Perceived and actual negative impacts on households
The financial burden of corruption on households seems to have increased since 2012. Of the respondents who stated that corruption had an impact on their households, 61% believed that the impacts of corruption on their households was considerable or extremely high and only 38% believed that the impacts was little or none. In comparison, similar percentage of respondents (61%) whose household had been impacted by corruption in 2012 reported that corruption had impacted their household considerably or to an extremely high extent. The proportion of households impacted by corruption, nevertheless, has increased drastically. While 32% of total households said that corruption impacted their households in 2014, only 18% had such an experience in 2012. In other words, although the impact of corruption on the households who experienced corruption remained the same in both years, the total households who experienced corruption almost doubled in 2014 (Figure 40).

Figure 40: The general effects of corruption on households

| Q20. General effect of corruption or bribes on your household included you? (N=32% os) |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Extremely high                  | Considerable    | Little          | None            |
| 16                               | 45              | 32              | 6               |
| 19                               | 42              | 38              | 1               |

*Figure 40: The general effects of corruption on households*
A strong majority of respondents (57%) believed that the financial burden of corruption on their households had increased, while 52% had such an experience in 2012 (Figure 41). More respondents who had paid high amounts of bribes than other respondents believed that the financial burden of corruption on their households had increased in the twelve months prior to the survey. This finding is consistent with the general increasing trend of bribery since 2012 survey as the total reported bribes increased from 63 billion to 106 billion Afs and the average reported bribes increased from 9,528 to 13,080 Afs. It also showed that the financial burden on Afghans of petty bribes had gone up from 1.25 billion to almost 2 billion USD.

As Figure 42 shows, the households who paid larger bribes were more affected by corruption. For instance, 59% of the households who had paid between 500 and 2000 Afs in bribes, 64% of those who had paid bribes of 2,001 to 10,000 Afs, and 77% of those who had paid bribes of 10,000 Afs or
more stated that the financial burden of corruption on their household had increased. Respondents who stated that the financial burden of corruption on their household had decreased in the past twelve months also stated that the general impact of corruption on their household was small.

More urban residents (61%) than rural dwellers (56%) stated that the financial burden of corruption had increased on their households. This corresponds with the more limited access of rural residents to government services, as only 35% of rural dwellers reported to have sought government services in the last 12 months, compared to 43% of urban residents. More respondents with higher levels of education (high school and university education) (65%) than those with no literacy or primary schooling (54%) stated that the financial burden of corruption on their household has increased.

Figure 43: Bribe paid by those who considered corruption had a negative impact on their household

Figure above shows the frequency and size of bribes paid for different public services as reported by the respondents who stated that corruption had a negative impact on their households. The largest bribes (more than 10,000 Afs) were paid more frequently for obtaining justice by courts. The smallest bribes (less than 500 Afs) were more commonly paid for obtaining ID cards and passports. The most frequent bribes (with various sizes) were reported as having been paid to the police (17%), followed by justice by the courts (16%).

26Based on cross tabulation of Q18 and Q21.
The presence of corruption in the police, courts, and hospitals was perceived to have the most negative impact on the households. The perceived negative impact of corruption, within these institutions, over households had increased dramatically since the 2012 survey. The proportion of respondents who saw their households being negatively impacted by corruption within police had, since 2012 survey, increased by 8%, courts by 11% and hospitals by 8% (Figure 44). The impact of corruption within the police and courts are discussed in more details in Section 6 of this chapter.
Figure 45: Corruption prevents using state services

The higher level of experiencing corruption or pervasiveness of bribery within a public institution does not appear to be associated with reduced access to public services. However, corruption in some sectors—either experienced or perceived—can be more detrimental to households’ access to public services than in other sectors. For instance, around 56% of the households reported to have access to state-provided electricity. While only 3% of households have paid bribes for electricity, 28% of respondents believed that they were being deprived of electricity because of corruption. Hence, it is not only the experience of corruption, but also perceptions of corruption in electricity services that make respondents feel deprived of these services. The second sector that a high percentage of respondents (18%) reported to have been deprived of access to due to corruption is higher education, followed by courts (17%) (Figure 45). This variation may reflect the fact that more households were likely to seek some public services, such as electricity, than other services such as higher education, or courts to an even lesser extent.

Place of residence seems to have an impact on respondents perception of deprivation from government services. In general, 6.6% of urban residents stated that they were deprived of government services due to corruption while 17.5% of rural dwellers believed so. The perception of deprivation of government services appears to have a provincial dimension as well. In Ghor, Daikundi, Bamyan, Khost, Wardak, and Uruzgan a much larger proportion of residents reported that they had been deprived of government services due to corruption.

III.3 Harassment to facilitate bribery

Although bribe giving sometimes reflects voluntary acts by clients in order to obtain preferential treatment, clients may often resort to bribery out of desperation. This is particularly evident when citizens do not seek any government services but still have to pay bribes. 62.5% of total respondents
reported that they never sought any government services over the past 12 months. Of this group, 33.6% were once forced by corrupt officials to commit corruption, 22.4% twice, and 8.6% three times (Figure 46). Committing corruption here refers to paying monetary and non-monetary (i.e. gifts, sherenee, harvest products, livestock etc.) transfers to public officials. Of course, those who sought government services reported being forced to pay bribe almost twice as much; 68.5% of those who sought government services once were forced once to pay bribe, 12.1% twice and 5% three times (Figure 46). Nevertheless, having to pay bribes without seeking government services is a possible indication of harassment by government officials who do not only ask for bribes from people who seek government services but also from people who happen to come into contact with them regardless. Harassment includes, for instance, the sort of extortion that can occur on the streets from the police, who may sometimes even use physical violence to extort bribes.  

![Prevalence of Bribery and Seeking Government Services](image)

**Figure 46: Bribery with or without seeking government services**

### III.4 Bribes paid for basic services

The institutionalization of corruption has resulted in the emergence of bribery as a common practice for obtaining public services. 32% of all households paid in a bribe at least once over the past 12 months in order to obtain basic services, which shows an increase of 4% compared to 2012 survey. The below table lists the average bribes paid to public institutions for obtaining services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Average paid in Afs</th>
<th>Average paid in USD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice by Courts</td>
<td>11700</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haj services</td>
<td>6580</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payment of duties to Customs</td>
<td>6321</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security by Police</td>
<td>5864</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27 Cross tabulation of Q12 and Q16.

28 An example of bribes collected by force is illegal tolls collected by the police from truckers, which is well documented by Mohammad Isaqzadeh and Antonio Guistozzi in *On Afghanistan’s Roads: Extortion and Abuse against Drivers*, Integrity Watch Afghanistan, November 2013.

29 These are not average annual amounts per typical Afghan households, but refer only to those households that paid a bribe during the previous 12 months.
As in the 2012 survey, courts received the highest average bribes for offering services in 2014. Furthermore, there was a large increase in the average bribes collected by courts from 9,013 Afs in 2012 survey to 11,700 Afs in 2014 survey. After justice by courts, the other services for which respondents paid the highest average bribes, and even more than what they paid in 2012, were Haj services and payment of duties to customs. The average value of reported bribes to the police roughly has remained the same since the 2012 survey (5,867 Afs in 2012 and 5,864 in 2014 survey).

As can be observed from the table below, an estimated 105.6 billion Afs (105,646,837,150 Afs = 1,942,037,448 USD) was reported to have been paid in bribes in 2014 survey. Compared to 2012 survey, this number shows an increase of 55% (43,064,170,030 Afs or 687,494,058 USD of increase in total). While in 2012 survey, the average bribe paid was 9,528 Afs or 191 USD, it increased to 13,080 Afs or 240 USD in 2014. Furthermore, in 2014 survey, considerably more adults (370,898 more) reported to have paid bribes compared to 2012 survey. This is a 23% increase in the number of Afghan adults who paid bribes in 2014 compared to 2012.30

Table 2: Estimated amount of money paid in bribes per year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Afghan adults who paid bribe</th>
<th>Average paid bribe (AFS)</th>
<th>Average number of bribe paid per year</th>
<th>Total amount of Afghani paid in bribes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,677,319</td>
<td>9,582</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>53,983,483,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,621,800</td>
<td>9,528</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>62,582,667,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,992,698</td>
<td>13,080</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>105,646,837,150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EQUIVALENT IN USD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Afghan adults who paid bribe</th>
<th>Average paid bribe (AFS)</th>
<th>Average number of bribe paid per year</th>
<th>Total amount of Afghani paid in bribes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,677,319</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>1,079,669,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,621,800</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>1,254,543,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,992,698</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>1,942,037,448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30Please note that the population estimates in 2010 came from National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007-08 while in 2012 we used the estimates from the Central Statistics Office (CSO). There is also a population growth factor that increases the number of adults paying a bribe. CSO is using an increase of 2.041% for the total population from one year to another.
The following table provides a breakdown of these figures in according to rural-urban divide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of Afghan adults who paid bribe</th>
<th>Average paid bribe</th>
<th>Total Average of bribe paid once</th>
<th>Average Number of bribes per year</th>
<th>Total amount of paid in bribes in 2014 (AFN)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Urban (AFN)</td>
<td>756,251</td>
<td>16363</td>
<td>12,374,585,209</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>46,173,256,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (AFN)</td>
<td>1,236,447</td>
<td>11075</td>
<td>13,693,746,751</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>58,171,644,279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (AFN)</td>
<td>1,992,698</td>
<td>13080</td>
<td>26,064,413,982</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>105,646,837,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (USD)</td>
<td>756,251</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>227,473,993</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>848,773,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural (USD)</td>
<td>1,236,447</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>251,723,286</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1,069,331,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (USD)</td>
<td>1,992,698</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>479,125,257</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1,942,037,448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The experiences of bribery appeared to vary depending on the place of residence. In 2014 survey, the average bribe paid by urban residents was much higher (5,288 Afs or 97 USD higher) than the average bribe paid by rural residents (Table 3). In addition, urban residents on average paid fewer bribes (3.7) than rural dwellers (4.2), but in larger amounts. Furthermore, more rural households had paid bribes to the police or when seeking health services, registering land and property, or obtaining ID cards and passports. On the other hand, more urban residents had paid bribes for obtaining public electricity. Not surprisingly, Afghans living in rural areas as a whole reported to have paid 11,998,387,942 Afs or 220,558,605 USD more in bribes than their urban counterparts.

III.5 Corruption in selected sectors
This section investigates corruption within two sectors that are viewed as most corrupt and with more impact on households: the police and judiciary. As discussed earlier, these two institutions were viewed as the two most corrupt institutions that also collected the largest bribes compared to other institutions (between 2001-10000 Afs and more than 10,000 Afs). In addition, these institutions are responsible for providing security and administration of justice. Widespread corruption within these institutions would seriously undermine citizens’ perception of security and access to justice and state legitimacy. It must be highlighted, however, that a large proportion of those who perceived these institutions as corrupt actually did not personally seek services from these institutions, but it seems that others people’s views of corruption within these institutions had impact on the respondents’ perception of corruption in these sectors.

III.6 Access to and corruption within the police
Corruption within the police has increased since 2012 survey and is perceived by respondents to have many negative impacts on households. While the police sector (including the Ministry of Interior) was the third most corrupt institution in 2012, it was viewed as the second most corrupt institution, after courts, in 2014 (Figure 10). In addition, collecting more bribes than any other public...
institution, police was viewed as the top recipient of bribes in 2014 (Figure 24). Furthermore, police corruption sometimes takes form of harassment and extortion, particularly from truck drivers along the highways. Using violence against drivers for extorting bribes from them is common among many segments of the national highway.32

The impact of corruption within the police, however, is not limited to increased financial burden on households. It also seems to have a negative impact on citizens’ access to security. Respondents reported that their households suffered the most negative impacts of corruption from the corruption within the police. 28% of respondents asserted that their households’ access to security was negatively impacted by corruption within the police (Figure 42). Furthermore, 16% of respondents stated that their households, as a result of corruption, were prevented from using security services provided by the police (Figure 43).

Corruption within the police could have more detrimental effects than corruption in many other public institutions since it concerns the two biggest problems that respondents believe Afghanistan faces: security and corruption (Figure 2). On the one hand, the perception of widespread corruption within the police deteriorates the overall perception of corruption in the public sector. On the other hand, corruption within the police is viewed to undermine citizens’ access to security, which is currently the biggest concern for respondents. 47% of those respondents who viewed police as the most corrupt institution identified insecurity as the biggest problem of the country, while 16% of them only saw corruption as the biggest problem.33 Corruption in the police, therefore, could exacerbate Afghans’ perception of the two biggest problems that the country faces and may reinforce the perception of severity of these problems.

More rural dwellers and uneducated respondents reported having felt victim to police corruption. A strong majority of respondents (74%) who reported to have been victim of police corruption were from rural areas, and approximately 49% were illiterate. Those who experienced police corruption interacted with the police for varying purposes, from verification of ID cards and licenses to robbery and rape. The following figure shows a breakdown of these encounters:

32 Ibid.
33 Cross tabulation of Q9 and Q1.
As Figure 47 shows, respondents referred to the police for different services, from following death and injury cases to robbery or other criminal cases. Of those who faced corruption, almost 40% referred to the police in relation to the cases of death, injury or other physical damages. The second top reason for interaction with the police was related to robbery cases. As the above figure shows, the top reasons for interacting with the police were serious crimes that are directly related to the public sense of security. Since a large proportion of the respondents who faced corruption within the police had referred to the police in relation to such important crimes, it is not surprising that 28% of all respondents reported that police corruption had negative impacts on their access to security and those who viewed police as the most corrupt institution saw insecurity as the biggest problem in the country.
Figure 48 shows the places where respondents interacted with the police and corruption happened. Almost half of corruption activities engaging the police, as reported by the respondents, took place at police headquarters, and 24% of them on roads, engaging patrolling policemen. The high frequency of corruption at police headquarters shows that almost half of the police corruption takes place at places where one expects a high level of supervision by senior officials. This would make one question the plausibility of police corruption at such level and scale without the knowledge of senior officials and police leadership.

The widespread corruption from police headquarters to patrolmen on streets seems to be linked to the alleged prevalence of sale of police positions. Numerous reports have indicated that police positions are sold, sometimes for thousands of dollars. If police officers have to pay for securing their positions, it is plausible that they would engage in bribery in order to secure their next positions, which could explain the widespread corruption within the police. Since police corruption appears highly related to people’s sense of security, tackling police corruption must become a top priority.

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Map 11: Household experiences of police corruption

Map 11 shows the provincial dimension of perception of police corruption. As it shows, the highest perceived corruption within the police was reported in Helmand and Zabul, followed by Farah, Badghis, Parwan and Kunar. It must be noted that these provinces are among the most insecure provinces as well. It is unfortunate that respondents have the most negative perception of the police in the provinces where they need police services most in terms of provision of security.

More importantly, more respondents who felt to be victim of police corruption and paid bribes to the police believed that corruption facilitates the expansion of the Taliban. 44% of those who paid bribe within the last 12 months to the police believed that corruption within the state facilitates the expansion of the Taliban, compared to 34% of those who did not report paying bribes to the police.  

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35 Cross tabulation of Q19 and Q60.
III.7 Access to and corruption in the judiciary System

Like 2010 and 2012, the judiciary was viewed as the most corrupt institution, with 34% of respondents believing the courts and 17% the Ministry of Justice to be the most corrupt public institution (Figure 10). As the figure below shows, 19% of all respondents sought services from the judiciary and public prosecutors (Attorney’s Office) over the last 12 months. Almost two thirds of those who referred to the judiciary faced corruption in the judiciary, and only one third did not face corruption. Such widespread corruption in the judiciary seriously undermines the administration of justice and citizens’ access to one of the key services that they are supposed to receive fairly and without charge.

Table 4: Experience of corruption in judiciary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Have you or your household faced corruption in the judiciary over the last 12 months?</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No in this duration I never been to judiciary</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No, I went to judiciary but I didn’t faced corruption</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of frequency of bribery, courts were reported to take bribes almost as frequently as the police; 9% of all households reported having paid bribes to courts or public prosecutors over the last 12 months, compared to 10% who paid bribes to the police (Figure 24). Nevertheless, officials in courts collected more bribes than officials in the police since court officials were the top recipients of large bribes. 3% of bribes collected by officials in courts were over 10,000 Afs while only 1% of bribes collected by the police officials were over 10,000 Afs. In addition, courts received the highest average bribes among all institutions. Average bribes collected by courts in 2014 survey amounted to 11,700 Afs while the average of bribes paid to the police was 5,864 Afs (Table 1).

The prevalent corruption in courts has highly undermined people’s perception of access to justice. Although 9% of respondents reported to have directly faced corruption in courts, 26% of respondents believed that corruption in courts had a negative impact on their household’s access to justice. Furthermore, 17% of respondents reported that they were prevented from using justice by courts due to corruption. This shows that the negative impacts of corruption in courts touches not only those who seek justice through courts but many more households who may feel deprived of judiciary services due to corruption.

There seems to be no substantial improvement in terms of addressing corruption within the judiciary. Only 2% of respondents in the 2014 survey believed that there were some improvements in tackling corruption within courts, compared to 1% in the 2012 survey. More than half of respondents (53%) who faced corruption in the judiciary were complainants, which was a slight increase compared to 2012 survey whereas 51% of complainants faced corruption. As Figure 49 shows, 24% of the accused and 16% of witnesses encountered corruption in the judiciary as well. Furthermore, considerably more complainants (48%) than the accused (30%) reported having been victims of corruption in the judiciary and deprived of access to justice by courts.  

36 Cross tabulation of Q26 and Q28.
Figure 49: Status of the household when experiencing corruption in the judicial sector

Figure 50: Corruption in the judiciary and attorney’s offices by level and type of institution

Figure 50 shows the perception of corruption in different judicial organs. Attorney offices are, in general, perceived as more corrupt than courts at any level. The district attorney’s office is viewed as the most corrupt judicial organ (50%), followed by the provincial attorney’s office (41%) and the provincial court (29%).

Corruption in the judiciary very often leads people to seek justice outside courts, from other state agencies or informal institutions such as district governors, members of Provincial Councils, tribal councils or Taliban courts. None of the respondents who did not face corruption in the judiciary referred to non-judicial organs for seeking justice, while 40% of those who encountered corruption in the judiciary sought justice outside courts of state or non-state actors.
The above figure depicts the institutions or individuals whom are referred to as de facto jurors due to corruption in the judiciary. District governors, provincial governors and district police chiefs were the top authorities that were referred to for administration of justice. Administration of justice by these actors undermines citizens’ access to due process, appeal procedures and fair administration of justice since most of these actors do not have the legal background and required education for administering justice. Citizens, therefore, would have to depend on arbitrary decisions of informal jurors who may not be impartial or qualified for administration of justice.37

As the above map shows, seeking justice outside the courts is common to different extents in most provinces. The ten provinces where seeking justice outside courts was very common ranged from the insecure Zabul and Nuristan to the capital, Kabul, and Farah in the west. The lack of trust in the formal court system due to corruption is taken advantage of by the Taliban who try to promote their courts as less corrupt and capable of providing fast and impartial justice. They also use their shadow courts and administration of justice as a propaganda tool for appealing to communities and improving their public image.38

III.8 Land and property-related corruption

Formal registration of land and properties is not common in Afghanistan, and buying and selling land often takes place through informal written agreement, sanad-e urfi, between buyer and seller. Since the property transactions are rarely registered, property-related disputes are very common in Afghanistan. 17% of all respondents reported that they were involved in a property dispute over the past 12 months. Of these respondents, 47% reported that they faced corruption when dealing with land or a property issue, which shows the extremely prevalent corruption related to the sector with highly deleterious effects on the enforcement of property rights in the country.

As Figure 52 shows, more than 50% of cases in which respondents faced corruption relates to the distribution or selling land or property. The least reported corruption involves paying land or property tax, which reflects the low capacity of the state to raise direct taxes, particularly land or property taxes.

The District Governor’s Office was reported to be the place where corruption took place more than any other state agency, followed by the District Police Office and the District Court Office. The district-level agencies constitute the first stage of dispute resolution. If the dispute is not resolved, it
will be taken to the provincial state agencies or even to the Supreme Court in the capital. The formal dispute resolution and its appeal process is a very lengthy, complicated and expensive process. The adjudication of the case will be transferred from district to the provincial centre and to the capital. As Figure 53 shows, people are likely to face corruption at each stage, although at varying degrees. People, therefore, may prefer to rely on informal dispute resolution mechanisms (local shuras, community elders, mullahs or Taliban) in order to expedite the adjudication process and avoid corruption.

![Figure 53](image)

Figure 53: Land related issues taken to non-state actors for resolution

More people (4% of total sample) referred to non-state actors for resolving land or property disputes in 2014 than in 2012 (2% of total sample). There were also notable changes in terms of the individuals to whom people referred for resolving property disputes. In 2014, 39% of respondents referred to local shuras or jirgas, compared to 29% in 2012. Another major change was observed in people’s use of Taliban courts for resolving land or property disputes. Only 1% of respondents reported relying on Taliban courts for property disputes in 2014, while 10% did so in 2012. Perhaps the lower level of people using Taliban courts for resolving property or land disputes is due to the fact that Taliban judges are often individuals from outside the village who are less likely to know the ownership history of land. In addition, the Taliban judges are often mobile and are not likely to stay in the village for long time and, thus, lack the enforcement mechanism for decisions related to property disputes. On the contrary, local shuras or jirgas are more familiar with ownership history of properties in their communities and are more capable of enforcing decisions made about property disputes since they are part of the community.

In a country such as Afghanistan where the industrial and banking sector is still underdeveloped, buying land is viewed as a safe method of long-term saving and investment. As the demand for land increased in post-Taliban Afghanistan, land grabbing became prevalent, particularly by powerful political actors. As such, the topic of land grabbing and involvement of state officials in the process has recently attracted the attention of the local media and the public in Afghanistan. In this survey, the majority of respondents believed that organized groups and high-ranking officials had a hand in the distribution, selling, and management of land.

Following the collapse of the Taliban regime in 2001, land grabbing became a major problem in Afghanistan. Capturing large tracts of state land and selling them at exorbitant prices became the common mechanism of primitive accumulation (obtaining the initial capital), by powerful individuals or groups, before engaging in other legal or illicit businesses.  

Graph 55 shows respondents’ perception of influence of organized groups, senior officials and political groups over distribution, sale and management of land in Afghanistan. Almost 70% of all respondents believed that these groups or individuals are extremely influential or very influential in management, distribution or sale of land in Afghanistan. People in the urban areas viewed senior officials and political figures to be more influential in distribution and management of land than people in rural areas.

### III.9 Irrigation and Corruption

Although Afghanistan is a mountainous country with a high degree of snowfall, most waters of the country, due to absence of effective water management, flow to the neighbouring countries and Afghans face water scarcity. Given that a predominant majority of Afghans live in rural areas, water is a very valuable resource and disputes over irrigation water are common. As Figure 56 shows, 20% of respondents were involved in disputes over irrigation water over the past 12 months. 25% of these respondents faced corruption when dealing with water irrigation disputes.

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III.10 Fighting Corruption

Respondents showed a low degree of satisfaction from current anti-corruption efforts and their expectations of political leaders ran high. They also showed a high level of trust in political leaders for fighting corruption, which is encouraging and must be taken advantage of by political leaders. A small percentage of respondents were aware of the efforts by international community to fight corruption, and almost two thirds doubted the intention of the international community to fight corruption. Almost two thirds of respondents also stated that they would not vote for an individual who they know to be corrupt.

Respondents were even more pessimistic about the Taliban’s willingness and ability to fight corruption. Furthermore, around 35% of respondents believed that corruption facilitated the expansion of the Taliban. More people in Farah, Uruzgan, Daikundi, Logar, Nangarhar, Kunar and Badakhshan than those in other provinces viewed corruption helping Taliban expansion. Urban and rural dwellers almost equally reported believing that corruption helps Taliban expansion (36%).

III.11 Filing a complaint

Filing complaints with the government about corruption fluctuates from year to year. Around 11% of all respondents reported having filed a complaint with the government related to corruption: this compares to 12% in 2010 and 5% in 2012. In spite of this variation, filing complaints about corruption is still uncommon considering that a large proportion of citizens face corruption when referring to different state agencies, as discussed in details in previous section. The lack of interest in filing complaints about corruption may reflect respondents’ perception that fight against corruption is not taken seriously: only 14% of all respondents believed that there were some improvements in fighting corruption in public sector while 70% believed there were no improvements (Figure 15). In fact, half as many respondents who believed that there were no improvements in fighting corruption reported that they had filed complaints about corruption.41

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41 Cross tabulation Q44 and Q10.
Figure 57: Channels of complaint

22% of the respondents who filed a complaint about corruption filed their complaints with the provincial or district governors, 21% with the courts or Supreme Court, and 19% with the Attorney’s or Attorney General’s Office. There was no noticeable difference between rural and urban residents; both groups equally reported filing a formal complaint about corruption. It is not clear what happened after filing complaints and what percentage of these complaints was successful.

III.12 Government anti-corruption performance

Respondents’ views were asked about key government leaders and officials’ effectiveness in anti-corruption performance. Figure 56 summarizes respondents’ views about these officials.
Figure 58: Government’s anti-corruption performance

President Karzai was viewed (by 60% of respondents) as the most effective individual in terms of anti-corruption performance. The Attorney General is viewed as the next effective person in fighting corruption with district governors and mayors as the least effective. Furthermore, only 34% of respondents thought their MPs are effective in fighting corruption. There was no major change in respondents’ views about the effectiveness of these officials compared to 2012.

Figure 59: Perceptions of officials’ ability to reduce corruption

Although people are not optimistic about the effectiveness of fighting corruption in the country, they believe that certain officials have the capability to reduce corruption. For instance, although 60% of respondents believed that President was effective in fighting corruption, a considerably larger proportion of the respondents (80%) believed that the President had the power and ability to reduce corruption. The discrepancy between the responses to this question and the previous question about the president demonstrates the high expectations of the respondents from the President in fighting corruption. Attorney General and the Minister of Interior were viewed as the next most capable.
officials to fight corruption. Mayors and district governors were seen as the least capable officials to fight corruption.

III.13 Trust in the officials and institutions fighting corruption
Afghans still have a high level of trust in many officials and political leaders in fighting corruption. The below graph demonstrate respondents’ trust in key political leaders to fight corruption.

![Figure 60: Who is best to fight corruption?](image)

The top three political leaders whom respondents trusted to fight corruption were the same as those in 2012 survey: Hamid Karzai, Abdullah Abdullah, Ashraf Ghani. There seems a decline in respondents’ expectations of President Karzai while more optimism regarding Ashraf Ghani compared to 2012. Expectations about Abdullah Abdullah do not seem to have changed (Figure 60). General Dustom was viewed as the 7th most trustable leader to fight corruption in the 2012 survey but was viewed as the 5th in 2014. It must be noted that in spite of the Taliban’s anti-corruption rhetoric, people do not appear to believe in their anti-corruption claims and Mullah Omar was viewed as the least trustable individual in fighting corruption.

III.14 The international community’s anti-corruption discourse and its support
The post-Taliban political system has been highly dependent on the international community’s financial and military support. Given their important role in Afghanistan, the international community has on different occasions pressed the Afghan government to fight corruption. Recently, this issue become a source of conflict between the two parties and the Afghan government has accused the donor countries of being responsible for spreading corruption in Afghanistan. The survey looks at people’s views about the role of the international community in fighting corruption.

The predominant majority of respondents (63% in urban areas and 72% in rural areas) said that they did not hear the international community speak against corruption in Afghanistan over the past 12 months. A similar proportion of the respondents also said in 2012 survey not to have heard the international community speak against corruption.

Of those who said to have heard the international community denounce corruption, almost one third (34%) reported to have heard the United Nations officials speak against corruption in Afghanistan while 11% said they had heard United States government officials speak against corruption. In
general, even in urban areas where Afghans have considerable access to media, a small proportion of the population were aware of the anti-corruption stance of the international community.

The predominant majority of Afghans are doubtful about the intention of the international community to fight corruption in Afghanistan. Only 36% of respondents believed that the international community wants to fight corruption in Afghanistan. Although more people in 2014 believed in the commitment of the international community to fight corruption than in 2012 (29%), still another 36% believed otherwise and 28% did not know whether the international community intended to fight corruption in Afghanistan. This pessimism about the intention of the international community was almost equally common among urban and rural respondents.

An even smaller proportion of respondents believed that the international community supported honest government officials in their province. Roughly 34% of respondents in urban and rural areas believed that the international community supported honest government officials, while 32% believed otherwise and another 33% did not know. More respondents with high school and university education (respectively 39% and 42%) believed in the commitment of the international community to support honest government officials.

Map 13 shows the provincial dimension of respondents’ perceptions about the commitment of the international community to fight corruption. A noteworthy observed change, in comparison to 2012, is less optimism in the western provinces about the intentions of the international community to fight corruption. In 2014, eastern and north eastern provinces in general had a more positive perception of the international community in fighting corruption in Afghanistan. The most optimistic views were expressed in Helmand, Paktika, Ghazni, Parwan, Nuristan and Faryab.

Q73. Do you believe the international community wants to fight corruption?
III.15 Corruption and the Taliban

It is widely accepted that corruption undermines social equality and contributes to increased support for insurgent groups and political instability. Looking at the prevalence of political instability in the 1950s and 1960s, which were marked by numerous instances of military takeover, riots and violent popular protests in developing countries, Samuel Huntington argued that corruption was conducive to “degeneration” and “political decay”. 42 35% of respondents also believed that corruption within the state facilitated the expansion of the Taliban. Respondents with higher levels of education believed more that corruption within the state facilitated the expansion of the Taliban. 43

Q60. In your view, is corruption within the state facilitating the expansion of the Taliban?

Map 14: Is corruption facilitating the expansion of the Taliban

Map 14 shows the prevalence, in provinces, of the perception that corruption facilitated the expansion of the Taliban. As can be observed, respondents in more insecure provinces were in general more pessimistic and viewed corruption as helping the Taliban expansion. More people in Farah, Uruzgan, Daikundi, Logar, Nangarhar, Kunar and Badakhshan viewed corruption as helping Taliban expansion. Urban and rural dwellers almost equally reported believing that corruption helped Taliban expansion. More women than men viewed corruption as helping the Taliban expansion.

43 Cross tabulation of Q60 and Q92.
Condemning corruption within the state has become a propaganda tool for the Taliban. 23% of respondents said that they had heard Taliban condemn corruption in the Afghan state. Slightly more people in rural areas had heard Taliban condemn corruption in the government. Considerably more respondents who heard the Taliban condemn corruption (42%) than those who did not hear (15%) believed that corruption within the state facilitated the Taliban expansion. Map 15 provides more details about the provinces and how many respondents heard the Taliban denounce corruption in the Afghan state. Not surprisingly, more respondents living in the provinces with stronger Taliban presence had heard the Taliban condemn corruption.

To better understand how corruption was perceived to help the expansion of the Taliban, respondents were asked to identify where corruption within institutions helped Taliban expansion (Figure 61).
Since 2014, there have been some changes in respondents’ answers to this question. As shown in Figure 61, in 2014 survey respondents viewed the corruption in the central government and courts and attorney’s offices as the top two contributors to the Taliban expansion, while in 2012 survey the respondents ranked the corruption in the provincial and district governors’ office as first and in the central government as the second. The strong pessimism toward the central government also reflects the high expectations that respondents have from the President and ministers to fight corruption, as discussed in earlier in this section.

Respondents were also asked how effective the major institutions and certain actors were in reducing corruption. The Afghan government and the clergy (Mullah and Uluma) were seen as the most effective institutions in fighting corruption. Respondents were much less optimistic about the efficiency of the judiciary and the parliament in reducing corruption. UN and international
organizations were viewed to be more effective than the judiciary and the parliament. The Taliban were also viewed as ineffective in fighting corruption.

III.16 Individuals’ ways of fighting corruption
Although corruption is highly common in the public and private sector, it still stands against social values and people’s beliefs in Afghanistan; an overwhelming majority of respondents (95%) stated that they would not vote for someone who they believe is corrupt. Less than 2% said that they would vote for such an individual. Slightly more urban dwellers (96%) than rural residents (94%) said they would reject voting for a corrupt politician.

![Figure 63: Individuals’ resistance to bribery](image)

In addition, most of the respondents (64%) stated that they would not protect their interests through bribery if they had an opportunity. A similar proportion of the respondents expressed such attitude in 2012 survey. It is promising that in spite of increased corruption since 2012 survey, the predominant majority of respondents prefer not to use bribery for protecting their interests. Once again more people in the urban areas (69%) than rural residents (61%) said they would reject using bribery for protecting their interests.

However, the prevalence of corruption, particularly in the public sector, undermines citizens’ access to public services and even may prevent them from access to those services if they do not pay bribes. As it was discussed in the previous sections, a sizeable proportion of respondents who sought key basic services such as security and justice were deprived of such services due to corruption. As a result, in order to ensure access to public services, people often had to engage in corruption although they may not like protecting their interests through bribery. This means people’s attitude may not play a significant role in reducing corruption as long as those who control distribution of public goods and services are not willing to provide them without bribery.
III.17 Corruption and Afghanistan’s Transition to 2014

Scholars have explicated the relation between corruption and political decay in developing countries, arguing that corruption dashes people’s expectations and eventually leads to political instability and political decay.44 The Afghan state also faces the overwhelming task of taking the full responsibility of securing the country and providing key public goods and services to the population. A key question is how the current widespread corruption within the state would impact the transition of responsibilities from the international forces to the Afghan state.

Figure 64: Government's ability to ensure successful transition

This study shows that almost the majority of Afghans (50%) believe in a successful transition and the capacity of the national security forces to resume the responsibility of securing the country. Nevertheless, a notable proportion of respondents (35%) were pessimistic about a successful transition and another 15% did not know whether or not the transition would be successful. People living in urban areas (58%) were more optimistic about a successful transition than those living in rural areas (47%). Likewise, more men (55%) than women (43%) believed there would be a successful transition.

Those who doubted a successful transition were asked the reasons why they thought the Afghan security forces would not be able to ensure security after transition. Lack of resources (22%) and corruption (21%) were cited as the top two reasons undermining the capacity of Afghan security sources to ensure security (Figure 65).

III.18 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
People’s perception of corruption and quality of governance seem to have a substantial impact on their participation in political processes, which in turn can bolster or undermine the legitimacy of the state or even the political system as a whole. This section focuses on political participation and how corruption impacts it.

Table 5: Political participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q78. Please tell me if there was an opportunity to vote for each of the following types of elections in your area, could you take part in the election?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Refused answer</th>
<th>to</th>
<th>Don’t Know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District shura</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Development Council</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial council</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above graph shows respondents’ participation in local and national elections. More respondents had participated in national elections than local elections, indicating the importance of these elections and the power vested in these positions. Slightly less respondents who viewed corruption as the biggest problem of the country had participated in all elections, with the exception of parliamentary elections, than those who saw insecurity as the biggest.\(^{45}\)

\(^{45}\) Cross tabulation of Q1 and Q78.
The majority of respondents were not certain that 2014 presidential elections would make their life better. Only 43% were optimistic while 12% believed that elections would make their life worse and 19% believed that it would make no difference (Figure 66). Slightly more men (43%) than women (40%) believed that the Presidential elections in 2014 would make their live better. More respondents who thought that government had done enough to address corruption (47%), than who believed otherwise (41%) thought the result of the Presidential elections would make their life better.46

Half of respondents believed that women should decide for themselves when it comes to voting in elections (Figure 67). Almost one quarter of respondents believed that men should decide for

46 Cross tabulation Q2 and Q79.
women who they should vote for. Respondents’ view about women’s voting differed by gender and place of residence. Men (54%) more frequently than women (45%) stated that women should decide for themselves in terms of voting. In addition, men in general showed slightly more favorable views than women about women’s independent decision making when it comes to voting (Figure 67). This might reflect men’s confirmation bias and trying to express more liberal views as they were asked this question by urbanized male enumerators. Alternatively, perhaps men might really have more liberal views than women about women’s voting.

Furthermore, 62% of respondents in urban areas, compared to 44% of rural dwellers, believed that women should decide for themselves in terms of voting. Considerably more respondents who stated that they would not vote for corrupt individuals (50%) than those who said that they vote for corrupt individuals (35%) held that women should decide for themselves for whom to vote.  

| Q81. Are you aware of any efforts being taken by the Afghan Government to reconcile with armed opposition groups? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | No | Refuse to answer | Don’t know |
| 52 | 28 | 3 | 18 |

*Figure 68: Awareness of reconciliation*

| Q82. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Yes | No | Refuse to answer | Don’t know |
| 48 | 22 | 3 | 28 |

*Figure 69: Reconciliation and stability*

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47 Cross tabulation Q66 and Q80.
A majority of respondents (52%) were aware of the reconciliation efforts of the government with the armed opposition (Figure 66). Only 48% of respondents thought that reconciliation efforts between the Afghan government and the armed opposition can help stabilize the country (Figure 69). More men than women were optimistic about reconciliation efforts; 60% of men, compared to 37% of women, believed that the reconciliation efforts can help stabilize the country. More urban residents (29%) than rural dwellers (19%) believed that the reconciliation efforts do not help destabilize the country. Respondents with primary and high school education were also more optimistic about the success of reconciliation effort than those with no literacy or with university education.
Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption has worsened over the past five years. The negative impacts of corruption are rife, particularly in terms of access to basic public services and views of state legitimacy. Corruption undermines households’ welfare and has deleterious effects on security, political stability and economic growth.

Given that the Afghan state is expected to take full responsibility for providing security and public services in 2014, corruption could highly undermine the prospect of successful transition. Corruption undermines social equality and leads to widened gap between the rich and the poor, which in turn could contribute to increased support for insurgent groups and political instability. In addition, corruption leads to rent-seeking opportunities and undermines rule of law and protection of property rights, which in turn may deter investment and undermine economic growth and development.

In spite of the negative impacts of corruption and the urgency of addressing corruption as the country faces transition, there have been very limited improvements in terms of reducing corruption. Instead, the study showed further monetization and institutionalization of corruption. Bribery remained the most common form of corruption and reliance on commission-takers was prevalent while respondents had a high level of confidence in obtaining desired services through bribery.

People’s expectations from the government in fighting corruption remained unmet. The majority of respondents were not satisfied with the government’s efforts to tackle corruption, and respondents were even less satisfied with the efforts of the international community. The majority of respondents doubted the commitment of the international community to address corruption.

Almost half of respondents believed that transition will be successful and the state will be capable of providing security after transition. However, another half of respondents doubted the capacity of the Afghan security forces to ensure security. They saw corruption as the second most important factor undermining the capacity of the Afghan national forces to provide security. A considerable proportion of respondents also believed that corruption helped the expansion of the Taliban.
This survey was the fourth biannual survey of its kind, which was conducted September through December 2012 and surveyed 7,798 households across 34 provinces. The data collection was conducted by 5 supervisors and 68 surveyors (34 male and 34 female) that were hired and overseen by IWA. The data collection was completed in three months. Only Afghans over 18 years old, residing in Afghanistan, were interviewed for this survey. The margin of sampling error is +/- 1% at a 95% confidence interval at the national level.

Distribution of sampling points by province and rural/urban strata

In order to insure that the interview sample was representative of the Afghan population and represented different socioeconomic, regional and ethnic diversity of the country, a multi-stage sampling procedure was adopted. The first consideration was the rural/urban divide of the country’s population. In order to be representative, 23% of the survey sample was selected from the urban centres while 77% of respondents came from rural areas. In this survey, an urban population was defined as the people who lived within provincial municipal limits, i.e., those residing in municipality districts in provincial centres. In the second stage, the number of interviews in each province was proportional to the province population compared to the country’s population, based on population estimates from the Central Statics Organization (CSO). In a few provinces, however, such as Nimroz, Noristan and Panjshir, the number of interviews was deliberately oversampled (three times higher than the province population). The goal of oversampling was to ensure a minimum of 200 interviews in these provinces in order to reduce the margin of sampling error at the provincial level. Third, the sample in each province was divided into a roughly equal number of male and female respondents to ensure gender-sensitive representation. Interviews with male and female respondents were conducted by the surveyors of the same gender in order to observe cultural norms in Afghanistan.

To ensure that the geographical distribution of the sample in the rural areas is representative of the rural population, at least two districts, including at least eight villages, were randomly selected in each province. Since some of the randomly selected villages were not accessible due to insecurity, snow or being located in very remote areas, they were replaced by other randomly selected villages. The total number of rural interviews in each province was then equally divided among the selected districts. During the data collection one reserve list was designed and for those villages, which were very insecure and/or were not reachable, we drew from the reserve list. The following section provides the details of the villages that were replaced due to insecurity, snowfall or remoteness.

Overall, 27% of the sampling villages (104 sampling points) were replaced by other randomly selected villages. 93% of these villages were inaccessible due to a lack of security, 5% due to heavy snowfall, and 2% due to being located in highly remote areas. The following tables list the number of replaced villages in each province and the reason for replacement.
National Corruption Survey 2014, List of replacements and the reason in each province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province Name</th>
<th>Insecurity</th>
<th>Remoteness</th>
<th>Snow</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BADAKHSHAN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALKH</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAYKUNDI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARYAB</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>HERAT</td>
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<td>JAWZJAN</td>
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<td>UROZGAN</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARDAK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>104</td>
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### National Corruption Survey 2014, List of replacement villages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Province Name</th>
<th>District Name</th>
<th>Village Name</th>
<th>Snow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>Bala Murghab</td>
<td>GULAB MIRANZAI</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>Bala Murghab</td>
<td>ZAMAN</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>Ghormach</td>
<td>NAGHARA KHANA</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>Jawand</td>
<td>BALRAB</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>Jawand</td>
<td>KUSHK</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>Jawand</td>
<td>SHAYESTA</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>BALKH</td>
<td>Chimtal</td>
<td>BORMA</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>BALKH</td>
<td>Kishindeh</td>
<td>QESHLAQ JOURA BAI</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>BALKH</td>
<td>Kishindeh</td>
<td>PAITOW</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>BALKH</td>
<td>Sholgara</td>
<td>SHORCHA</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>DAYKUNDI</td>
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### Population Estimation for NCS 2014

According to the Central Statistics Office’s household data, the total population of Afghanistan, based on 1.0205 annual growth rate, was estimated 25,104,920 in the year 2012. It was further estimated that 20,147,254 of the total population lived in rural areas while the urban population was estimated 4,957,667. Furthermore, the total population over 18 years old is estimated 11,026,531 while the rural population over 18 is estimated 8,826,045 and urban proportion to be 2,200,486. The following table shows these distributions in each province.

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### Population Estimations: Rural vs. Urban

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<td>351,550</td>
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<td>173,210</td>
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<td>349,991</td>
<td>143,732</td>
<td>3,309</td>
<td>147,041</td>
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<td>1,456,032</td>
<td>557,503</td>
<td>97,379</td>
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</tr>
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<td>40,965</td>
<td>13,683</td>
<td>54,648</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>142,038</td>
<td>59,756</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>59,756</td>
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<td>877,391</td>
<td>369,231</td>
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<td>372,036</td>
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<td>25,037</td>
<td>558,347</td>
<td>233,308</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>244,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANJ SHER</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>118,422</td>
<td>55,753</td>
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<td>55,753</td>
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<td>339,695</td>
<td>137,874</td>
<td>15,640</td>
<td>153,515</td>
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<td>32,554</td>
<td>479,657</td>
<td>200,750</td>
<td>13,472</td>
<td>214,223</td>
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<td>247,114</td>
</tr>
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<td>ZABUL</td>
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<td>8,898</td>
<td>265,607</td>
<td>103,083</td>
<td>3,453</td>
<td>106,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>20,147,254</td>
<td>4,957,667</td>
<td>25,104,920</td>
<td>8,826,045</td>
<td>2,200,486</td>
<td>11,026,531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**National Corruption Survey Probability Sampling by province**

In order to calculate the total number interviews in each province, the population over 18 in each province was divided by 2000. If the result was less than 200, oversampling was carried out to ensure a minimum of 200 interviews in each province. For instance, the total population of those over 18 in Badakhshan was 398,252. The random sample of 1/2000 in the province was equal to 199, but with oversampling of 1 unit, the total number of interviews carried out in Badakhshan was 200. The
Following table lists the probability sampling in each province in addition to the corresponding oversampling factor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province Name</th>
<th>Probability sample</th>
<th>Oversample</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BADGHIS</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAGHLAN</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BALKH</td>
<td>265</td>
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<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAMYAN</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAYKUNDI</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
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<td>FARAH</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARYAB</td>
<td>214</td>
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<td>214</td>
</tr>
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<td>GHAZNI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghor</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>KABUL</td>
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<td>610</td>
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<tr>
<td>KANDAHAR</td>
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<td>KAPISA</td>
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<tr>
<td>KHOST</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>KUNARHA</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUNDUZ</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAGHMAN</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
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<td>LOGAR</td>
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<td>126</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NANGARHAR</td>
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<td>200</td>
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</tr>
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<td>PAKTYA</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PANJSHIR</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>172</td>
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</tr>
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<td>SAMANGAN</td>
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<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
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Sampling Distribution: Urban vs. Rural

While the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s population live in rural areas, in some of the provinces this is even more extreme and the urban population is very small compared to rural population. In order to ensure the provincial samples are representative, in those provinces with very small urban population, the sample was selected entirely from rural areas. Only in 15 provinces was the urban population significant enough to be included in the survey sample. The following table shows the distribution of interviews in the urban and rural areas in each province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province Name</th>
<th># of final interview - Urban area</th>
<th># of Interview - Rural area</th>
<th>Total Number of interview per province</th>
<th># of Urban Cluster</th>
<th># of Rural Cluster</th>
<th>Total cluster number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>DAYKUNDI</td>
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<td>200</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FARAH</td>
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<td>10</td>
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</tr>
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<td>PAKTIKA</td>
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</tr>
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<td>160</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selection of communities and households

The sample communities were randomly selected in each rural and urban district. In order to increase the number of urban and rural communities in each province, the number of interviews was limited to 20 interviews in each community. In each village or town, a starting point (often, a mosque or a school) and a cardinal direction was given to surveyors who selected households following a random walk procedure. The total number of households in the village has been divided by 20 to be selected for interviews, the first interview was with a male and the second interview was the female interview. For example if in a village had 200 households the interval in this village is 20, first house was selected randomly and after that after every 20 household have been selected for an interview. If no adult of the required sex was available in a house for the interview, the interviewer moved to the next right house to complete his interview.

No sorting or selection by age took place at household level.

After the completion of interviews, IWA’s local monitors were provided with the information regarding the location of the settlements and targeted households. They randomly monitored both the sampling and the conduct of the interviews by inquiring among household members about verifiable information concerning the households that were registered by surveyors.

Training of Surveyors

Surveyors were trained in five separate trainings in the major regional centres. A maximum of 19 enumerators (a roughly equal number of males and females) were trained in the language in which they were to conduct the interviews. In total, enumerators were trained for two days; each training included a general course on the purpose and modality of quantitative research, techniques of interviewing, proper household and respondent selection, review of the questionnaire content, elementary use of the GPS devices, class simulations of interviews and, finally, inside and outside test interviews to assess the performance and understanding of the surveyors. As the following table shows, one training was held in the province of Balkh for all northern provinces, one in Herat for the western provinces, one in Kandahar for the southern provinces, and two trainings in Kabul (one for Dari-speaking regions and one for Pashto-speaking regions).

<table>
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<th>Location</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Number of supervisor</th>
<th>Fem</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Number of Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul Pashtu Training</td>
<td>8th and 10th October 2013</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13th and 15th October 2013</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar Training</td>
<td>8th and 10th October 2013</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart Training</td>
<td>13th and 15th October 2013</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of surveyors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quality control
After the questionnaires had been completed and returned to Kabul, all provinces were divided into 
four zones for verification purposes. IWA’s monitors crosschecked both the sampling and the proper 
filling of the questionnaires. At least two districts per province surveyed were selected. For each, a 
random sample of questionnaires was verified. 12% of the total interviews were crosschecked in this 
way. Furthermore, a different team of men and women controlled the quality of the interviews by a 
similar procedure, but over the phone from Kabul.

Calibration and weighting
The raw data resulting from the random sampling matched most of the basic characteristics of the 
Afghan population as provided by other major surveys and the figures of the Central Statistics 
Organization, except in the case of the level of literacy. Nonetheless, weights were applied to some 
indicators to bring them as close as possible to the population distribution at both the national and 
provincial levels. At the national level, the structure by age (18+ years of age) was maintained for 
each province on the basis of statistics provided by the Households Listing survey of the Central 
Statistics Office. This included a recalibration of the oversampling in Nimroz, Nuristan and Panjshir 
provinces. Furthermore, data was calibrated at the national level according to six basic indicators 
(rural/urban, sex, ethnicity, literacy, age and employment) before being calibrated at the provincial 
level for sex and literacy variables. Calibration at the provincial level was carried out to ensure a 
representative sample in each province. This did not have a significant impact on calibrated data at 
the national level.
APPENDIX II: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS AND EXPERIENCES SURVEY

Q1. What is the biggest problem in Afghanistan?
1. Insecurity
2. Corruption
3. Illegal drugs
4. Presence of armed groups
5. Lack of development
6. Unemployment
7. Access to education
8. Access to health
9. Access to justice
10. Access to water and electricity
11. Lack of political freedoms
12. Other
13. Don’t know

Q2. What is the biggest problem in Afghanistan that the government must address?
1. Insecurity
2. Corruption
3. Illegal drugs
4. Presence of armed groups
5. Lack of development
6. Unemployment
7. Access to education
8. Access to health
9. Access to justice
10. Access to water and electricity
11. Lack of political freedoms
12. Other
13. Don’t know

Q3. Do you think the government has done enough to address the problem over the last two years?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know

Q4. In your judgment, is the government present in your village or town?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know

Q5. In your view, do the people mentioned here work for the benefit of all the people, for the benefit of some, or only for their own benefit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>For The Benefit of All People</th>
<th>For The Benefit of Some of the People</th>
<th>For Their Own Benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Provincial Governor?</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Ministers?</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President of</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Members of Parliament?</th>
<th>B</th>
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<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Q6. In your opinion, is corruption a common occurrence in the country?
1. Yes
2. No
3. don't know

Q7. In your opinion, has corruption become a more significant problem over the last two years?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know

Q8. Which sector has more corruption?
1. Private sector
2. Civilian part of public sector
3. National security organizations including National Police, Security Directorate and National Army
4. Foreign organizations, NGOs and the civil society sector
5. Foreign military
6. Political parties
7. Media
8. Other
9. Don’t know

Q9. Which public institutions do you consider the most corrupt? [List up to three respecting the priority of spontaneous responses given]
First choice / Second choice / Third choice
And for 3 chosen institutions, please select the reason(s) you think are explaining the corruption within this specific institution (check the matching box)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INSTITUTION</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>O</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name below</td>
<td>The management team is corrupted</td>
<td>The salaries of staff are too low</td>
<td>The staff do not have interest for citizen or common good</td>
<td>The capacity of the staff is too low</td>
<td>Their work must be computerized to avoid corruption</td>
<td>There is no monitoring body above the institution to control it</td>
<td>Other specify</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Justice</td>
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<td>Directorate of National Security</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Q10. Do you believe there have been some improvements in reducing corruption in any public institution during the last 12 months?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know

Q11. If yes, in which state institutions have you seen progress?
[List up to three respecting the priority of spontaneous responses given]
First choice / Second choice / Third choice
6. Ministry of Education 18. President’s Office
11. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development 23. Other & specify
12. Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation & Livestock

THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT YOU PERSONNALLY (not family, colleagues or friends)

Q12. Roughly speaking, how many times have you actually sought government services over the last 12 months?
1. Never 3. Two to three times 5. Seven to ten times
2. Once 4. Four to six times 6. Eleven or more times

Q13. Have you personally as an individual experienced corruption over the last 12 months?
1. Yes 3. Refused to answer
2. No

Q14. If yes, how many times have you personally faced corruption over the last 12 months?
1. Once 4. Four times 7. Eleven or more times
2. Twice 5. Five Times
3. Three times 6. Six to ten times

Q15. If yes, which form of corruption have you experienced? [Multiple responses]?
1. Paid a sum of money
2. Offered a gift or Sherenee
3. Paid a professional commission-taker or commissionkar
4. Paid in livestock such as goats, sheep, cow etc.
5. Paid in harvest such as wheat etc.
6. Exchange of favour or service [Skip to Q 19]
7. Nepotism [Skip to Q 19]
8. Used ethnic, tribal, personal or family relations [Skip to Q 19]
9. Other [Skip to Q 19]
10. Refuse to answer [Skip to Q 19]

Q16. If yes, how many times have you been forced by corrupt officials to commit corruption through paying in cash or in kind?
1. Once
2. Twice
3. Three times
4. Four times
5. Five Times
6. Six to ten times
7. Eleven or more than eleven times

Q17. If you paid a sum of money, a gift, part of harvest or livestock or any other material item, when was the last time you paid that?
1. one month
2. two month
3. three month
4. four month
5. five month
6. six month
7. seven month
8. eight month
9. nine month
10. ten month
11. eleven month
12. twelve month
13. Don’t know

Q18. What was the amount of the bribe paid the last time you personally paid a bribe [if in kind, please estimate the monetary value]?
1. Less than 100 AfS
2. Between 100 AfS and 500 AfS
3. Between 501 AfS and 2,000 AfS
4. Between 2,001 AfS and 10,000 AfS
5. More than 10,000 AfS

NOW THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT YOU AND YOUR HOUSEHOLD (members of your house)
So if something happen to you but not your household member it should be still included here.
And the contrary if something happen to a member of your household but not you, it should be included here

Q19. How much have you or a member of your household paid a bribe, a gift or other material items to obtain any of the following state services over the last twelve months and what was the amount? 
(Read the options randomly)
Not paid / less than 500/ between 501 AfS and 2,000 AfS / between 2,001 AfS and 10,000 AfS / more than 10,000 AfS

1. Security by Police
2. Justice by Courts
3. Payment of duties to Customs
4. Payment of taxes to Ministry of Finance or tax authorities
5. Primary and secondary education
6. Higher education
7. Hospitals or health services
8. Housing or resettlement service
9. Land and property registry, sale and purchase
10. Construction permit
11. Electricity provided by the government
12. ID cards & passport
13. Arbab of village or wakil-e-guzar of town
14. Employment and social affairs
15. Martyrs and disabled services
16. Haj services
17. Transport services including driving license

Q20. How do you assess the general effect of corruption or bribes on your household including you? [Definition: the household includes all individuals who share daily food under a same roof]
1. None
2. Little
3. Considerable
4. Extremely high
5. Don’t know

Q21. Has the financial burden due to corruption on your household including you over the last 12 months ..........?
1. Increased?
2. Decreased?
3. Stayed the same?
4. I don’t know
Q22. To which of the following government services does your household including you have access from the village or the town in which you live?

Yes / No / Don’t know

1. Police
2. Courts
3. Primary and secondary education
4. Hospitals or health services
5. Housing or resettlement service
6. Electricity provided by the government
7. ID cards
8. Arbab of village or wakil-e-guzar of town
9. Employment, social affairs, martyrs and disabled
10. Haj services
11. Transport services and traffic department
12. National Solidarity Program

Q23. In which state services has the existence of corruption had a negative impact on your household including you? [List the two responses given spontaneously]

First response / Second response

1. Security by Police
2. Justice by Courts
3. Payment of duties to Customs
4. Payment of taxes to Ministry of Finance or tax authorities
5. Primary and secondary education
6. Higher education
7. Hospitals or health services
8. Housing or resettlement service
9. Land and property registry, sale and purchase
10. Construction permit
11. Electricity provided by the government
12. ID cards, passport
13. Arbab of village or wakil-e-guzar of town
14. Employment and social affairs
15. Martyrs and disabled services
16. Haj services
17. Transport services including getting driving license
18. Other

Q24. How certain were you or was your household member that the bribe you had to pay allowed services to be obtained?

1. Highly certain
2. Some certainty
3. Little certainty
4. Not certain at all

Q25. From what you remember or know, for which of those services have you used professional commission takers or commissionkar?

1. Did not pay bribe Go to Q26
2. Security by Police
3. Justice by Courts
4. Payment of duties to Customs
5. Payment of taxes to Ministry of Finance or tax authorities
6. Land and property registry, sale and purchase
7. Construction permit
8. Electricity provided by the government
9. ID cards & passport
10. Retirement pension
11. Martyrs and disabled services
12. Haj services
13. Transport services including driving license
14. Other

Q26. For which state services you or your household members were prevented from using the services due to corruption?
[Spontaneous responses]
Yes, deprived of the service / No, not deprived of the service / Don’t know
1. Security provided by Police
2. Justice provided by Courts
3. Payment of duties to Customs
4. Primary and secondary education
5. Higher education
6. Hospitals or health services
7. Housing or resettlement service
8. Land and property registry, sale and purchase
9. Construction permit
10. Electricity provided by the government
11. ID cards and/or passport
12. Municipal and district authority services
13. Employment and social affairs
14. Martyrs and disabled services
15. Haj services
16. Transport services including driving license

Q27. Have you or your household referred to the judiciary over the last 12 months? (If yes), did you face corruption?
1. Yes
2. No in this duration I never been to judiciary (skip to Q32)
3. No, I went to judiciary but I didn’t faced corruption (skip to Q32)
4. Don’t know (skip to Q32)

Q28. If faced corruption in the judiciary you or your household were ...?
1. As a complainant
2. As an accused
3. As a witness
4. Other

Q29. At what stage did the corruption occur?
[If more than one, list up to three]
(Spontaneous answers)
First / Second / Third
1. District Attorney’s Office
2. Provincial Attorney’s Office
3. Attorney General’s Office
4. District Court
5. Provincial Court
6. Supreme Court
7. Special Court
8. Provincial Justice Department
9. Provincial Administrative Tribunal
10. Other

Q30. Have you turned to other non-state justice providers to resolve the problem?
1. Yes
2. No (skip to Q33)
3. Refused to answer (skip to Q33)

Q31. If yes, who were they?
1. District Governor
2. District Chief of Police
3. Provincial Governor
4. Provincial Council Members
5. MPs of your province
6. Ministries in Kabul
7. NSP shuras
8. Local shuras or jirgas
9. Local commanders
10. Mullahs, malawis or any other individual with religious credentials
11. Other local influential figures including tribal elders
12. Taliban courts
13. By yourself or your family (own revenge)
14. Other
15. Refused to answer

Q32. Have you or your household had to deal with land or property issues over the last 12 months? (If yes), did you face corruption?
1. Yes
2. No, in the past 12 month I don’t had any dispute (skip to Q37)
3. No, We had dispute but we didn’t face any corruption (skip to Q37)
4. Don’t know (skip to Q37)
Q33. If faced with corruption on land or property issues, you or your household were...?
1. Transferring property
2. Buying land or property
3. Selling land or property
4. Distributing land or property
5. Determining boundaries of land or property
6. Paying land or property taxes
7. Resolving disputes with immediate neighbours
8. Other

Q34. Where did corruption happen? If more than one, list up to three.
1. District office
2. Police district office
3. District’s court offices
4. Provincial court offices
5. Provincial amlak office
6. Provincial Justice Department of Ministry of Justice
7. Provincial Administrative Tribunal of Ministry of Justice
8. Refugees and Returnees Ministry’s provincial department
9. Municipality or district authority
10. Amlak Department of Ministry of Agriculture
11. MRRD provincial offices
12. Other district offices
13. Other provincial offices
14. Others specify

Q35. Have you turned to other non-state institutions to resolve the land or property problem?
1. Yes
2. No (skip to Q37)
3. Refused to answer (skip to Q37)

Q36. If yes, who were they?
1. Local shuras or jirgas
2. Local commanders
3. Mullahs, mawlawis, or any other individuals with religious standing
4. Other local influential figures
5. Taliban courts
6. By yourself or your family
7. Other
8. Refused to answer

Q37. Have you or your household faced corruption in the police during the last 12 months?
1. Yes
2. No, in the past 12 month I didn’t asked for service (skip to Q40)
3. No, I asked for services but did not face with corruption
4. Refused to answer

Q38. If you or your household faced corruption in the police, what was the purpose of your interaction?
1. House, shop, office or car robbery
2. Livestock and harvest robbery
3. Robbery in public places and pickpocket
4. Death, injury or other physical damage
5. Circulation accident or violation of traffic law
6. Illegal trafficking of drugs or other illegal products
7. Kidnapping and human trafficking
8. Moral crimes such as rape, adultery, use of alcohol and drugs
9. Verification of ID card, driving license or passport that was not available
10. Other specify
Q39. Where did the corruption happen?
1. At police headquarters
2. On the road or in a open environment by patrolling police
3. At home
4. At work place
5. Other, specify

Q40. Have your household paid bribes to government officials in order to maintain the main source of the revenue for the household over the last twelve months?
1. Yes
2. No [skip to Q 42]
3. Don’t know [skip to Q 42]
4. Refused to answer [skip to Q 42]

Q41. If paid, what was the amount paid?
1. Less than 500 Afs
2. Between 501 Afs and 2,000 Afs
3. Between 2,001 Afs and 10,000 Afs
4. Between 10,001 Afs and 20,000 Afs
5. More than 20,000 Afs

Q42. Have you or a member of your household been victim of nepotism either in the state administration or with NGOs, international organizations or private companies during the last twelve months?
[Definition of nepotism: abuse of authority for according advantages to one’s own family members or relatives in recruiting or promoting]
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Q43. Would you rely on nepotism if this is necessary to secure a job?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don’t know
4. Refused to answer

Q44. Have you or a member of your household filed a formal complaint related to corruption over the last 12 months?
1. Yes
2. No (skip to Q46)
3. Don’t know (skip to Q46)
4. Refused to answer

Q45. If yes, what were the channels used to file the complaint?
[If more than one, circle up to 3 options]
1. The Attorneys or the Attorney General
2. The Courts or the Supreme Court
3. The Special Commissions of Meshrano or WolesiJirgas
4. Ministers of Deputy-Ministers
5. Province or District Governors
6. Former GIAAC or current HOO
7. Other
8. Do not remember/Refused to answer
Q46. On a scale of one to five where one is the most common and five the most uncommon, how would you rate the following forms of corruption in Afghanistan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Form of Corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Highly common/ Common/ Relatively common/ Un common/ Highly uncommon</td>
<td>Giving money or bribe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Using social relationships or favoritism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embezzlement or illegal use of money under one’s authority</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Modifying and/or establishing laws and regulations for one’s private or group interests</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Involvement in falsifying of documents or fraud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Court tempering</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Misuse or stealing of government property</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sexual extortion or exploitation going from harassment to assault</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Q47. On a scale of one to five where one is the most acceptable and five the most unacceptable, how would you assess the following attitudes of the civil servants vis-à-vis state customers?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating/ Don’t know</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most acceptable</td>
<td>Creating unduly difficulties as indirect request for bribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>Asking directly for money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively acceptable</td>
<td>Asking money from the poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unacceptable/ Most unacceptable</td>
<td>Asking for gift against small services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not performing official task in an appropriate time while expecting to be offered a bribe</td>
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<td>Civil servants’ taking money with the excuse that they don’t have enough income</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Reducing taxes and customs duties in exchange for taking a percentage of them</td>
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</table>

Q48. Would you protect your interests through bribery if you had an opportunity to do so?

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<tr>
<th>Option</th>
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<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
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</table>

Q49. Would you buy products from a company that you know to be involved in corruption and the prices of which are slightly lower than market prices?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Option</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
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</table>

Q50. Do you trust private banks in Afghanistan to put your money?

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<th>Option</th>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, skip to Q.53</td>
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<tr>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
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</table>

Q51. If no, what is the main reason?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Islamic banking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banks involved in corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Risk of loss of money</td>
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<td>Weak financial management and leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Q52. How do you feel when you pay a bribe?

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<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Guilty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As a sinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relieved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worried</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honoured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powerful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, specify</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Q53. In your opinion, how is a corrupt person perceived in the Afghan society?
1. Guilty
2. As a sinner
3. Poor
4. Powerful
5. Clever, smart
6. Nasty
7. Selfish (self centred)
8. Venal
9. Other, specify

Q54. In your opinion, how is a corrupt person perceived in his closed social environment?
1. Guilty
2. As a sinner
3. Poor
4. Powerful
5. Clever, smart
6. Nasty
7. Selfish (self centred)
8. Venal
9. Generous
10. Other, specify

Q55. Compared with previous governments, which type of relationship was most usually relied on in corrupt actions under the Karzai governments?
1. Family relationships
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or faction links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. None

Q56. On a scale of one to three where one is the least important factor so three is the most important in causing corruption, how do you assess the following factors?
Least important / Important /Most important / Don't know
1. Weak law enforcement and weak government control
2. Lack of sanctions and discipline among civil servants
3. Low salary among civil servants
4. Civil servants feel protected and are, indeed, supported by superiors or political leaders
5. Lack of political will at the highest levels of the state
6. No objection of the state beneficiaries of state services to corruption
7. Public administration is not monitored by civil society and Parliament
8. Large influx of donor money

Q57. From your or your household’s experience, what kind of relationship is most often relied on in corrupt actions?
1. Individual
2. Family
3. Ethnic
4. Religious
5. Party
6. Alliance or faction
7. Professional
8. Political
9. Acquaintance with local commanders
10. Acquaintance with high-level officials
11. Other, specify

Q58. From you or your household’s experience, which type of individual is most often the intermediary in bribe-taking?
1. Relatives
2. Acquaintances
3. Intermediary or commission-takers
4. Civil servants
5. Customers with experience of corruption
6. Other
Q59. Have you heard the Taliban denouncing corruption in the Afghan state?
Yes  No

Q60. In your view, is corruption within the state facilitating the expansion of the Taliban?
1. Yes, absolutely  3. Absolutely not (skip to Q62)
2. Yes, a little  4. Don’t know (skip to Q62)

Q61. If yes, corruption within which institutions is helping the most the expansion of the Taliban?
1. Provincial and District Governor Offices
2. Provincial and District Police
3. Courts and Attorney’s Offices
4. Customs
5. Central government
6. Other, specify

Q62. On a scale of one to five where one is the least effective and five is the most efficient, who is the most efficient in reducing corruption in Afghanistan?
(Please read)
Least efficient/ Most efficient/ Don’t know
4. Taliban leaders  9. Tribal and local influential leaders  14. The judiciary
5. NGOs  10. Commanders

Q63. On a scale of one to five where one is the least efficient and five the most effective, how do you assess the anti-corruption performance of the following over the last twelve months?
Least efficient / Most efficient / Don’t know
1. The President  5. Your District Governor or Mayor
3. The Head of the High Office of Oversight  7. MEC
4. Your Provincial Governor

Q64. On a scale of one to five where one is the least able and five the most able, who within the Afghan government do you consider to be the most able in fighting corruption in the state administration in the coming year?
Least efficient / Most efficient / Don’t know
15. The President  20. Your province Governor  23. Head of Control and Audit Office
16. Attorney General  21. Your Mayor or District Governor  24. Other, specify
17. Minister of Interior  18. Minister of Justice  22. Head of High Oversight
19. Minister of Finance  30. Amrullah Saleh  34. Bismillah Khan

Q65. When you think about people in combating corruption, who is the one person in Afghanistan who you view most favorably?[List up to three spontaneous answers]
First choice / Second choice / Third choice
25. Hamid Karzai
26. Abdullah Abdullah
27. Ramazan Bashardost
28. Ashraf Ghani
29. Abdal Raouf Ibrahimi
30. Amrullah Saleh
31. Abdul Hadi Arghandiwal
32. Mohammad Ishaq Aloko
33. Abdul Salam Azimi
34. Bismillah Khan
35. Anwar-ul-Haq Ahadi
36. Hanif Atmar
Q66. Would you vote for someone who you believe is corrupt?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know 4. Refused to answer

Q67. To what extent do you believe that the government officials abuse their authorities for their own benefit or so that they could control the economic activities of the country?
1. Very much 2. Much 3. Little 4. Not doing this at all 5. I don’t know

Q68. In your opinion, how much do the government officials informally control the distribution, selling and management of land?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know

Q69. Has the existence of corruption in the public sector caused land or property disputes in your area over the last 12 months?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know

Q70. Has your household experienced any dispute over access to irrigation water that has resulted in corruption or paying a bribe over the last twelve months?
1. No dispute experienced 2. Dispute existed, but not resulted in corruption or bribe 3. Dispute resulted in corruption or bribe

Q71. Have you heard any member of the international community speaking against corruption in Afghanistan over the last 12 months?
1. Yes 2. No (skip to Q73)

Q72. If yes, who have you often heard speaking?

Q73. Do you believe the international community wants to fight corruption?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know

Q74. Do you believe the members of the international community are supportive of honest government officials in your province?
1. Yes 2. No 3. Don’t know
Q75. Do you think the government will be able to successfully ensure the transition of power from international military forces by mid-2014?
1. Yes
2. No skip Q77
3. Don’t know skip 77

Q76. If yes, do you believe the Afghan security forces will be able to ensure the security of the country?
1. Yes (Skip to Q78) 2. No 3. Don’t know

Q77. If no, for what reasons do you think the Afghan security forces will not be able to ensure security?

Q78. Let’s focus on elections. Please tell me if there was an opportunity to vote for each of the following types of elections in your area, could you take part in the election?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Did you vote?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. District shura</td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refuse to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Community Development Council</td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refuse to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Provincial council</td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refuse to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Parliamentary</td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refuse to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Presidential</td>
<td>1. Yes 2. No 3. Refuse to answer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Don’t know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q79. In 2014, there will be an election for a new President in Afghanistan. Do you think the result of the Presidential election in 2014 is likely to make your life better, make your life worse, or have no impact on your life?
1. Better
2. Worse
3. No Difference
4. Refuse to answer
5. Don’t know

Q80. Do you think that women should decide who to vote for themselves or should men decide for their women who they should vote for?

1. Women should decide for themselves
2. Men should decide for women
3. Women should decide for themselves but in consultation with men
4. Refuse to answer
5. Don’t know

RECONCILIATION

“Reconciliation” is the process which takes place when two or several opposing parties overcome a grievance and start to rebuild their relationships to be able to work together for the benefit of the Afghan people

Q.81 Are you aware of any efforts being taken by the Afghan Government to reconcile with armed opposition groups?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to answer
4. Don’t know

Q.82 Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can help to stabilize the country, or not?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Refuse to answer
4. Don’t know

PERSONAL DATA

Q.83. Ethnic group
1. Pashtun
2. Tajik
3. Uzbek
4. Hazara
5. Turkmen
6. Aimaq
7. Arab
8. Baluch
9. Pashai
10. Nuristani
11. Other
12. Refused

Q.84. Respondent's phone number: __________________________________________________

Q.85. Sex
1. Male
2. Female

Q.86. Marital status
1. Single
2. Married
3. Widow/widower
4. Refused

Q.87. Are you now working, retired, looking for a job, student, an housewife?
1. Working
2. Student
3. Retired
4. Housewife
5. Looking for a job (unemployed)

Q.88. If working, you work as:
1. Civil servant
2. Farmer, shepherd, or stockbreeder, including Kuchis (Pashtun nomads)
3. Farm laborer (on other’s land)
4. Self-employed professional
5. NGO, United Nations, or other international organization employee
6. Foreign military employee
7. Private security or military company
8. Political personnel (party, Member of Parliament, Provincial Council member)
9. Other
10. Refused

Q.89. If a self-employed professional, please detail
1. Small-business owner such as shopkeeper or other informal sales
2. Skilled worker or artisan such as mason, carpenter
3. Trader (import/export)
4. Executive director or manager of a private production company
5. Media and communication professional
6. Taxi, truck, bus, or car driver
7. Other

Q.90. How many people are living in your households?
1. One
2. Two
3. Three
4. Four
5. Five
6. Six
7. Seven
8. Eight
9. Nine
10. Ten
11. Eleven
12. Twelve or more

Q.91. How old are you?
|   |   | Year

Q.92. What is your level of education?
1. Illiterate
2. Semi-literate (can read and write)
3. Completed primary school (level 6)
4. Completed Secondary School
5. Completed high school (level 12)
6. Bachelors (level 6)
7. Master’s or above

Q.93. How many people were breadwinners in your household during the last 12 months?
1. None
2. One
3. Two
4. Three
5. More than three

Q.94. Are you a breadwinner?
1. Yes
2. No

Q.95. What is the average income of your household in a month?
|   |   | Per month

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Q.96. How has the income of your household evolved compared to last year?

1. Has increased
2. Has decreased
3. Is the same
4. Don’t know