Afghan Perceptions of Corruption
A Survey Across Thirteen Provinces

Integrity Watch Afghanistan

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Acknowledgments:

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All material contained in this survey is believed to be accurate as of January 30th, 2007. Every effort has been made to verify the information contained herein, including allegations. Nevertheless, Integrity Watch Afghanistan does not accept the responsibility for the consequences of the use of this information for other purposes or in other contexts. Particular efforts were made to increase the cost-efficiency of this survey.

The details of the survey expenses as well as the complete report are available at IWA’s office and will be available on www.iwaweb.org

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Executive Summary:

The attention of media, Afghans and international organizations on corruption in Afghanistan has risen since Kabul’s riots of May 2006. Integrity Watch Afghanistan has been providing policy-oriented research to increase transparency, integrity and accountability in Afghanistan since August 2005 and felt the need for a comprehensive study of Afghan perceptions of corruption. This study is looking at how corruption is perceived and actually experienced by more than one thousand two hundred and fifty Afghans in thirteen provinces. This survey provides us with data on the most corrupt institutions, as per Afghan perceptions, how corruption is practiced by them, and the impact of corruption on Afghan society. The results are alarming:

Corruption is endemic in Afghanistan, as it is in many third world countries. However, over the last five years, corruption has soared to levels not seen in previous administrations and now risks undermining the legitimacy of the government.

Corruption is becoming a common phenomenon when dealing with state institutions. Over 40 percent of our respondents said they had to pay a bribe to get things done with the government, although it was still possible to function without giving into corruption; 56 percent of respondents said that corruption had little or no effect on their households.

Even after assuming that perceptions of corruption may be higher than the actual experience of the respondents, the number of respondents who have given or taken bribes over the last 12 months are alarming. Over the last year, half of the respondents have paid bribes while two-thirds have seen their families suffer financially over the last year due to corruption.

Respondents from the southern areas of Afghanistan and in particular Kandahar, where the Taliban movement originated, were the most critical of corruption problems that existed during the Taliban period. This criticism suggests that they do not see the Taliban era as an idealized time of government to which they would want to return. However, the problems facing the current administration in the fight against corruption remain daunting. Some 65 percent said that corruption had a direct effect on their personal security.

Respondents were overwhelmingly cognizant of corruption as such and - whether or not they claimed to have participated in or abetted it - seemed aware that corrupt practices were not a desirable way to carry out administration.

Impunity and unaccountability on the part of civil servants were singled out as the main factors underpinning corruption. The government was seen as unable or unwilling to tackle it as shown by respondents who pointed to a lack of law enforcement, the impunity with which civil servants could take bribes and commit crimes as well as poor government policy in appointing the heads of institutions. The emergence of organized crime networks was also a cause for concern.

The emerging picture is bad news for the Karzai administration and for efforts towards administrative reform. Emerging institutions such as the media, the National Assembly and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission were seen less corrupt than the Government. However, other more traditional means such as tribal networks and Sharia law were perceived to be tools that could be used to tackle corruption. In rural areas, Sharia law is seen as a bulwark against the problem.
Afghans are not averse to state rule per se. Many respondents expressed a high degree of confidence in newly created governing bodies such as the new anti-corruption administration and the National Assembly, which could be interpreted as an expression of their hopes for reform.

Media and new state institutions such as Provincial Councils or special courts (particularly at the local level) still have enough legitimacy to fight corruption. The trust in these institutions contrasts with the lack of trust in older state institutions like existing courts and the police.

Some 60 percent of respondents perceived President Hamid Karzai’s administration to be more corrupt than that of the Taliban, Mujahiddin or the Communist periods. While under previous governments ethnic ties or political leanings enabled corruption, today money has become all-important, and those with access to ready cash can buy government appointments, bypass justice or evade police.

The poorest 20 percent of the population are the worst hit by corruption; respondents perceived it to be most evident in the courts, the municipalities and the Ministry of Interior - which controls the police. Over 60 percent of respondents said that corruption had increased their disaffection towards the state: figure so high that it risks undermining the legitimacy of the state and its backers in the international community.
Introduction:

This report summarizes the results of a survey on perceptions of Afghan administrative corruption, an issue that was addressed only partially in a few studies. Our report provides insight on what Afghans believe corruption to be, and its extent and impact on the Afghan population. This is the first perception survey conducted in a wide range of provinces among a wide range of population groups. Integrity Watch Afghanistan will use its results as a baseline for further surveys in order to measure the evolution of Afghans’ perceptions of administrative corruption and the perceived impact of administrative reforms.

The focus of our survey was administrative corruption, which we believe is the most visible part of the corruption phenomenon. Within that, our survey specifically focused on aspects of administrative corruption - bribery, obstruction, nepotism, etc. - to which ordinary citizens are most widely exposed when obtaining public and social services. We did not aim to record perceptions and experiences of grand corruption or corruption of a political nature because we believed prior to that, more qualitative studies had to be conducted on those issues. In addition, a large public survey may not be the best tool to study corruption amongst high officials and political elite in Afghanistan. The survey focused on the public sector, while the private sector and NGO-related corruption are only superficially looked at.

As mentioned before our survey is mainly about the perceptions of Afghans, meaning that their experiences of corruption have only been collected in a limited manner. A few questions in the survey (44, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 96 and 97) deal with the direct corruption experiences of individual respondents, however, the survey does not provide sufficient evidence for systematically linking perceptions with the experiences of corruption. By cross-checking between the corruption experienced by respondents and their perception of corruption, we observed that corruption perceptions were often an exaggeration of their experiences and that experience might have shaped the perception.

We assumed that there would be considerable differences in perceptions of corruption depending on the sex, place of residence, province, ethnicity, educational level of respondents and whether they were civil servants (CS) or ordinary citizens. These assumptions proved to be valid in many cases but not in all, showing that the level of education and ethnicity are not the main factors responsible for differences in corruption practices and in their perceptions. Cognizant of these assumptions, we addressed such characteristics systematically throughout the survey. We did observe distinct provincial differences, and we have tried to present these differences on maps. A forthcoming study by IWA and UNDP, which is mainly qualitative and based on focus group discussions and in-depth interviews, will be complementary to this survey in order to provide explanations for certain behaviours observed in this survey.

In order to represent regional and provincial characteristics, we selected 13 provinces from all regions: Badghis and Herat (West), Kandahar and Farah (South-West), Ghazni, Paktia and Khost (South), Nangarhar (East), Balkh and Baghlan (North), Bamiyan, Parwan and Kabul (Centre). The surveyed provinces were selected following representative criteria. The capital and the four most populous urban centres and a range of provinces with varying degrees of state authority and ethnic composition. The number of respondents per province was based on the population of each province. The average provinces (those containing neither a large city nor the capital) provided 64 respondents each, while in the four most populated provinces 128 respondents were interviewed and
the capital provided 225 respondents. The fieldwork was carried out in August and September 2006, just before the security situation deteriorated in the South. Yet, security constraints still limited the access to more remote areas; in Kandahar, interviews could not be conducted in remote villages, in Ghazni, we limited the number of interviews to the equivalent of those for the population of an average province, instead of 128 we only surveyed 64 people. The age structure is

The survey was designed in six parts following a method similar to the aforementioned forthcoming qualitative study based on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, in order to facilitate comparisons. The first section contextualises corruption by exploring the connotations Afghans give to it, what they consider acceptable or legitimate and what they consider unacceptable. The second section outlines the perceptions of where and how corrupt practices take place. The third part seeks to highlight the perceived causes and justifications people attach to administrative corruption. The fourth presents the perceived impacts on households, society, vulnerable groups, women, economy, state building, etc. Part Five shows the perceptions of the efficacy of a variety of old and new solutions proposed to curb administrative corruption. Finally, we wrap up with a diachronic overview of perceived corruption characteristics over the past forty to fifty years and continuing into the present.

Limitations of the Survey

1) The sample size is significant for most of the provinces but we observed that in certain cases the sample size might have been insufficient causing inconsistencies with certain provincial level results; however, this has negligible effect at the national level.

2) Security constraints limited the access to more remote areas; in Kandahar, interviews could not be conducted in remote villages in Ghazni, we had to limit the number of interviews.

3) Due to the low levels of literacy, the surveyors were filling out the questionnaire for respondents and the interaction with the surveyors itself may have influenced their responses.

4) A “recall bias” (when a past event is reinterpreted or reevaluated in the light of present experience) might have influenced respondents’ position on the perception of the evolution of corruption over time.

5) The sensitivity of corruption as an issue and the possible consequences of their response may have influenced respondents in their answers.

6) The relation between narcotics and corruption has not been covered by this survey: IWA is currently developing studies in this area.

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1 See figures 15 and 63 (Badghis), 39 and 41 (Khost)
Part I: Attitude towards corruption in Afghanistan

Part One aims to give the general picture about corruption and corrupt behaviour: what is acceptable and why? Corruption is considered a common fact of life and is seen to be relatively more acceptable amongst poor segments of the Afghan population. Corruption however reveals an aggregate phenomenon as displayed through diverse attitudes, social backgrounds and values shaping respondents’ perceptions of corruption, the plurality of the practices and activities defined as corruption, geographic differences in the need for the state’s services and in the administration’s performance leading to corruption. This also shows the ambivalent nature of perceptions regarding corruption. While it is generally condemned, in situ it becomes accepted, possible and justified on the ground of its utility or necessity.

A common occurrence

Two-thirds of the respondents thought that corruption was a common occurrence in the country and an established practice (Amr-e-mahmul in Dari) while one-third either thought that it was not a common phenomenon or said they did not know. There was no significant difference between the opinion of civil servants and the opinion of the general population. The certainty with regards to perceptions of corruption as an established practice slightly grew with the age of respondents.

Words for corruption

Respondents were asked to name three words most commonly used to indirectly ask for a bribe. Without any distinction of age, profession, marital status and ethnicity the respondents the following words were reported: gift (75%), “low income” (59%) and tea money (55%). All of these refer to petty corruption and have been justified on the ground that salaries are low. Shirini (Sweets) or Tohfa (Gift) is a donation and/or compensation when one obtains the expected service. The gift can be given before, during or after the service is obtained. It is a hybrid word used for bribing both the high and low ranked civil servants. Other common expressions are “low salary” or “lack of sufficient salary” - which are perhaps used as a rationale in order to accept or give bribes because the bribes serve as some sort of compensation for the insufficient salaries. This therefore refers more specifically to lower-income civil servants. In general, it is due to the initiative of the bribe-taking civil servant or his/her colleague that such a transaction takes place. Low-salary bribing can occur any time but most often happens when an agreement has been tacitly reached that the civil servant will render the expected service. The bribe is given most often during or immediately after the service is provided. Tea money has a similar origin as the shirini (sweets or chocolate) in that they both provide an “extra” to the lower-income civil servant’s subsistence.

In all cases, the three above words confirm the fact that corruption is an established practice. Furthermore, the existence of a widespread vocabulary referring to corruption is an effective vehicle to indirectly initiate interactions between bribe-takers and bribe-givers.

Drawing the lines: Poverty and corruption

The survey found that respondents tolerated corruption by civil servants primarily because of their insufficient salaries. Respondents were asked which kind of administrative corruption they could
tolerate. The answers included: a civil servant taking money when he/she was poor, taking small amounts of money against services delivered or when a civil servant was engaged in other activities during their official working hours. Corruption was accepted for a variety of reasons showing that it was a phenomenon based on multiple social motivations. This made it hard to adequately assess all of the reasons for which the respondents accepted corruption on the part of civil servants.

What Makes Corruption Acceptable?

![Bar chart showing the percentage of respondents accepting different forms of corruption.](chart.png)

- Taking money when CS is poor: 13%
- Taking little money against services delivered: 10%
- Working elsewhere on official time: 9%
- Carelessness and lack of professionalism: 8%
- Not respecting the laws in order to help people: 8%
- Recruitment based on relationships: 7%
- Not respecting foreseen timeframes: 3%
- Reducing taxes by taking a percentage of it: 3%
- Make relatives benefit in priority from state services: 10%

Of the four given responses above for which they might not tolerate corruption on the part of civil servants, respondents reacted equally to three of them: taking bribes from the poor (28%), obliging customers to pay bribes (32%) and disloyalty towards the government (28%). The civil servants perceived the third factor (30%) slightly differently from the rest of the population (28%), which was instead more concerned with disloyalty (Khyanat-ba-edara in Dari). Responses were, however, different depending on the location of the respondents. Those who lived in the cities tolerated lower-income civil servants taking bribes, but did not support disloyalty towards the administration. Those who lived in villages near cities strongly rejected lower-income civil servants taking bribes while they remained indifferent about disloyalty. Those respondents living in remote villages strongly objected to being obliged to pay bribes but showed less interest on the civil servant’s disloyalty. The level of education also had some influence on people’s acceptance of corruption. Respondents with no education tended to react negatively to lower-income civil servants’ extorting bribes while the educated classes were more concerned with the fact that all citizens were obliged to pay bribes in order to obtain services.
When asked about specific corrupt activities which they disapproved of, respondents had quite different opinions. Each respondent was asked to provide three answers. Responses varied for some provinces. For instance, in Kabul and in Khost, obtaining diplomas and degrees by using corruption was unacceptable. Similarly, the illegal release of criminals from prison through corruption was strongly disapproved of in Kabul, Badghis, Bamyan and Ghazni while it was perceived as less disapprovingly in other provinces. Illegal purchase of land and property was strongly condemned in Balkh, Bamyan and Khost compared to other provinces. The use of corruption to get access to land property was also perceived as highly unacceptable by the respondents who lived in the city or nearby villages. Building illegally is perceived as unacceptable in the cities by a remarkably high number of respondents. A possible interpretation of these differences might be that those seeking services from the state are exposed not only to different provincial administrations, but also to different demands from the state.

Specifying corrupt practices

When asked about the most common practice used when a civil servant seeks to request a bribe, respondents overwhelmingly replied that it was through creating difficulties and delaying the services requested. This is what has become known in Dari as mushkiltarashi. Interestingly, civil servants agreed with the view of the general population. "Mushkiltarashi" is higher, however, in Kabul (66%), Herat (78%), Ghazni (78%), Paktia (66%), Khost (88%) and Bamyan (66%). In Parwan, it were direct and indirect requests at the place of work (58%) that constituted the most common practice. Badghis and Nangarhar had the highest rate of indirect request by an intermediary. No significant variation between urban and rural respondents was observed in the practices of CS to seek bribes. However, the level of education was inversely proportional to direct or indirect request. The more educated the respondents, the more they perceived that the most common act of corruption were difficulties and delays generated by the civil servant.
The survey later asked which one of the common practices or behaviors listed in the survey were perceived as acceptable or unacceptable. There was a minor ambivalence in the responses: almost all said that one or all practices listed in figure 2 were unacceptable to them. Yet when asked which one they could tolerate, some 19% of respondents showed some level of tolerance regarding one of the practices most often when the civil servant delayed or created difficulties (9% of all respondents). In Kandahar, exceptionally, some 70% of respondents perceived one of the identified practices as tolerable. In this province, the creation of difficulties to acquire bribes was tolerated by 41% of respondents. Male respondents showed less tolerance than female respondents. Respondents from rural areas were harsher on tolerating any bribing as compared to urban respondents.

Respondents’ involvement in abetting corruption

Respondents were asked which corrupt activities they might tolerate or possibly be involved in themselves and they overwhelmingly responded (88%) that they would not tolerate or be involved in any such activities. Giving money (39%) and falsifying documents (29%) were the most intolerable activities. Thus attitudes towards sharing the resources or wealth originating from corruption (14%) or involvement in patronage behavior underlying corruption (18%) were not perceived as negative. Still there is some ambivalence towards giving money or bribing. Those who stated that they would avoid participating in any form of corruption through social exchanges or wealth sharing expressed a small preference for giving money while at the same time overwhelmingly refusing all types of direct involvement.

As shown above, the attitude of respondents varied considerably by province when reacting to one of the four types of corruption one may take part in (see figure in the annex). In Baghlan, Parwan, Bamyan, Kandahar, Farah and Helmand, people overwhelmingly rejected bribing civil servants. Rejection rates regarding giving money to civil servants varied from province to province (between 3% and 72% of responses). On the other hand, the kind of involvement with the least rejection rate (sharing resources originating from bribes, with a national average of 14%) represented a variation between 0 and 39%.

Generally, in male respondents, attitude toward giving money for bribes was ore severe than females, but they were less reluctant in refraining from social interactions involving corruption. Unmarried respondents were more ready to accept bribes, but to some extent perceived the falsification of documents as unacceptable. There was a slight preference amongst civil servants to share bribes and falsify documents rather than participate. 45% of civil servants considered giving money the most unacceptable practice compared to 39% of ordinary citizens. Only 35% of civil servants

thought that the falsification and the sharing of gains were the most unacceptable practices against 45% of other respondents. The category of 31 to 40-year-olds was less reluctant in denouncing bribe giving while the 41-50-year-olds had the opposite attitude.

Those respondents (317) who were intolerant of disloyalty to the state were also relative prompt to denounce the falsification of documents. Those who disapproved of taking bribes from the poor (322) also constituted the biggest group of respondents (44%) who disapproved of the practice of giving bribes. Respondents who considered corruption unacceptable in the country also strongly held that falsification of documents was the most unacceptable form of corruption. Activities considered corrupt are accepted or denounced depending on the background of the respondent.

Bribes which make people uncomfortable

Respondents essentially felt uneasy with two types of bribes: when bribes are given in succession to a number of people while ‘securing’ a service (a network of individuals), or, when the bribe is to be given immediately - on the spot - to the other party.

Male respondents felt relatively at ease when bribing a succession of people (as mentioned above) than female respondents who reacted very negatively. On the other hand, the male respondents were more uncomfortable than females when bribes were demanded immediately. Those respondent who did not approve of Mushkiltarashi of the people by civil servants also felt uncomfortable when bribes are demanded by many government officials.
Corrupt attitudes

Over one-third of the respondents (37%) stated they would ensure their interests even if they had to bribe. Hazaras respondents’ response indicated a greater reluctance in ensuring their interests (26%). The value placed on ensuring one’s own interests was high in Kandahar, Khost, Baghlan and Badghis. It was less present in Bamyan, Paktia, Parwan, Balkh, Ghazni and Herat. Male respondents had higher disposition towards corruption (41%) than females respondents (31%). Civil servants seemed less willing to participate in corrupt practices (31%) in order to advance their own interests. The inclination to offer bribes was less prevalent when the level of education of the respondents was higher. Those respondents who did not accept corruption which entailed disloyalty to the state were also less inclined to resort to bribes to defend their own interests; those who said they could not accept civil servants taking a lot of money would still pay bribes if it came to defend their interests.

Attitude towards corrupt individuals

One-third of respondents believed that bribe-takers feel guilty. Female respondents expressed this opinion more strongly than males (45% compared to 27%). A significant 40% of the civil servants also gave this response as compared to 31% of non-civil servant respondents. Perceptions varied from province to province. A higher percentage of those respondents who believed that a corrupt civil servant was unacceptable also believed that the bribe-taker felt guilty.

2 Our intention here is not to reinforce or introduce ethnic stereotypes but to reflect the outcome of our statistical analysis stratified by ethnic grouping. We do acknowledge that much more sophisticated stratifications and analyses should be conducted on ethnicity with regards to corruption in the future.
An overwhelming 82% of the respondents, irrespective of their sex, age, level of education, location, civil service status, etc, were of the opinion that corrupt people would be ostracized by Afghan society.
Part II: Types and Manifestations of Corruption

Part two addresses the manifestations of corrupt practices. It identifies the main areas, institutions, sectors, types of activities and types of demands which often generate corruption. Additionally, it looks at when, where and by whom decisions are made, how corrupt civil servants are organized, the percentage of state services for citizens that require corruption. This section also looks at how frequently citizens experience corruption.

![Most Corrupt Sector](image)

**Figure 5**

The public sector compared

Two thirds of the respondents believed that there were more than three types of corruption. More generally, there were a small percentage of respondents that held the assumption that corruption was a monolithic phenomenon, bearing the same form all the time.

![Highest number of responses for the most corrupt institution](image)

**Figure 6**
77% of respondents said that corruption was prevalent in the public sector. Only 14% of respondents thought of the ‘NGO sector’ as the most corrupt. Male respondents designated the public sector as the most corrupt whereas female respondents did not. Responses were the same whether they came from civil servants or ordinary citizens. 21-30-year-olds considered the public sector as the most corrupt (81% of responses from this age group). Those who stated drugs and development are the biggest problems the government has to address also considered the ‘NGO sector’ as the most corrupt. This group however still believed that the most amount of corruption occurs in the public sector.

Figure 7

Corrupt state institutions and sectors

Figure 8

Corruption Perception of Civil Servants by Function
Each respondent specified three different institutions in the public sector where they perceived corruption to be most prevalent. The responses were scattered showing that corruption was perceived as existing a phenomenon in every state institution. However, the courts (53% of respondents), the Ministry of Interior (45% of respondents) and the Municipalities (38% of respondents) were perceived the highest in term of corrupt practices.

The judicial (courts and the Ministry of Justice) and security (Ministry of Interior and Directorate of National Security) institutions were deemed the most corrupt when they were seen as sector (see figure 6, 7 and 8). However, institutions delivering public services such as education, health, transport, water and electricity, and municipalities constituted together the biggest part of perceived corrupt institutions. Economic institutions grouped here are the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Commerce, the state banks and state owned enterprises. The Afghan parliament was perceived to be corrupt only by 3% of the respondents. This perception is not unexpected for a newly elected body that has not been discredited by scandals (as of September 2006) when the field research was conducted. The President’s Office was considered corrupt by 1% of the respondents.

In accordance with other studies, the justice (41% of valid responses) and the security (20%) sectors were perceived as the most corrupt followed by the municipalities and customs services. Contrary to the previous findings, which dealt with corruption within sectors, these questions address each sectors as a whole. The male respondents perceived the justice sector to be more corrupt than the other sectors. There were no differences in perception between civil servants and ordinary citizens regarding corruption in customs. Respondents who lived in rural areas perceived the justice sector as more corrupt than those residing in cities. Those for whom corruption is considered routine in Afghanistan ranked the justice sector with a high level of corruption (47%) - suggesting that the justice sector has crystallized the expansion of corruption in the country. The justice sector remained highly corrupt in the minds of those who identified the Ministry of Interior and municipalities as two of the three most corrupt institutions.

Different ethnic groups had differing perceptions of the corrupt sectors, however. For the Pashtuns, compared to the views of the other ethnic groups, the justice sector was less corrupt while the security sector appeared much more corrupt. This finding might be linked to the reality of Afghan institutions over the last couple of years, with Pashtuns dominant in the justice sector through their domination of the Supreme court, while Tajiks dominated the security institutions. Yet, both sectors
together formed the most corrupt sector for all ethnic groups, except for Uzbeks whose perceptions were dispersed among many sectors.

Corruption perceptions varied from province to province. Significantly, except for Kandahar, the customs sector was perceived corrupt in provinces hosting custom points such as Nangrahar (39%), Herat (27%) and Balkh (19%). The security sector featured prominently in perceptions of corruption in the provinces where insecurity has been dominant over the last year: Kandahar, Khost, Farah, Baghlan and Ghazni. Pointing to this view, the justice sector was perceived as highly corrupt in Kabul with some 60% of valid responses.

Respondents were asked to name, without prompting, two categories of civil servants that they deemed the most corrupt. Scores invariably went to justice and police officials. 42% of respondents identified, the judges as the most corrupt category for instance.
The government employees in the police forces and the traffic police were perceived to be corrupt by all ethnic groups. This perception was much stronger for the police and traffic police employees in Kabul, Kandahar, Khost and Parwan. Male respondents had a more negative view of the police and traffic employees.

Respondents were asked in an open ended question, to identify one type of activity which they perceive as the cause of most government corruption. Respondents thought that more than one-third of corruption occurred during procurements (purchases and contracts which formed together 37% of responses), one-third was perceived to occur in the issuing of licenses and other official documents and less than one-third perceived to occur in recruitment of civil servants.
Activities involving corruption

Figure 12

Which type of activity causes most corruption?

- Recruitments: 26%
- Issuing of licences: 20%
- Contracts: 18%
- Purchase: 19%
- Official documents: 14%
- Other: 3%

Figure 13
Afghan Perceptions of Corruption

The perception of types of corrupt activities differed depending on the gender of interviewees. Male respondents thought of the issuing of licenses and official documents as the main activity causing corruption. On the other hand, civil servants perceived that issuing contracts was the activity causing most of the corruption. The ordinary citizens perceived recruitment as the government activity with the highest likelihood of corruption. Those residing in semi-rural areas perceived a higher likelihood of corruption in recruitment and also a fewer occurrences in procurement. The lower income group of our respondents perceived a considerable level of corruption in recruitment (34% compared to 26% on average). Perhaps because they were actively seeking jobs themselves as a majority of them (63%) were less than 30 years old. Those who declared monthly revenue of 5 000 to 10 000 Afghanis associated the issuing of licenses (30%) with the highest cause of corruption probably because they themselves have been in the position of obtaining such documents from the government.

Among provinces, different types of activities were perceived as a possible source of corruption. The respondents in Herat, Badghis and Kandahar thought that more than one-third of corruption was caused by issuing licenses and documents by the authorities. In Khost and Nangarhar respondents identified the issuing of licenses and documents as being responsible for more than one third of corrupt activities. The capital Kabul was marked by its high rate of respondents perceiving that corruption was mainly caused by public procurement.

The When, Where and Who of corrupt decision-making

Kabul was perceived by 58% of the respondents as the main center for corruption while 42% pointed to the provinces. The above who thought that the capital was the most corrupt claimed that corruption happened mostly in urban centers. 80% of Kabul residents believed that the capital was more corrupt than the provinces. Except for Badghis, Baghlan, Kandahar and Ghazni, more than 45% of respondents in all the other provinces thought that the capital was more corrupt than the provinces. There was no major ethnic variation on this opinion. Female respondents perceived more than male respondents that the capital was corrupt, possibly because three-quarters of our female respondents lived in urban or semi-rural areas. Indeed, residents of urban centers thought of the capital as the area where most corruption occurs. Comparatively, only a small percentage of those living in remote villages (51%) perceived that Kabul was more corrupt than provinces. There was no significant difference in opinions of civil servants or of ordinary citizens. Those who believed that the “NGO sector” was most corrupt also believed that corruption occurred in the rural areas.

An overwhelming number of respondents (84%) perceived that corruption occurred in the cities rather than in rural areas; this is not surprising given that the presence of the state is stronger in cities. There was a strong perception amongst respondents from bigger provinces such as Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Balkh that corruption occurred in the urban centers. Only in Badghis and Baghlan did people believe that there was corruption in the rural areas as much as in urban zones. 88% of civil servants believed that corruption existed in urban centres. Those who lived in remote villages believed (79%) that the urban centres were corrupt.
Almost half of the decisions involving corrupt practices are thought to be made in public offices. Places such as restaurants, relatives or friends’ houses or offices of the intermediary persons were indicated in 32% of responses. Sometimes, there were no determined physical space for decision to engage in corruption. At times, both parties decided together over the phone or the civil servant asked for a bribe through a third party. However, the majority of decisions were perceived to be made with the people meeting at a pre-assigned place.

Almost all respondents could give an opinion regarding the moment when decisions to engage in corruption. Respondents perceived that half of the decisions were made during office time. The office was seen as the place where one-quarter of such decisions were made.
The respondents’ perceptions on corruption activities revealed that they believed these decisions occurred in public offices and were more prevalent in the big provinces: Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Balkh and Nangarhar. Male respondents thought that a higher number of decisions were made outside of the public office while female respondents believed that decisions were made in the majority of cases (54%) in government offices. There was no major difference of opinion among civil servants and ordinary citizens.

With a few exceptions, engaging in corrupt activities on the job were prevalent in big provinces; respondents in Baghlan, Badghis, Bamyan, Khost and Ghazni perceived that engaging in corrupt activities mostly occurred while off the job. Civil servants had a slightly different view from ordinary citizens and perceived that decisions were taken more frequently while on the job.

Respondents perceived that the majority of corruption decisions were made by executive officers. An alarming 18% of respondents were of the view that corruption originated from the head of the government’s decision makers (see figure 15 above). This widespread perception might indicate the respondents’ perception of complicity between the executive and decision-makers. A widespread perception was that civil servants when engaging in corrupt acts were either part of a group (55%) or of a larger system (24%) that is constituted of various groups - only 16% considered that they were acting individually when engaging in various acts of corruption. Civil servants respondents thought that there was less involvement (15%) in corruption from high-level decision-makers of the government. Civil servants however might have been biased in giving their opinion or felt threatened by the question as a significant percentage (25%) of them stated that they ‘did not know’. Those who reside in semi-rural areas frequently blamed corruption on state decision-makers (22%). Those respondents with higher education pointed to government executive as the most responsible for corruption; those with no education mainly stated under ‘did not know’.

![Figure 16 Group involvement of corrupt officials](image)

Another question in the study allows us to confirm the way corruption the institutionalization of corruption within the government. Over 50% of respondents thought that all civil servants cooperated with each other. Civil servants themselves had a slightly different view of the situation. 43% thought that corruption was the result of collaboration between colleagues. This acknowledgment
within the government services itself is alarming. This also highlights a particular dynamic where individuals (civil servants) are compelled to be a part of a group collaboration in order to indulge in bribery and corruption. This “system” can look unfavorably upon civil servants who resists corruption. This was also true by insiders’ view as 37% of civil servants said corruption resulted from organized collaboration (civil servants’ networks) and not solely through the actions of individuals. One-third of respondents said corrupt officials were organized within a department. This ratio was higher in the case of civil servant respondents (39%). Civil servants tended to downplay the involvement of corrupt officials across many departments of the same ministry (26%) or many ministries (29%).

The profile of a corrupt civil servant

According to the respondents’ perception, the profile of a civil servant who engages in corrupt activities is a male (91% of responses), married (73%), between 31 and 50 years old (82%) who is literate or with a baccalaureate education degree (56%). In Kabul and Balkh however, a higher number of respondents (20%) thought that female civil servants were corrupt. It is worth noting that there is a relatively higher number of female civil servants in these two provinces then in others.
At which education-level civil servants are perceived to be most corrupt?

- Illiterate: 12%
- Literate: 35%
- Baccalaureate: 21%
- Bachelors: 14%
- Masters: 5%
- Above masters: 13%

Female respondents tended to perceive the 31- to 40-year-olds as more likely to be corrupt while male respondents considered 41- to 50-year-olds as more corrupt. Civil servants did not express a different opinion in terms of age, but a significantly high number thought that those above a master’s degree level were more likely to be corrupt. The ideal profile of the corrupt civil servant should not however be over emphasized. Our previous findings have shown that corruption applies to a variety of activities that a large number of individuals can be associated with, either through group involvement, loose cooperation or through a lenient attitude. One need not to be directly involved in a corruption act in order to abet it.

Which age group of civil servants is perceived to be most corrupt?

- From 31 to 40 years old: 36%
- From 41 to 50 years old: 46%
- More than 50 years old: 8%
- Less than 30 years old: 10%
Percentage of state services that require corruption

94% of respondents believed that between 50% to 100% of services commonly sought from the government require some form of bribe (see figure 20 below). Female respondents were more pessimistic: 24% claimed that 100% of works/services asked from the state would involve corruption compared to the average 20%. This view had an alarming consensus with in the government: 92% of civil servants interviewed believed that 50% to 100% of state services are obtained by resorting to bribery.

One of our questions asked respondents to give a personal account of involvement in bribery or other corrupt activity. One-third of respondents said they were not involved in corruption. 26% of them said that for every 10 public services they had to engage in some form of corruption 2 to 3 times. In addition a high proportion (43%) stated that they would be involved in corruption four
times or more. Considerable variation exists between male and female respondents. 49% of male respondents saw themselves involved more than four times in corruption for every 10 services against 33% of females. Civil servants were less likely (39%) than ordinary citizens (45%) to be involved in corrupt activities.

An important gap exists between perceived corruption and corruption that was actually experienced by respondents. Perception regarding government corruption are worse that actual experiences.
Part III: Causes and Justifications

![Perceived factors that cause corruption](image)

Figure 22

Part Three will attempt to identify causes such as socio-economic justifications, institutional relations and accountability problems, the characteristics of mediating individuals, attitudinal gaps and inter-organizational politics that generate administrative corruption. This section of the report brings to light a variety of ways through which corruption is created, sustained and justified. While the poverty of civil servants is seen as the major cause of corruption, the findings make a strong case for laying responsibility for corruption with the inactions of the state that allow corruption to flourish with impunity. Even though the corrupt habits and weakness of civic responsibilities of citizens are mentioned by the respondents as a cause of corruption, the lack of accountability on the part of the government constitutes the dominant perceived cause for corruption.

Direct and indirect causes

Our questionnaire made a distinction between factors causing corruption and those causing impunity which fosters corruption. Corruption is understood by two-thirds of respondents as a consequence of poverty. 42% believed that low salaries of civil servants were the primary justification for corruption, followed by constraints on their livelihood. This presents an interesting paradox in that corruption is understood and accepted for the same reasons for which most respondents declared it as unacceptable: taking bribes from the poor and by the poor (low-income civil servant group). Furthermore, those who said taking bribes from the poor was the most unacceptable form of corruption constituted a high percentage of those who thought that corruption was due to low salaries. This illustrates the self-perpetuating and self-contained nature of petty corruption- while corruption is perceived as being justified by low salaries identifying the poorest individuals as the main victims of corruption as well as the main ‘perpetrators’ of petty corruption. As an indication, civil servants...
salaries vary between USD 40 per month for the lowest and USD 240 per month for civil servants of grade 1.

A higher number of female respondents (46%) then male (37%) gave low salaries as the main factor contributing to corruption. Civil servants (44%) and ordinary citizens (40%) also stated that low salaries constituted the major cause of corruption. Those who lived in urban centers pointed to corruption as a consequence of poor salaries rather than the poor living standards of civil servants. The link between corruption and poor salaries progressively diminished when the respondents’ level of education increased. The relationship between livelihood and corruption dramatically decreased when the income of respondents increased.

Lack of government control and law enforcement were perceived as the second major cause for corruption. They together constituted less than one-third of all responses (29%). However, those respondents who insisted that corruption existed because civil servants were not held accountable to their actions by the state were significantly more likely to assert that lack of government control and law enforcement constituted the main cause of corruption. Importantly, this was also the view of those who said that civil servants enjoyed impunity because there were minimal to non-existent government sanction mechanism to discipline such employees. Those who identified the lack of government control also tended to point out the lack of supervision from higher officials.

Male respondents (31%) more than and female respondents (24%) identified the lack of control and enforcement as the main causes of corruption. Only 26% of civil servants lay the blame for corruption on the lack of control and enforcement by the state. The apparent relationship between the lack of government control and corruption was more pronounced as the level of respondent’s education increased.
Weaknesses of administrative system, lack of sanctions and lack of attention from higher officials were identified by a majority of respondents (53%) as the main factors that enhance impunity for corruption in the government. This was followed by 22% of respondents who identified the widespread culture of corruption and personal relationships as the decisive factors that increase corruption. It was also clear that a majority of those who said that support and protection networks give rise to impunity also held the position that corrupt civil servants worked in concert rather than individually; in such systems, the strategies of individuals are not pertinent. Interestingly, civil servants rather than ordinary citizens pointed out that lack of attention of heads of government and weaknesses in the administrative system were important factors for creating impunity. However, they refrained from designating lack of sanctions and disciplinary actions as the major causes for impunity in corruption. As the location of the residence of respondents became more distant from cities, respondents increasingly denounced the inaction of government as a major factor enhancing corruption.
Identifying the Gaps

Respondents were asked to choose where they perceived weaknesses (in law, administrative system, law executors or citizens) that could cause corruption. Three-quarters of responses pointed to the law executors and the administrative system as major sources of weaknesses. Only 20% of respondents pointed to laws. A slightly higher percentage of civil servants said the law executors were responsible for corruption rather than the laws or the administrative system itself. A higher percentage of civil servants (86%) also fully agreed that a civil servant became corrupt because he or she is not held accountable. In general, male respondents were more critical than females in condemning a lack of accountability within state institutions for corruption. The emphasis on accountability of civil servants in order to counter corruption was stronger in Badghis, Farah, Kandahar and Parwan more than other provinces.

The fact that an overwhelming majority of respondents (86%) stated that civil servants are corrupt because they are not accountable is confirmed by other responses. A large majority (76%) believed that civil servants are able to take bribes because law enforcement is non-existent for them and they feel civil servants are protected. Only one-quarter of respondents give different reasons other than the two mentioned. Wider networks of civil servants played a secondary role, in the eyes of respondents, in enabling civil servants to take bribes. Furthermore, civil servants in the sample were more emphatic than ordinary citizens in asserting that bribing existed because civil servants were protected. Two-thirds of respondents also believed that civil servants holding multiple posts concurrently was a cause of corruption.

61% of respondents believed that it was in the interest of civil servants not to respect the law, and civil servants themselves largely (50%) agreed with this. 39% of total respondents said civil servants did not have the capacity to understand laws compared to 37% who thought they did. 32% of civil servant respondents agreed with this inability of their colleagues to understand the law while...
46% of civil servants disagreed. Those who said civil servants engage in corruption in order to ensure their interests equally attributed this to a problem in the administrative system and to the executors of the law. Very few respondents linked this with the recipients of state services themselves.

Which weaknesses cause corruption?

Figure 26

71% of respondents stated that the lack of government authority meant an increase in corruption. Male respondents believed this more strongly than female respondents. Those who lived in villages near the city were more likely than urban residents to link the lack of government authority with increased corruption. In Kandahar (28%) and Balkh (52%), however, fewer people outlined this relationship.

However, a significant number of respondents disagreed (50%) while 25% agreed that corruption decreased under the authority of non-state actors, such as local commanders, tribal jirgas or shuras. Female respondents significantly disagreed (52%) in the power of non-state actors to reduce corruption. At a provincial level, 52% of respondents in Balkh, 44% in Kandahar and 35% in Baghlan believed in the power of non-state actors to reduce corruption while very few held this position in Badghis (4.5%), Paktia (4.5%), Bamyan (6%) and Parwan (2%).

Citizens’ attitudes as a causes of corruption

Respondents gave various reasons to illustrate how citizens’ attitudes could cause corruption. They are grouped here under three broad categories:
1) paying a bribe for their own interest referred as “lack of time (6%)” and “self-interest (9%)” of citizen;
2) lack of knowledge referred to as difficulties for customers of public services in understanding their rights (41%);
3) lack of power rooted in their difficulty in accessing other institutions (19%) and using other solutions other than resorting to corruption (24%).
Female respondents attached more importance to lack of knowledge (49%) while male respondents said it was rather the lack of power (48%) of citizens that results in corruption. There was no major difference between the opinions of civil servants and ordinary citizens on this issue.

Citizens’ weaknesses in facing corruption

- Lack of knowledge: 41%
- Lack of power: 42%
- Lack of concern: 15%
- Other: 2%

Figure 27

36% of all respondents stated they were never obliged to pay bribes, including 46% of female respondents. It was not clear how many of these respondents ever dealt directly with the state however. Naturally, those who were never obliged to pay a bribe represented a higher percentage of those who believed that less than 25% of services asked from the government required corruption. Those who were never obliged to pay a bribe also tended to believe that disarmament, drugs and development were the biggest issues that the government had to address. They constituted a considerably higher proportion of those who believed that corruption exists in the justice system, municipalities, district governor offices and customs offices. In addition, those who were never obliged to pay a bribe were less likely to think of the security, health and education sector as corrupt.
64% of all respondents paid bribes and gave three main reasons for paying bribes:

i) because they lacked the time or the procedures were too long (33%),

ii) they did not have the necessary relations to obtain the service by means other than by bribing (36%),

iii) they did not have access to the higher levels in the administrative hierarchy (21%) to pursue their case.

Civil servants had access to mediating individuals more than ordinary citizens and therefore paid less. However, they often had to pay because they lacked sufficient time or the delays became unacceptable (41% of civil servants compared to 30% of ordinary citizens). In general, people in the rural areas lacked time or relevant contact with the administration and were obliged to pay bribes more than those living in urban centers. Access to higher officials was less so for respondents whose place of residence was more distant from cities. People gave different reasons for paying bribes depending on their provinces. In Kabul, Badghis, Khost and Bamyan, the lack of access to higher authorities constituted a major reason, for instance.
Respondents identified numerous issues causing corruption, grouped here under three broad categories:
1) Factional-political affiliations represented by far the biggest cause of corruption (52%) and included party and faction relations (21%), political affiliation (5%) and connections with commanders (19%) or high-level officials (12%);
2) Community relations (40%) which were comprised of ethnic (30%), religious (4.5%) and social (5%) relations; and
3) the remaining 8% was comprised of personal, professional and other relationships.
The male respondents compared to female respondents tended to believe more in community ties as catalyst of corruption. Community ties were viewed as less important in the perceptions of inhabitants of cities and remote villages in regards to corruption. Ethno-religious ties were prevalent in rural areas near the city. Factional-political relations were the dominant concern in cities or remote villages. Personal and professional relations were more viewed as problematic in the educated strata of the population. Kandahar, Kabul, Bamyan and Ghazni to some extent represented the provinces where factional-political affiliations were least linked to corruption, and, where community relations were most perceived to foster corruption. There were no significant variations among the different ethnic groups.

Respondents were also asked to identify in an open-ended question the kind of individuals who most often mediate and act as a catalyst in bribery. Intermediary and professional commission-takers were the first group (35%) to play such a role followed by civil servants. This category, ‘brokers’, involved those who took bribes for others (21%) as well as those who only established the contacts (9%). Citizens thought bribery and back-channels were referred to individuals who previously required the same services and had accumulated some transferable experience and contacts from this process in the figure 32 below these are referred to as “Experienced Customers”.

Figure 31

The map illustrates the perception of community links causing corruption across different provinces in Afghanistan. The colors indicate the level of perceived corruption: very low, mean, and very high.

Figure 32

The map below shows the distribution of citizens who perceived specific individuals as mediators in bribery.
Male respondents (40%) more than females (24%) and civil servants (34%) perceived commission-takers as the dominant intermediary agents for bribery. The use of commission takers and intermediaries increased considerably with the income of respondents.

A higher percentage of those who paid bribes because they did not have access to higher authorities when civil servants blocked the delivery of their services (through delaying or creating difficulties) also perceived civil servants as the most instrumental in facilitating bribery. Those who bribed because they lacked intermediaries considered commission-takers as the most suited for mediating between citizens and state agents.

The Politics of Patronage

61% of respondents agreed that appointments by co-optation (*maslahati*) were a main source of corruption compared to 15% who said this was not so. For the 61% who agreed about co-optation, ethno-populist appointments were seen as the primary cause of corruption. Ethno-populist appointments included appointments on the basis of ethnic background (*mardomi*).

A significant percentage of civil servants (66%) as compared to ordinary citizens (59%) said co-optation led to corruption and this perception increased with the level of respondents’ education. The perception that corruption is an ethno-populist co-optation practice was dominant in Kandahar and Balkh, where 70% of respondents agreed that co-optation meant corruption. On the other hand, a significant number of respondents in Paktia, Bamyan and Farah designated factional-political co-optation practices as the origin of corruption.
Those who believed that community relations mainly caused corruption also held the view that ethno-populist cooptation caused corruption. On the other hand, the majority of those who made a link between factional-political relations and corruption also said that co-optation based on factional-political grounds was a source of corruption.

A more general look at job recruitment shows that respondents placed very little importance in merit for obtaining a position within the government. More than 87% of respondents tended to believe that some form nepotism or co-optation determined the recruitment of civil servants (see table 2). This view could explain why respondents consider job recruitment as the source of 27% of the overall corruption in the government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors essential in recruitment</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merit</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic ties</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political or party ties</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal acquaintances</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1 252</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Female respondents accorded relatively more importance to merit and ethnic background as a determining factor for recruitment in government services while male respondents believed that political or party affiliations and personal relations mattered more. Both civil servants and ordinary citizens held the same views on the role of nepotism and acquaintance in public recruitment. As in previous questions, respondents in Farah, Kandahar, Bakh and Bamyan pointed to the importance of ethnic relations in recruitment or appointments.
Practices of corruption

Our survey also tried to identify some of the institutionalised practices that promote corruption. They are grouped under three categories: 1) the culture of giving gifts after being hired (20%) or promoted (13%); 2) the harassment of citizens (mushkeltarashi), as the main institutionalised practice which promotes corruption with 52% of responses, and 3) a more general category which consider other types of bureaucratic procedures 15% of responses (refer to figure 34).

*Mushkeltarashi* refers to a practice of causing delays and procedural difficulties that oblige the customers to pay bribes in order to get things done. Other bureaucratic behaviors that foster corruption include a variety of established practices that range from not arriving in time to perceiving and utilizing one’s office more as a private property.

![Figure 34](image)

The survey did not explore in detail as to why the culture of giving gifts after being hired or promoted registered as the second most perceived practice for respondents that promotes corruption. After all, there should be no further obligation to pay once one gets recruited or promoted. This practice feeds only the cycle of institutional corruption.
Part IV: Impacts and perceived effects

Part four draws on experiences and perceptions of respondents in order to assess the impact of corruption on the households, and on different sectors of society, especially women and other vulnerable groups. The impact of corruption on social and public services, on security and local infighting, on the economy, on property disputes, on state-building, on aid effectiveness and on the presence of the international community in the country is also studied. The respondents deemed the effects of corruption to be essentially negative in each aspect.

Impact on society

Each respondent identified three effects that corruption has had on Afghan society. The results are presented in the chart below (see figure 35). As the chart shows, respondents associated corruption overwhelmingly with negative impacts on society. We did consider the possibility that corruption could be viewed positively: in a way it is diametrically opposed to the modern state since it replaces impersonal governance with personal relations. Feelings of empathy, increased collaboration and increased social links (grouped here under one category) was identified by 11% as of one of three possible responses. 59% of respondents thought that corruption decreased concern of citizens and increased widespread disaffection regarding the state for the same question. 54% of respondents consider that corruption negatively impacts the moral fabric of society, and hence is against the ideals of a Muslim community. Furthermore, 49% and 47% of respondents respectively considered the increased culture of corruption and reinforced feelings of injustice and inequality as one of the three impacts that corruption has had on Afghan society.
There were no major differences regarding views of the impact of corruption on society in terms of gender, civil servant status, ethnic affiliation, age and level of education of respondents. Ordinary citizens more than civil servants attributed feelings of injustice and inequality to corruption. There existed however provincial differences amongst respondents.

Connection with local infighting

80% of respondents either partially (22%) or fully agreed (58%) that there was a link between corruption and local infighting amongst non-state actors (insurgent groups, militias, local commanders, warlords), a large percentage (85%) of civil servants believed this to be the case. People in rural areas tended to link corruption and in-fighting between local commanders more strongly than those who lived in cities. In addition, a higher percentage of those who believed that corruption was dominant in Kabul (64%) also tended to hold the view that corruption was linked to local infighting. 50% of respondents said corruption most often happened in the provinces and was linked to local infighting. Similarly, those who perceived corruption as occurring in cities and those who considered it as occurring in villages linked corruption and local strife.

Naturally, those who did think that corruption was reduced under the authority of non-state actors tended to make a link between corruption and local infighting. Those who thought that the lack of state authority increased corruption as well as those that did not believe that a lack of state authority contributed to corruption shared the view that there was a strong link between corruption and local infighting.

Impact on Households

The impact of corruption on families was perceived as moderate. 44% of respondents ranged from corruption had “some” to “extremely high” impacts on their families. 82% of those who said the impacts were non-existent also belonged to households who said they have never paid bribes. Among those who perceived that corruption has had considerable or extremely high impact on their
households, there was still 40% who claimed never to have paid a bribe. This means that corruption can be treated as a permanent risk that impacts Afghan families. Afghan households therefore need to always bear corruption in mind when dealing with public services and even otherwise developing effective coping mechanisms.

Corruption in social services affecting families

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher Education</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services to the handicapped</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services of Haj</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 37

Corruption had slightly different impacts on civil servants compared to ordinary citizens. In addition, the perceived impact depended on the stated income of the respondent: the impact of corruption increased when the household income of the respondent decreased.

More than half of respondents said their families were damaged financially over the last year due to corruption. The rest stated that no financial damage occurred to their families as a result of a bribe or corruption. This percentage is quite high compared to 36% of respondents who previously stated that they never paid bribes. These figures reiterate the deep impacts of corruption on families, independent of whether they engaged in corrupt practices or not. One explanation is that individuals engage in corruption as it is an easy source of cash - and a sound survival mechanism. The consequence of this act is however negative and cumulatively impacts a wide range of households. Since the use of corruption as a survival mechanism by households bears perverse effects, corruption on a large scale would become an unsustainable survival mechanism. If lower-income civil servants resort to massive corruption, they would be confronted by other groups of civil servant acting similarly and all would stand to lose. The percentage of male respondents whose families were not affected by bribes during the last year was 41% while this rose to 61% for female respondents. Female respondents comprise the category with families paying less than 2,500 Afghanis (50 USD) while a higher percentage of men paid more than 2,500 Afghanis over the last year. 18% of male respondents paid bribes between 2,500 and 5,000 Afghanis compared to 6% for females during the same period. Two-thirds of respondents had their families financially affected by corruption by paying up to 5,000 Afghanis per year and one-third of respondents’ families were affected more than that amount per year.
54% of civil servants’ households did not pay bribes or were not affected by corruption compared to 46% for ordinary Afghans. Besides, there were fewer civil servants whose families were financially affected by more than 2,500 Afghanis compared to ordinary citizens over the last twelve months. The amount paid by respondents’ family members differed depending on the province of their residence. Pashtun households considered themselves as more affected than any other ethnic group with most of them falling in the categories that had to pay more than 2,500 Afghanis. Of all the re-
spondents, those who paid bribes tended to describe the security sector as the most corrupt. Although the findings of our survey capture the financial loss due to bribes in the households, the survey does not provide us with reliable data on the potential financial benefits related to the bribes. We can assume that there is a financial benefit associated with engaging in bribes because of its overwhelming prevalence.

The data of the potential financial benefits to households is necessary in calculating the aggregate financial effects of corruption as well as other effects (non-financial) on households. This would however require further regard and analysis.

Respondents spontaneously identified two sectors in public services and two others in social services which had effects on their families due to the high levels of corruption found in the provision of these services. A majority of respondents asserted that corruption in one or two sectors has either directly or indirectly affected their families. Two-thirds of all responses considered the justice and security services as the most affected by corruption while they were more divided regarding the effects of corruption on other social services. In addition, 80% of responses considered education, employment and health among the social services affected by corruption. An important factor that needs to be considered in order to adequately understand the perceived effects of corruption on social services is that a majority of social services, such as health and education, are provided by non-state actors such as NGO’s and private institutions. A recurrent consequence is the reduction of the state’s role in providing social services.

![Corruption in public services affecting families](image)

**Figure 40**

**Impact on property disputes**

52.5% of respondents though that corruption caused property disputes in their village or area compared to 19% who said that corruption did not. Such disputes existed predominantly in the cities and in semi-urban localities. A higher percentage of Pashtun respondents (57%) confirmed that property disputes as a result of corruption existed in their vicinity. Such disputes were less reported in the main cities of: Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Mazar-e Sharif remained an exception, yet Balkh province is among the provinces with a relatively low rate of property disputes in this survey. These
provinces also had the highest number of respondents answering that they did not know if property disputes caused by corruption of civil servants existed in their areas.

Figure 41

Impact on Socio-Economic Groups

Three-quarters of respondents stated that corruption had immediate effects on the poor; 10% believed corruption immediately affected the middle class; while 6.5% said it affected the rich. There were no significant differences in regards to other characteristics of the sample population.

Respondents identified small business owners category as the most affected by corruption. Civil servants were identified by 24% of respondents as the second most affected social category. Male respondents generally perceived small business owners as affected by corruption while female respondents identified civil servants as the most affected by corruption. In addition, a significant number of civil servants (33%) identified their own category as the most affected by corruption as compared to 21% of ordinary citizens who identified civil servants as most affected by corruption. Only 31% of civil servants identified small business owners as the group most affected by corruption. A higher number of people living in the cities believed that civil servants were the most affected category while those living in villages thought of small business owners as the most subject to corruption. It was not clear why a high number of respondents considered civil servants as the most vulnerable group to corruption. Upon noting this response repeatedly, surveyors in the field questioned the respondents further and found that they tended to believe that civil servants lived under the most amount of stress, and that their salaries were blocked at low levels due to corruption,
the respondents also perceived that many of the civil servants were themselves not corrupt. There is no statistical means of proving this however. In addition, even though a slightly higher number of respondents said that corrupt civil servants were held in low esteem by society, they also considered civil servants to belong to the group most affected by corruption.

![Figure 42](image1)

**Figure 42**

Individuals without connections and networks were designated as the most vulnerable group followed by women and the handicapped. Male and female respondents perceived vulnerabilities differently. 27% of female respondents designated themselves as the most vulnerable category as compared to 17% of men. Male respondents identified individuals without connections as most vulnerable (47%) - this figure was however for female respondents at 34%. Civil servants designated women and themselves as most vulnerable to corruption.

![Figure 43](image2)

**Figure 43**

**Impact on Afghan women**
The negative impact of corruption on women was perceived by the majority of respondents on a growth in moral corruption. 50% of male respondents linked the impact of corruption on women with moral corruption, compared to 37% of female respondents. Female respondents, however, had more pragmatic concerns when it came to assessing the effects of corruption on their lives. The link between impact on women and moral corruption also depended on one’s marital status. Vulnerable women, such as widows or women without male relatives, may be more constrained in adequately responding to corruption. This category of women might therefore be most impacted by corruption. A large proportion of civil servants, including the male respondents, considered that the most important impact of corruption on women was a “corruption of ethics”. This proportion was higher than for the ordinary citizens. The correlation between corruption of women and a “corruption of ethics” was more significant in the views of female respondents who lived in the cities than those who lived in rural areas. Surprisingly, however, this did not correlate with the education level of the female respondents.

![Impact of corruption on women](image)

Only female respondents in Kabul and Balkh believed that corruption impacted women with regards to morality. Male perceptions were more pervasive in this regard and were significant in Kabul, Ghazni, Farah, Khost, Parwan, Baghlan and Nangarhar provinces.

Impact of corruption on security and economy

82% of respondents thought that corruption either weakened or caused the economy to stagnate. Respondents from Nangarhar, Balkh and Herat strongly held that corruption weakened the economy while in Kandahar, respondents constituted 3% of the total 6% of respondents who believed that corruption increased or expanded the economy.

Nearly half of the respondents thought that corruption had negligent to no impact on security. This is at odds with the findings regarding the link between local infighting and corruption, probably in
part due to respondents not associating insecurity directly with corruption but rather with the greed of local officials. Those who said corruption impacted security lived most often in the cities or remote villages. The impact of corruption on security was felt in most of the provinces where insecurity was present during the year.

Figure 45

Consequences of Corruption on State-Building Processes

Figure 46
The majority of respondents (57%) said that corruption negatively impacted both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the Afghan state and the international community in Afghanistan. However, for the state, the question of legitimacy was more significant than the capacity of the state or its willingness to perform effectively, while for the international community it was rather the issue of its effectiveness. Naturally, for those who highlighted overall national development as the biggest issue to be addressed, the question of aid effectiveness was more relevant. Aid effectiveness was also identified by 47% of those who thought that the “NGO sector” was the most corrupt. There were no significant differences in perceptions between male and female respondents, civil servants and ordinary citizens or between rural and urban populations. Differences were only present geographically.

69% of respondents believed corruption in the state apparatus will result in donor fatigue compared to 8% who said it would have no impact. Kabul, Kandahar and Ghazni constituted the majority of respondents who believed corruption would have no effect on aid. A similar proportion of civil servants and ordinary citizens shared the belief that persistant corruption in the public administration will cause the end of foreign aid.

![Figure 47](image_url)

**Afghan Perceptions of Corruption**

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69% of respondents believed corruption in the state apparatus will result in donor fatigue compared to 8% who said it would have no impact. Kabul, Kandahar and Ghazni constituted the majority of respondents who believed corruption would have no effect on aid. A similar proportion of civil servants and ordinary citizens shared the belief that persistent corruption in the public administration will cause the end of foreign aid.
Part V: Perceptions of Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Proposed Solutions

Part V reviews a variety of tools and existing (and foreseeable) institutions that could be effective in fighting corruption. The respondents perceived newly developed institutions such as the GIAAC as well as specialized courts, newly elected local institutions and the emerging private media to be more efficient in fighting against corruption. Stigmatized bureaucratic procedures and older state institutions were associated with inefficiency or corruption. When asked which advocacy medium were needed to fight corruption, respondents saw the media as a more efficient advocacy tool than the traditional ulama; also media were preferred in urban centers while ulama were favored in rural areas. The National Assembly and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission are relatively new institutions and are perceived as alternative checks on corruption even if their mandates might not allow them to directly tackle corruption. The sharia was seen as an effective tool in curbing corruption.

Anti-corruption Administrations

56% of the respondents believe that anti-corruption entities can reduce corruption compared to 24% who did not. A higher number of female respondents (64%) compared to male respondents (41%) and a slightly higher number of respondents from the cities compared to the respondents from rural areas agreed with the above opinion. Male civil servants, compared to females, agreed more in the effectiveness of anti-corruption institutions such as GIAAC, the attorney general’s office and the central audit office. The belief in the effectiveness of government anti-corruption agencies decreased as the level of education of the respondents increased.

A significant percentage (more than 30%) of respondents who named the Ministry of Interior, the courts and municipalities as the most corrupt did not believe that anti-corruption institutions are effective against corruption. Similarly, respondents who perceived judges, police, traffic officials and employees of the Attorney General’s Office as the most corrupt strongly believe in the effectiveness of anti-corruption administration. It appears that anti-corruption governmental entities can work to remedy the inefficiencies of other institutions. However, other respondents did not see any purpose in an anti-corruption institution because they did not believe that state institutions would be able to work together effectively.

Respondents who identified lack of law enforcement and governmental control mechanisms as the main causes of corruption in the country significantly believed in the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies. Similarly, those who said that lack of discipline and leniency toward corrupt civil servants were a major cause of corruption also strongly believed in the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies.

In response to the correlation between the amount of bureaucratic procedures and corruption, 47% of respondents believed that more bureaucratic procedures would increase corruption, compared to 21% who said it would not. There was still a high level of uncertainty as 31% of respondents indicated that they did not know whether more bureaucratic procedures would increase or decrease corruption. This is probably because too many procedures mean, for some, more opportunities for creating difficulties and obstacles that result in corruption. For others, having many procedures are perceived as safeguards against abuses. Female respondents rejected the use of bureaucratic proce-
dures as a solution for preventing corruption. Civil servants had the same opinion as the average. Respondents from the capital (54%) were not very supportive of an increase of administrative procedures in order to prevent corruption; this perception was similar in the provinces around Kabul and in the other big cities, except Kandahar.

**Administrative reform - a solution to fight corruption?**

Administrative reform was not perceived as a mechanism to reduce corruption. Only 25% of respondents said that administrative reform would cause a reduction in corruption compared to 58% of respondents who said it would not. Civil servants were slightly more confident that administrative reform could curb corruption and female respondents thought likewise (36%).

Provincial perceptions regarding the effectiveness of administrative reform for reducing corruption varied. Only Farah, Kandahar and Baghlan supported administrative reform as a mean to curb corruption. In Kabul a higher percentage of respondents indicated that administrative reform could be a means of curbing corruption. However, a high number of respondents clearly said that administrative reforms would not be efficient in curbing corruption at present. This apparent paradox suggests that in order for administrative reforms to efficiently curb corruption they need to be done in an environment where clear priorities are drawn and “islands of integrity” are constructed around key institutions.

Respondents who believed that corruption occurred as a result of the work of one individual believed more in administrative reforms as a tool to curb corruption than those who believed that corruption was caused as a result of the work of a group or a system. This was also the case of those who thought that weaknesses in the administrative system caused impunity for corruption more than other factors.

Those who supported administrative reforms perceived that part of its success was due to the establishment of anti-corruption institutions within the government. Also, the majority of those who supported administrative reform did not want it to mean increased bureaucratic procedures.

When respondents were asked if changes in the law, the administrative system or in the civil servants would reduce corruption, 45% of them indicated that changing the administrative system was needed. This is not in contradiction with what was said before. In fact, a significant percentage (28%) of respondents said that change should occur in all three the categories asked.

In response to whether the employment of women in public administration will decrease corruption, interestingly, interestingly only 55% of respondents said that recruitment of more women in administration would decrease corruption in response to another question while more than 90% of respondents perceived that women were less corrupt by nature. 45% male respondents supported this idea against 71% of female respondents, this shows that women are perceived not to have the sufficient influence in changing the core of the administrative corruption system. Indeed, those who believe that corruption was the result of cooperation among a group of individuals or the outcome of an established system were less enthusiastic about recruiting women.
Attitudes towards the sharia’s role in decreasing corruption

The majority of respondents (81%) believed that the sharia would help addressing the problem of corruption at least partially. Male respondents were more inclined to believe this view. Civil servants were more inclined towards the efficiency of sharia to fight corruption than ordinary citizens. Respondents from rural areas, more than respondents from urban areas perceived the sharia to be beneficial in fighting corruption. Kabul respondents (90%) were an exception and they overwhelmingly considered sharia an effective instrument in reducing corruption.

The respondents who thought the justice sector (including the judges and courts) as the most corrupt also believed more than any other group that the sharia could reduce corruption. Yet, the survey did not contain further elements to specify how the sharia could help in curbing corruption.

The preference for media over the ulama as an advocacy channel to fight corruption largely correlated to the urban or rural origin of the respondents. Urban respondents preferred the media whereas rural respondents preferred ulama. Among those who thought the sharia was a good means of combating corruption, one-third perceived traditional structures such as community leaders and gatherings as the most effective means of advocating against corruption.

Male respondents thought that advocacy on anticorruption would be more efficient through the ulama while female respondents thought it more efficient through public gatherings. Civil servants had a slight preference for religious institutions while ordinary citizens perceived that resorting to mass media would be the best means of advocating against corruption.
Resisting corrupt officials

Respondents envisaged resorting to a variety of ways in fighting against corrupt officials. Using the law that have been passed were the most preferred followed by referring the case to the General and Independent Administration of Anti-Corruption and Bribery (GIAAC) (refer to Table 3). The bulk of respondents who would resort to GIAAC came from Kabul, Herat, Farah, Kandahar, Ghazni and Nangarhar. It is also interesting to note that the recently established National Assembly (11%) enjoyed some degree of support for curbing the activity of corrupt officials. It is noteworthy that a similar percentage of those who saw the judiciary and police as the most corrupt sectors of public administration still considered referring to these institutions - judiciary (15%) and police (7%) - to fight against corrupt civil servants.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specified ways</th>
<th>Percentage of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By knowledge of law</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By contacting GIAAC</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By referring to the judiciary</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Parliament</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By contacting the Police</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By arguing</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3

Male respondents referred more often to the Parliament and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) as means to fight corrupt civil servants. Civil servant respondents perceived that the most likely way to fight against corrupt civil servants would be to relay on their knowledge
of laws and by contacting the GIAAC. People in the cities perceived that arguing and using the GIAAC would be the most efficient way to fight against corrupt civil servants. In rural areas respondents would relay more on their MPs as leverage or on the AIHRC. In Kabul, Farah, Bamyan, Badghis and Nangarhar, respondents thought that the judiciary would be the best means of combating corruption.

Local institutions

![Local institutions or councils effectively dealing with corruption](image)

When asked who was the best agent for combating corruption, respondents overwhelmingly perceived local institutional actors as the most efficient. More than one-third of respondents designated the recently elected provincial councils as the most suited for dealing with corruption. Yet, one-third said that no local institution could effectively deal with corruption. Female respondents, compared to male respondents, perceived local commanders and the NSP councils as more effective in curbing corruption. Civil servants were less enthusiastic about provincial councils and tended to perceive that none of these local institutions could efficiently fight corruption. Many urban respondents (41%) perceived that provincial councils could be an efficient way of fighting corruption. Respondents reported the highest rates of confidence in NSP councils in Kabul, Balkh and Parwan provinces. Provincial councils had the most support in Bamyan, Balkh, Khost, Kandahar, Farah, Badghis and Herat.

International agencies were viewed as effective. 55% of respondents believed that the international agencies could effectively address the issue of corruption. Female respondents, compared to male respondents, showed more optimism on the efficiency of the international community’s involvement in fighting corruption. Respondents from the cities thought of international agencies more favorably than respondents living in rural areas. In least populated provinces the perception of international agencies’ efficiency in fighting corruption was less, except for Farah province. In Kabul, the support for international agencies was weak. Only in Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, Kandahar, Farah and Badghis provinces did respondents perceive that the international agencies had efficiency to fight against corruption.
Currently, there are no specialized courts for dealing with anti-corruption cases in Afghanistan. The respondents were asked whether they thought specialized courts could be effective instruments in decreasing corruption. 58% of respondents believed that specialized courts could effectively curb corruption and 21% perceived that specialized courts would not be effective in curbing corruption.

The series of questions used to elaborate our analysis on the specialized complaint mechanisms might have been a bit advanced for most of our respondents. We did find coherence among the respondents on this issue. Civil servants were slightly more supportive of the idea of specialized courts while non-civil servant respondents and ordinary citizens from the cities were the most reluctant towards an effective role for specialized courts in curbing corruption. Those who believed anti-corruption institutions dealt more effectively with corruption also tended to believe that specialized courts would help curb corruption in the country.

Figure 51
Part VI: Perceptions on the Evolution of Corruption

The types of relationships facilitating corruption have changed considerably over time, for instance the role of money in enabling corrupt activities has never before gained as much prominence as it has under the current Afghan government. The current regime is also considered as the most corrupt compared to the five previous regimes by the respondents of our survey. The judiciary, customs office and municipalities are perceived to have undergone a significant increase in corruption over the last five years. While social services and the security sectors are thought to have experienced a decrease in corruption. We hypothesize that the perceived decrease in corruption in the social services and security sectors could be related to the dramatic increase in international actors involved in both of these sectors for the past five years. The Afghans might be perceiving the increased international community presence as more accountable and less prone to corruption than services rendered by the Afghan state alone. This hypothesis does not mean that there is no corruption within the services provided by the international community or that there is more accountability within the international community. It is simply one possible explanation for why perceptions of corruption in the social services and security sectors is considered to have decreased in the past five years.

In this section, we are concerned only with the concept of corruption and how it evolves over time. We are not interested in making political statements or attempting to present the views of our respondents as reflecting their political positions. Instead we intend to focus only on the perception of corruption as a concept and practice. We consider that perceptions are an accumulation of experiences comprise of the social transmission of these experiences; in consequence, even if some of our respondents did not live under previous regimes, we cannot deny their (built) perception of that period.

Least and most corrupt regimes

Figure 52
Female respondents perceived the Karzai regime as less corrupt compared to male respondents (who considered the mujahiddin government as less corrupt). To female respondents, Zaher Shah’s rule was considered the least corrupt regime (30%). The regimes of Dawood Khan and Zaher Shah are remembered as the least corrupt regimes over the last forty years. Civil servants considered Dawood Khan (42% of responses) and the communist regimes to be the least corrupt. When considering the highest corruption level under different periods there were no significant differences among civil servants and ordinary citizens - except for the mujahidin for which civil servants assigned a relatively higher level of corruption. Zaher Shah’s rule was perceived as the least corrupt period in the cities while people in rural areas viewed the Dawood government as least corrupt. Rural populations looked upon the Taliban as the least corrupt.

The Taliban period was seen by 24% of respondents in Kabul as the least corrupt. Similar perceptions of the Taliban period were collected from respondents from the provinces of Ghazni, Khost and Nangarhar. Respondents in Herat, Ghazni, Paktia, Bamyan and Parwan saw Dawood Khan’s regime as the least corrupt regime. However, respondents in Kandahar, Farah and Balkh thought of Zaher Shah’s regime as the least corrupt. Respondents in Kandahar perceived the Taliban regime as having the highest rate of corruption. The period after 2001 and up to present has been unanimously viewed as having the highest level of corruption in most of the provinces, except in Kandahar, Paktia and Bamyan.

There were no significant differences in perceptions amongst respondents when stratified across the different age categories. The exception were the less than 20 year olds who perceived the Karzai’s regime as least corrupt. Perhaps the perception of respondents less than 20 year olds of the current regime is influenced by their lack of experience as well as lack of insight to comment on previous regimes.

Perceptions of the Evolution of Specific Aspects of Corruption

![Figure 53](image-url)
Ethnic and family ties were perceived as the most common channels through which corruption transpired under Zaher Shah’s regime. Party or factional links and money were seen as less relevant channels to carry out corruption. Male respondents tended to support the perception that ethnic and family ties were the most common channels through which corruption transpired under Zaher Shah’s regime while female respondents did not agree and some thought that no corruption existed at all during that time.

For Dawood Khan’s rule, a significant number of respondents said that none of the proposed means were considered relevant in describing the channels through which corruption was carried out. Similarly, almost half of the civil servant respondents did not identify with any of the proposed channels for corruption under Dawood Khan’s regime. However, the respondents perceived ethnic ties as a dominant channel (as well as party or factional links) through which corruption transpired.
Respondents thought party or factional links as the most relevant channels through which corruption was performed during the communist regime. Female respondents saw party or factional links as more relevant during the communist regime while male respondents (9%) considered moral corruption as the most relevant factor contributing to other forms of corruption more than the average respondent. Civil servants saw party or factional ties as the more relevant channels through which corruption transpired during the communist regime.

Under the mujahidin, party or factional links ceased as the to be the main perceived channels of corruption. Ethnic relations re-emerged according to the perceptions of the respondents as the most significant channel through which corruption was carried forth during the mujahedin. In perceptions of the mujahedin regime, money increasingly emerged as a channel through which corruption was facilitated. Civil servants thought of ethnic relations as more significant channels for corruption. Perceptions of corruption during the mujahedin regime also significantly varied from one ethnic group to another across the thirteen provinces.

Figure 56

Perception of the most common aspects of corruption under Mujahiddin's regime

Under the mujahidin, party or factional links ceased as the main perceived channels of corruption. Ethnic relations re-emerged according to the perceptions of the respondents as the most significant channel through which corruption was carried forth during the mujahedin. In perceptions of the mujahedin regime, money increasingly emerged as a channel through which corruption was facilitated. Civil servants thought of ethnic relations as more significant channels for corruption. Perceptions of corruption during the mujahedin regime also significantly varied from one ethnic group to another across the thirteen provinces.
Respondents perceived that ethnic ties were the most significant channel than any other during the Taliban regime. 69% of male respondents perceived ethnic relations to be the most relevant channel by which corruption occurred. However, for 7% of respondents, money was perceived as the most relevant channel through which corruption transpired.

Money was seen as having played a significant role under the current administration (as opposed to the less prominent role of money in the perceptions of previous regimes) by the respondents. In addition, respondents perceived that the corruption of moralities contributed to other forms of corruption after 2001. The general perception amongst respondents is that ethnic, family relations and party or factional links are less relevant channels by which corruption is carried out. Female respondents give less importance to money (35%) and greater importance to personal (13%) and eth-
nic relations (22%). 45% of civil servant respondents perceived that money played a major role in sustaining corruption under the Karzai regime.

**Illustration perception of the most common medium used for corruption over the last forty years (in 2006)**

![Illustration of corruption perception](attachment:image.png)

**Trends for core state sectors**

Perceived corruption has increased in the judiciary, security, customs and in the municipalities over the last five years. The perception of corruption has decreased only in the social services sector. The respondents, were ask to select three areas where they perceived corruption increased and in another question, the three areas where corruption had decreased. By and large, the respondents were quite consistent in these two questions: Respondents perceived the judiciary as the sector where corruption increased the most (74% of responses). Balkh and Kandahar accounted for half of the respondents who perceived that corruption has decreased in the judiciary over the last five years.

Male respondents constituted a slightly higher percentage of those who thought corruption increased in the municipalities. In addition, a decrease in corruption was resented much more in the cities than in the far-away villages.

Security in particular had to be evaluated at the provincial level considering the vast differences in security across provinces: Security is the sector where corruption is perceived to have increased and decreased at the same time. Respondents of the southern provinces of Kandahar, Farah, Khost, Ghazni and Paktia perceived an increase in corruption in the security sector. These provinces are also the areas where insecurity and violence has been the most acute over the past two years.
Often, respondents who identified the judiciary and the municipality as the sites where corruption increased also considered money as the main channel though which corruption was carried out since 2001.

**Frequency of bribing in recent years**

33% of respondents said they were personally involved in giving or taking bribes in recent years compared to 67% who said they did not participate in bribe-taking or giving. However, considering the sensitive nature of the question, it is unsure whether the respondents accurately expressed their involvement in bribery. The sensitive nature of this question was confirmed when a small percentage of those who said they paid bribes once or more during the last three years were among those who in response to another question said they were not personally involved in paying or taking bribes.

38% of male respondents compared to 24% of female respondents answered positively when asked if they were involved in bribing. Bribing was more frequently an act which males engaged in and also admitted to having engage in. Ordinary citizens answered affirmatively more often than civil servants when asked if they were involved in bribing. People living in remote villages were exposed to bribing more often than those who lived in the cities.
Conclusion

A few lessons can be drawn from the broad snapshot we have presented of Afghan perceptions of corruption. It is widely recognized that perceptions of corruption are often worse than the reality; this statement notwithstanding, the level of perceived corruption reported in this survey is alarming enough in itself to constitute serious concerns and generate further interest on the actual levels of corruption throughout Afghanistan. Up to two-thirds of respondents have paid bribes or their families have suffered financially from corruption over the last year while at least one-third of respondents have been involved in taking or giving bribes over the last three years.

In addition, the results of our survey reveal a widespread perceived ‘institutionalization’ of the phenomenon of corruption either evidenced: 1) at the level of administration as a culture, a network or, system of corruption; 2) through the existence of a specialized vocabulary for referring to corruption (gift, “low salary” etc.); 3) through customs habits and practices that often perpetuate corruption (giving gifts after being hired or promoted and other awards for obtaining services); 4) as citizens’ lenient attitudes towards or justifications for corruption (the economic calculation that sees bribing as a means to a particular financial end, the penetrating nature of poverty in Afghan society which provides the justification and necessity which make corruption possible); 5) by a variety of relationships that facilitate corruption; and 6) through the physical spaces where corruption happens.

The double-edged poverty arguments towards which there seems be a strong convergence of responses should be looked at with concern. At one hand, on the part of the civil servants, it is used to justify and to legitimize actions and attitudes that lead to administrative corruption. On the other hand, on the part of citizens, poverty becomes the argument for denouncing corruption, protesting against it, associating it with social injustice and making a case for the emergence of an “immoral society”.

In this regard, three sectors crystalize the resentment reflected in our respondents views: justice, security, and municipal services. Customs follows a little behind but still present concerns in the provinces which have border authorities. While respondents single out the courts, the municipalities and the Ministry of Interior as the most corrupt institutions, social services that are distributed into many institutions also formed more than one-third of responses, a fact that cannot be overlooked. It confirms the widespread nature of administrative corruption.

Impunity and unaccountability of civil servants were singled out as the main factors supporting corruption acts. Respondents indicated on many occasions the lack of government action. This is manifested through a lack of law enforcement, a lack of access to higher officials, the existence of support and protection for civil servants, the existence of organized networks and weak or faulty management etc. This is a new challenge for Karzai’s government and administrative reform, as people are relaying on new institutions (the media, parliament, Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, etc.) or external mechanisms (the shariat, social mediation, local institutions, factional-political relations etc.) in dealing with corruption. Nevertheless, the laxity of citizens’ attitudes towards corruption is also contributing to its prevalence. Corruption is regularly used by a large portion of the population for their own convenience in the guise of saving time -expedience- and as a ‘business opportunity’ for a professional class of mediators (commission-takers) who facilitate public transactions for private gain.
Finally, in the popular perceptions, the current period is also viewed as having the most corruption, 60% of respondents considered it as the period with the highest rate of corruption. Furthermore, Afghan citizens are truly concerned by the use of money as a medium for bribery. The core functions of the state (justice, security and municipalities) have had a marked increase in perceived corruption with cooptation appointments playing a major role. The perceptions recorded in this document are certainly a lesson for the current administration; they should however be read as a call to action rather than a cause for despair.
Methodology

The design of the questionnaire and the definition of the themes were based on the accumulated research experience of IWA and in particular, lessons from the roundtable discussion which took place at IWA in June 2006. The discussions included participants from civil society organizations and specialized state organs and were aimed at identifying the root causes of administrative corruption. At the beginning of August 2006, approximately 15 in-depth interviews were conducted in Kabul by IWA researchers. These initial interviews allowed IWA research staff to gain an understanding of corruption perceptions among both civil servants and ordinary citizens. Consequently, the questionnaire on Afghan perceptions of corruption was divided into six parts: 1) acceptable and unacceptable practices concerning corruption, 2) the types and manifestations of corruption, 3) causes and justifications for corruption, 4) the impacts and effects of corruption, 5) the perception of some proposed solutions and 6) the perceived evolution of corruption over time. In addition, the questionnaire was designed in six parts and structured in this manner in order for the results to be compared and contrasted with IWA and UNDP’s upcoming study.

The questionnaire was directly designed in Dari in order to better capture meanings, wordings, social representations and images that Afghans associate with administrative corruption. A two-day training session allowed surveyors, some with previous experience of conducting surveys and some with little prior experience, to learn the basic techniques of conducting an interview as well as making a random selection of respondents at village or district (nahiya) in cities. The training included an initial review of the questionnaire, a pilot test in Kabul by all surveyors and a final review of the questionnaire.

There were 19 surveyors, six of whom were women. Most of the surveyors were either originally from the province where they conducted the surveys or lived there at the time of the survey. The fieldwork took place between 20 August and 3 September 2006.

The sample consisted of some 1,258 individuals. In order to capture the broadest views, six basic criteria were considered to enable a good sampling of the population. First, at least 25% of the sample had to be composed of civil servants allowing a statistical significance for this crucial group and, for further conducting specific analysis on their perceptions. Second, 60% of the sample had to come from rural areas. While rural areas have not been rigorously defined in previous researches concerning the Afghan population, we have tried in this survey to introduce a sub-division within the rural population (60%): 30% of the total sample had to come from villages near cities while the last portion (30%) of the sample had to come from remote villages. Third, the ethnic balance of the sample was constituted of following ethnic groups: 40% Pashtun, 35% Tajik, 15% Hazara, 5% Uzbek and 5% other ethnic groups. The ethnic balance tried to reflects the reported composition of ethnic groups across Afghanistan, although precise figures are not available. Our intention was not to reinforce or introduce ethnic stereotypes but instead to merely reflect the outcome of our statistical analysis stratified by ethnic group. We do acknowledge that much more sophisticated stratifications and analyses should be conducted on ethnicity with regards to corruption in the future. Fourth, women had to constitute approximately 40% of the sample. Fifth, the spatial distribution of the respondents has to be wider over the country. Finally, the number of respondents in each province was distributed into three categories based on the estimated population size of the province, i.e. 64-65 respondents for small provinces (with a population of around 400,000), 128-130 respondents for provinces with a large population (Balkh, Kandahar, Nangarhar, Herat, with a population of around 67
1 million) and 225 respondents for Kabul province where the population is more than 2.5 million. The actual sample figures after the survey was conducted were however slightly differed from our initial estimates. The basic statistical representations for each of the six pre-selected criteria (ethnicity, province, gender, civil service status, urban/rural location, population size) are presented below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>39.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
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<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbak</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1258</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paklia</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>65</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<table>
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<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>61.5</td>
<td>61.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civil servants versus ordinary citizens status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>27.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>None Civil Servant</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>72.2</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>1204</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Rural location</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>40.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nearby City Village</td>
<td>376</td>
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<td>30.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Far away by City Village</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1242</td>
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The questionnaire
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questionnaire number:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of interviewee:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of interview:</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1 Ethnic group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Pashtun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tajik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Hazara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Uzbek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2 Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kabul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Herat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Badghis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Farah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Kandahar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ghazni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Paktia</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Khost</td>
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<td>9. Parwan</td>
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<td>10. Baghlan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Balkh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Bamiyan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Nangarhar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3 District (post-coding)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4 Village or naheeya (name)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 Sex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6 Marital status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Married</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7 Interviewee is civil servant or not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Perceptions of Corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 8 Location
1. City
2. Village near city
3. Remote village

### Q1 How old are you?
1. Up to 20 years old
2. 21 to 30 years old
3. 31 to 40 years old
4. 41 to 50 years old
5. More than 50 years old

### Q2 What is your level of education?
1. Illiterate
2. Semi-literate
3. High school
4. Bachelors
5. Master’s and above

### Q3 What is your income?
1. Up to 5,000 Afs
2. 5,001 to 10,000 Afs
3. 10,001 to 20,000 Afs
4. 20,001 to 30,000 Afs
5. More than 30,000 Afs
6. No income

### Q4 How many people are in your family?
1. Up to 4
2. 5 to 10
3. 11 to 15
4. More than 15

### Q5 What is the biggest problem in Afghanistan that the government has to address?
1. Security
2. Corruption
3. Drugs
4. Disarmament
5. Development
6. Other
Perceptions of corruption

Q6 What are the three most commonly used words for bribes? (3 responses)
1. Bribe
2. Help
3. Gift
4. Tea money
5. Share
6. Thinking of others
7. Due to low income
8. Other

Q7 In your opinion, is corruption a common occurrence in the country?
1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know

Q8 To which kinds of corruption would a civil servant turn a blind eye? (2 responses)
1. Holding two official positions
2. Not performing the task at the appropriate time
3. Civil servants' taking money when they are poor
4. Taking small bribes in exchange for services
5. Employment based on personal relationships
6. Carelessness in relation to work
7. Not respecting the laws in delivering services
8. Redirecting state services for the benefit of family members
9. Reducing taxes and customs duties in exchange for taking a percentage of them
10. None of the above

Q9 To which kinds of corruption would a civil servant not turn a blind eye?
1. Taking a large bribe against services delivered
2. Taking bribes from the poor
3. Obliging the customers to pay bribes
4. Disloyalty to or subversion of the government

Q10 In which of the following situations is corruption more unacceptable to you? (3 responses)
1. For obtaining a driving licence
2. For obtaining passport or ID card
3. For obtaining degrees or diplomas
4. For building illegally in violation of zoning laws
5. For modifying and changing of civil court decisions
6. Illegal release of criminals from prisons or on custody
7. Illegal purchase and sale of lands or properties

Q11 Which practice or behaviour of civil servants is the most common while committing corruption?
1. Direct request in the workplace
2. Indirect request in the workplace
3. Delaying the work or creating obstacles
4. Indirect request by an intermediary
5. Other

Q12 Which method (of civil servants’ committing corruption) is acceptable to you?
1. Direct request in the workplace
2. Indirect request in the workplace
3. Delaying the work or creating obstacles
4. Indirect request by an intermediary
5. None of the above

Q13 Which method (of civil servants’ committing corruption) is not acceptable to you?
1. Direct request in the workplace
2. Indirect request in the workplace
3. Delaying the work or creating obstacles
4. Indirect request by an intermediary
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q14 Which one of these corrupt activities or type of bribe is acceptable to you?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Giving money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sharing of resources or wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Involvement in falsifying of documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. None of the above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q15 Which one (of these corrupt activities or bribes) is unacceptable?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Giving money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Social transactions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Sharing of resources or wealth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Involvement in falsifying of documents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q16 Which kind of bribes makes you feel more uncomfortable?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Taking bribes immediately</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Taking bribes incrementally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Many individuals taking bribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. One person taking bribes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q17 Would you protect your interests through giving bribes if the conditions existed? (For instance: you have to give the government 2000 Afs but instead you pay a civil servant 500 Afs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q18 Lack of accountability for civil servants causes corruption?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Fully agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Completely disagree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q19 Does the bribe taker feel guilty?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q20 Is a corrupt person detested in society?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Types and Manifestations of Corruption

**Q21 How many types of corruption exist in state institutions?**
1. One type
2. Two types
3. Three types
4. More than three

**Q22 Which sector has more corruption?**
1. Private sector
2. Public sector
3. Foreign organisations and the civil society sector
4. Other

**Q23 In the public sector which three institutions have more corruption? (3 responses)**
1. Ministry of Justice
2. Directorate National Security
3. Ministry of Interior
4. Ministry of Finance
5. Ministry of Education
6. Ministry of Higher Education
7. Ministry of Transport
8. Ministry of Water and Electricity
9. Ministry of Health
10. Ministry Rural Rehabilitation and Development
11. Ministry of Commerce
12. Municipalities
13. Banks
14. Courts
15. President's Office
16. Parliament
17. State-run enterprises
18. Other

**Q24 Which category of civil servant is more corrupt? (2 responses)**
1. Police
2. Traffic police
3. Customs employees
4. Bank employees
5. Ministry of Transport employees
6. Employees of the attorney-general’s office
7. Judges
8. Other

**Q25 In which of the following sectors is there more corruption?**
1. Security
2. Education
3. Health
4. Customs
5. Justice
6. Municipal services
7. District-level services

**Q26 Which type of activity causes more corruption in public administration?**
1. Purchases
2. Issuing of licences
3. Contracts
4. Employment
5. Official documents
6. Other

**Q27 Corruption is more prevalent in which areas?**
1. Provinces
2. Kabul city

**Q28 Corruption is more prevalent in which locations?**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghan Perceptions of Corruption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Villages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q29 In which places are the decisions regarding corruption made?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Public offices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Civil servant's house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Outside of office and house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q30 When is the decision of corruption taken?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. On the job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Off the job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q31 In which positions does more corruption happen?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Decision making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q32 In bribe taking, how many individuals are involved?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. One individual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. One group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. One system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q33 Who is more corrupt; men or women?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q34 In your opinion which category is more corrupt? Single or married persons?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Single</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Married</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q35 Amongst civil servants, which age group is more corrupt?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Less than 30 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. From 31 to 40 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. From 41 to 50 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. More than 50 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q36 Amongst civil servants, those with which level of education are more corrupt?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Illiterate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Semi-literate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. High school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bachelor’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Master’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Above master’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q37 What percentage of administrative services are regularly solved through corruption?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. 25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q38 Purchasing does not involve corruption.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Fully agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Agree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Don't know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Completely disagree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Q39 In employment the following factor is considered essential?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Specialisation and merit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ethnic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political or party links</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Personal acquaintances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Afghan Perceptions of Corruption

Causes and Justifications

Q40 Which factors cause corruption?
1. Low salary
2. Low livelihood
3. Not knowing the laws
4. Lack of law enforcement
5. Weakness of government control
6. Dominant administrative culture
7. Other

Q41 Which factor enforces impunity for corruption?
1. Relationships
2. Widespread corruption among civil servants
3. Weakness in administrative system
4. Lack of sanctions and discipline of civil servants
5. Lack of attention of government leaders
6. Existence of support and protection
7. Other

Q42 In which part of the system do weaknesses cause corruption?
1. Weakness in administrative system
2. Weakness in law
3. Weakness in law implementors
4. Weakness in beneficiaries of law and public services
5. Other

Q43 Which types of weakness in the citizen causes corruption?
1. Lack of time
2. Lack knowledge regarding law and citizens’ rights
3. Illiteracy
4. Lack of experience
5. Lack of access to other institutions
6. Indifference from people
7. Powerlessness before civil servants
8. Other

Q44 In which cases were you obliged to give a bribe?
1. Never obliged
2. When lacking time
3. When I could benefit from it
4. Lack of connections
5. Lack of access to another authority
6. When the administrative process is prolonged

Q45 What are the effects of lack of state authority over corruption?
1. Increased corruption
2. Decreased corruption
3. No effect
4. I don’t know

Q46 Are appointments by co-optation causing corruption?
1. Yes
2. No
3. I don’t know

Q47 If yes which kind of co-optation?
1. Party
2. Ethnic group
3. Popular
4. Alliance or factional
5. Political
6. Friendship
7. Other
Afghan Perceptions of Corruption

Q48 What kind of relationships adds to corruption in society?
1. Individual
2. Ethnic
3. Religious
4. Party
5. Alliance or faction
6. Professional
7. Political
8. Group transactions
9. Knowing commanders
10. Knowing high-level officials
11. Other

Q49 Which type of individuals are intermediaries in bribe taking?
1. Relatives
2. Acquaintances
3. Intermediary or commission takers
4. People who have asked for given serviced and thus acquired experience
5. Civil servants
6. Bribe-taking civil servants
7. Other

Q50 Which customs cause corruption?
1. Gift giving at the time of being hired
2. Gift giving while getting a promotion
3. Harassment by creating obstacles
4. Not arriving in time
5. Bureaucratic procedures
6. Dominance of illegal and unprofessional relationships
7. Using public office for private gain
8. Other

Q51 Civil servants take bribes because...
1. They don't know the laws
2. They don't fear law enforcement
3. Someone is protecting them
4. They are positioned within networks of corruption
5. Other

Q52 The authority of non-State actors decreases corruption.
1. Fully agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Completely disagree

Q53 It is in the interest of civil servants not to respect laws.
1. Fully agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Completely disagree

Q54 Civil servants do not have the capacity to understand laws.
1. Fully agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Completely disagree

Q55 Accumulated power in one individual cause corruption.
1. Fully agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Completely disagree
Q56 These factors are considered essential for getting contracts:

1. Ethnic relationships
2. Family links
3. Fulfilling eligibility conditions
4. Political relations
5. Personal relations
6. Giving money
7. Social transactions
8. Other
Effects of Corruption

Q57 What are the effects of corruption on society? (3 responses)
1. Moral corruption increased
2. Culture of corruption increased
3. Indifference or public hatred towards government
4. Increased sense of injustice and inequality
5. Feelings of impunity in regards to crime is increased
6. Social relations increased or enhanced
7. Collaboration and sympathy among individuals increased
8. Increased individualism and decreased altruism

Q58 Is there a link between corruption and internal conflict in Afghanistan?
1. Partially
2. Fully
3. Absolutely not
4. I don't know

Q59 What is the effect of corruption or bribe on your family?
1. Non-existent
2. Little
3. Some
4. Considerable
5. Extremely high

Q60 By your estimates how much financial damage has been incurred by your family during the last year because of bribes or corruption?
1. None
2. Up to 2,500 Afs
3. Between 2,501 to 5,000 Afs
4. Between 5,001 to 10,000 Afs
5. Between 10,001 to 20,000 Afs
6. More than 20,000 Afs

Q61 In which two social service sectors, has corruption had a negative, direct, or indirect impact on your family? (2 responses)
1. Education
2. Higher education
3. Health
4. Employment
5. Handicapped services
6. Hajj services
7. Other

Q62 In which two public service sectors have corruption had a negative impact on your family? (2 responses)
1. Justice
2. Security
3. Water and Electricity
4. Sanitation
5. Transport
6. Other

Q63 Did the existence of corruption in the public sector caused land or property disputes in your area?
1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't know

Q64 Which class is immediately effected by corruption?
1. The poor
2. The middle class
3. The rich
4. I don't know
Q65 Which class is most affected by corruption?
1. Big merchants
2. Small business owners
3. Civil servants
4. New property owners
5. Other

Q66 Who is the most vulnerable group before corruption?
1. Women
2. Handicapped
3. Individuals with low social status
4. Civil servants
5. Elders
6. Displaced people

Q67 How do you evaluate the impact of corruption on women?
1. It increases moral corruption
2. It decreases their economic situation
3. It increases their lack of interest in the government
4. It increases the sympathy among women
5. It increases the feeling of powerlessness
6. Other

Q68 What is the impact of corruption on the country’s economy?
1. It stagnates the economy
2. It accelerates economic growth
3. It strengthens the economy
4. It weakens the economy
5. I don’t know

Q69 What kind of role does corruption have in providing security?
1. None
2. Negligent
3. Some
4. Extremely high

Q70 What is the impact of corruption on state’s institution?
1. Weakens the legitimacy of the state
2. Weakens capacity and power of the state
3. Both responses
4. None

Q71 What is the impact of corruption on the presence of the international community?
1. Less legitimacy for their presence
2. Less effectiveness of their presence
3. Both
4. No impact

Q72 What is the impact of corruption on foreign aid in Afghanistan?
1. No impact
2. Donor fatigue
3. I don’t know
4. None
# Solutions and remedies

**Q73 Are anti-corruption administrations effective in decreasing corruption?**
1. Fully agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Completely disagree

**Q74 The number of bureaucratic procedures increase corruption.**
1. Fully agree
2. Agree
3. Don't know
4. Disagree
5. Completely disagree

**Q75 Does administrative reform reduce corruption?**
1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

**Q76 Does employing more female civil servants reduce corruption?**
1. Yes
2. No

**Q77 To which extent can Sharia reduce corruption?**
1. Effectively
2. Partially
3. Not at all
4. Don't know

**Q78 What changes are needed for decreasing corruption in society?**
1. Changes in laws
2. Changes in administrative system
3. Changes in civil servants
4. All three types of changes
5. Other

**Q79 What means of advocacy against corruption is needed?**
1. Through the ulama
2. Through public gatherings
3. Through ethnic and tribal leaders
4. Through media
5. Other

**Q80 How is it possible to fight against corrupt civil servants?**
1. By arguing
2. By knowledge of laws
3. By contacting the police
4. By referring to the judiciary
5. By contacting GIAAC
6. By contacting Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission
7. By contacting the National Assembly
8. Other

**Q81 Who can be effective in reducing corruption?**
1. Provincial councils
2. Local commanders
3. Development councils of NSP
4. Other councils
5. None

**Q82 How effectively can international agencies fight against corruption in the country?**
1. Effectively
2. Ineffectively
3. Absolutely not effective
4. Don't know
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q83 Can setting up specialized courts be effective in curbing corruption?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I don't know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Afghan Perceptions of Corruption

### Evolution over time

**Q84 How are corrupt civil servants distributed in the system?**

1. One person is corrupt
2. All civil servants cooperate with each other
3. There is only one network of corrupt civil servants
4. Other

**Q85 Which groups of individuals are often involved in bribe taking?**

1. Individuals belonging to one department
2. Individuals belonging to one ministry or institution
3. Individuals belonging to many institutions
4. None of the above

**Q86 Which historical period had more corruption?**

1. During Zaher Shah
2. During Dawood Khan
3. During the communist regime
4. During mujahidin government
5. During the Taliban
6. During Karzai’s rule

**Q87 Which historical period has had the lowest level of corruption?**

1. During Zaher Shah
2. During Dawood Khan
3. During the communist regime
4. During mujahidin government
5. During the Taliban
6. During Karzai’s rule

**Q88 Which type of corruption was the most common under Zaher Shah?**

1. Family relations
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or factional links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. Moral corruption
7. None

**Q89 Which type of corruption was the most common under Dawood Khan?**

1. Family relations
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or factional links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. Moral corruption
7. None

**Q90 Which type of corruption was the most common under the communists?**

1. Family relations
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or factional links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. Moral corruption
7. None

**Q91 Which type of corruption was the most common under the mujahidin?**

1. Family relations
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or factional links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. Moral corruption
Q92 Which type of corruption was the most common under the Taliban?
1. Family relations
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or faction links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. Moral corruption
7. None

Q93 Which type of corruption was the most common under Karzai?
1. Family relations
2. Ethnic relations
3. Party or faction links
4. Personal relationships
5. Money
6. Moral corruption
7. None

Q94 In which three sectors has corruption increased over 5 years? (3 responses)
1. Social services
2. Security
3. Custom and taxes
4. The judiciary
5. Municipalities
6. Districts
7. None

Q95 In which three sectors has corruption decreased over 5 years? (3 responses)
1. Social services
2. Security
3. Custom and taxes
4. The judiciary
5. Municipalities
6. Districts
7. None

Q96 Have you yourself been involved in bribe giving or taking?
1. Yes
2. No

Q97 If yes, how many times in the last three years?
1. Never
2. Once
3. Twice to three times
4. More than three

Q98 For ten services you need from the government how many times would you give bribe or be involved in corruption?
1. Never
2. Twice to three times
3. More than four