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ABOUT INTEGRITY WATCH

Integrity Watch is an Afghan civil society organization committed to increase transparency, accountability, and integrity in Afghanistan. Integrity Watch was created in October 2005 and established itself as an independent civil society organization in 2006. The head office of Integrity Watch is in Kabul with provincial programmatic outreach in Balkh, Bamyan, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunduz, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Parwan provinces of Afghanistan.

Over the last one decade, Integrity Watch’s work has focused on three major components: (1) Community Monitoring, (2) Research, and (3) Advocacy.

Ever since its establishment, Integrity Watch has tried to encourage active citizenship and community mobilization through its programs. Our community monitoring work has included development of community monitoring tools, mobilizing and training communities to monitor infrastructure projects, public services, courts, and extractives industries.

Our research work has focused on policy-oriented research measuring trends, perceptions and experiences of corruption and covering wide range of corruption related issues including security and justice sectors, extractive industries, budget and public finance management, and aid effectiveness. The objective is to develop new, ground-breaking empirical research in order to set the agenda, influence decision-makers, bring to the public attention non-documented and non-explored issues.

The aim of our advocacy work has been to enhance Integrity Watch’s pioneering role in advocating for knowledge-based decision-making and informed public debate on corruption and integrity issues. Our advocacy work includes facilitation of policy dialogue on issues related to integrity, transparency, and accountability. We have engaged in policy advocacy for issues that communities experience on day-to-day basis while trying to hold the government and service providers accountable. Such issues has included access to information, budget transparency and accountability, aid transparency and effectiveness, effective public services, and other issues related to anti-corruption.
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ACRONYMS

NCS  National Corruption Survey
NGOs  Non-Government Organizations
NUG  National Unity Government
CEO  Chief Executive Officer
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan
UN  United Nations
SIGAR  Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
GDP  Gross Domestic Products
ACJC  Anti-Corruption Justice Center
CSO  Civil Society Organization
MEC  Afghanistan’s Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee
MoE  Ministry of Education
Map 2: Regions and province distribution
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The period since IWA’s last biennial National Corruption Survey in 2016 has been marked by ongoing political turmoil, rising insecurity, increasing internal migration, economic stagnation and record levels of opium production. The findings of this year’s survey demonstrate that corruption remains central to many of these challenges and that any progress in addressing Afghanistan’s myriad problems requires a renewed commitment to, and focus on, long term anti-corruption efforts.

General trends

With regards to the general situation in Afghanistan there appears to have been some slight progress since 2016 although room for optimism is limited. 61 percent of respondent’s state that they are either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the situation in their home province, compared to 54 percent in 2016. In terms of the level of progress made over the past 12 months, respondents in the Northeast and Central Highlands - areas where the government has stronger representation and greater influence – as well as the Southern region - which, in contrast is traditionally a Taliban stronghold - are the most positive.

When asked to consider the political situation in Afghanistan as a whole, the level of optimism is markedly different however, with only a quarter of all respondents describing the political situation in Afghanistan as either very good or somewhat good. This sense of pessimism is particularly acute in Central and Western regions, where only 16 percent and 18 percent respectively gave a positive assessment.

As was the case with previous surveys, insecurity continues to be the main concern among Afghans, followed by unemployment and corruption. While the proportion of those who mention corruption among the country’s top three problems has declined from 47 percent to 33 percent, this does not necessarily indicate that corruption is on the decline. Instead it is more likely that the deteriorating security situation and other key challenges are demanding citizens’ attention, problems which are themselves exacerbated by widespread corruption and the failure to prioritise longer-term strategies to strengthen governance in the country.

62 percent of those surveyed feel that the government has not done enough to tackle these problems over the past two years, a slight decrease on the 67 percent who felt the same way in 2016. Respondents in the more insecure Southern region are significantly more positive about the government’s efforts to address Afghanistan’s major problems than those in the more strongly government-controlled areas, such as the Central Highlands region.

Despite deteriorating security and the ever-increasing influence of the Taliban, Afghans remain optimistic about the prospects for peace and reconciliation and the impact this would have on stability and good governance. Nevertheless, 43 percent of respondents strongly agree or agree with the statement that “because of corruption people in our area refer to the Taliban”, up from the 39 percent of 2016. Meanwhile, 62 percent of respondents across the country agree with the statement that corruption within the state is facilitating the expansion of the Taliban, a significant increase on the 51 percent who believed this to be the case in 2016. Respondents in the South, where the insurgency is at its strongest, were the least likely to say that corruption within the state was facilitating the expansion of the Taliban.

The international community is also the target of much criticism. More than half (52 percent) of those surveyed do not believe that the international community wants to fight corruption in Afghanistan, compared to 45 percent in 2016, 36 percent in 2014 and 37 percent in 2012. The same proportion (52 percent) believes that the international community is not supportive of honest government officials in their province.

Perceptions and experiences of corruption

Since 2016, there has been a slight decrease in the proportion of citizens who feel that corruption is “very serious” and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of Afghans who feel there has been no improvement in reducing corruption in any public institution. When asked to consider which institutions are the most corrupt, the largest proportion of respondents named the courts/Judges (14 percent), Ministry of Education (10 percent) and the Attorney General’s office (9 percent) among the top three, by a significant margin. This largely mirrors the responses given in 2016. Meanwhile, only a quarter of Afghans believe that there has been some progress in reducing corruption in any public institution.
In terms of Afghan citizens’ experiences with administrative corruption, more than a quarter of the respondent’s report having personally experienced corruption over the past 12 months, with slightly more men experiencing corruption than women, possibly because of their greater day to day contact with government services. This represents a continuation of the increase in experienced levels of corruption as reported by citizens over the past 8 years. However, it is possible that this may simply reflect a greater willingness to report rather than an actual increase in levels of corruption. In terms of bribery specifically, the number of people reporting paying bribes has increased, but the frequency of bribes per person and the average size of bribes appears to have decreased with the net result being that the total amount of bribes paid in Afghanistan has decreased to levels not seen since 2012 and before. Among other things, this may be a reflection of the deteriorating economic situation in the country and hence a reduced ability among citizens to pay bribes. Meanwhile one quarter of Afghans report having been victims of nepotism, with the practice most prevalent in the Northern region and least prevalent in the Central Highlands and Central regions.

Impacts and drivers of corruption

The vast majority of respondents (83 percent) believe that corruption has negatively affected the life of people in their local area, with corruption seen as worse at the local level than at the provincial level. Almost three quarters of those surveyed do not trust local public services because of corruption and there is a strong sense that people in government, NGOs and international organisations are only out to benefit themselves.

By far the most common reason Afghans say they would give a bribe is because there is no other way to obtain a service. Thus, administrative corruption and bribery can largely be considered “demand-side” phenomena to the extent that citizens tend to pay bribes out of “need” (because they are demanded), rather than to help speed up bureaucratic processes or to gain an advantage. Meanwhile, there has been a significant increase since 2016 in the number of respondents who say they would pay a bribe (33 percent up from 22 percent). While this may indicate an increasing tolerance to petty corruption among Afghan citizens, it may also reflect an increasing willingness to discuss corruption more openly, which is consistent with the increase in citizens’ willingness to report corruption.

Attitudes to fighting corruption

Worryingly the proportion of citizens who feel that there is nothing they can personally do to reduce corruption has doubled since the last survey in 2016, with women being significantly more pessimistic than men in this regard. On the other hand, awareness among citizens of where to report corruption has increased significantly since 2016. At the same time, 14 percent of respondent’s state that they or someone in their household has reported such an act during the past 12 months, compared to 9 percent in 2016. While this is a positive development, given the high levels of experienced and perceived corruption in Afghanistan, it still represents a small proportion of those who have faced corruption. Moreover, around half of those who reported corruption voiced some level of dissatisfaction with the process. The most commonly cited reasons for not reporting corruption remain the lack of confidence that any action will be taken and the fear that those who report corruption will be subject to retribution/revenge.

Although 40 percent of those surveyed feel that corruption cannot be reduced at all (as compared to 37 percent in 2016), two-thirds nevertheless rate the government’s efforts to fight corruption as being very effective or somewhat effective. More specifically, 64 percent, 54 percent and 44 percent of respondents respectively believe that the Office of the President, the NUG and the Office of the Chief Executive have “a sincere desire and will to combat corruption”, which is a small but significant improvement on 2016.

In sum, the National Corruption Survey 2018 paints a very mixed picture with regards to progress in addressing Afghanistan’s key challenges including the fight against corruption. While there are some areas for cautious optimism, such as a decrease in the proportion of citizens who feel that corruption is “very serious” and the fact that Afghan citizens are slightly more confident in the will of their leaders to fight corruption, there are also some areas of real concern. In particular, the increasing influence of the Taliban, the continued high levels of both perceived and experienced corruption and the apparent increasing pessimism regarding what citizens themselves feel they can do to tackle the problem, suggest that much more work is required to raise awareness and improve the effectiveness of specific anti-corruption mechanisms in the country.
Recommendations

▪ **Prosecutions:** To give confidence to the people that the Government is really serious about tackling corruption, the Government must prosecute a much higher number of more serious corruption cases & carry out these prosecutions in a timely & efficient manner.

▪ **Asset recovery:** Use the existing legislation on illicit enrichment to seize assets unlawfully obtained.

▪ **Staffing:** The Attorney General’s and Anti-Corruption Justice Centre (ACJC) office must be properly staffed with suitably qualified personnel to allow a much higher level of prosecutions in corruption cases both in number & seriousness of cases.

▪ **Penalties:** As a proper deterrent, the penalties for conviction of persons involved in corruption cases, particularly the more serious ones, must be reviewed so that those persons so convicted will face the penalties of losing their jobs, their pensions, serving a prison sentence and paying substantial fines.

▪ **Accountability systems:** The government should establish robust accountability mechanisms within the public service, including the use of complaint mechanisms and citizen-led monitoring systems in key service delivery ministries.

▪ **Whistleblowing:** The government must take urgent action to ensure that those who report corruption are afforded protection through the active enforcement of Afghanistan’s new whistle-blower protection law.

▪ **Awareness-raising:** All actors should work to strengthen public engagement in the fight against corruption by supporting the use of tools to anonymously report and track corruption such as Integrity Watch Afghanistan’s Efshagar platform.

▪ **Anti-Corruption Law:** The government should urgently reconsider its decision not to form a joint governmental and civil society selection committee for the proposed Anti-Corruption Commission. Without a joint selection committee, the independence of the Commission will be seriously compromised.

▪ **Civil service reform:** The government should push through key civil service reforms, including installing & enforcing a system of recruitment & promotion on merit, ensuring the verification of asset declarations of all senior public officials and the imposition of sanctions for failure to register.

▪ **Business sector:** The government should continue its recent progress in simplifying business processes and reducing red tape in order to further reduce the opportunities for administrative corruption. Areas which require further simplification include registering property, dealing with construction permits and enforcing contracts.

▪ **Working Together:** Encourage government departments, business, civil society organisations and donors to work together in the fight against corruption and to promote a culture of integrity within the civil service and society in general.
INTRODUCTION

On the 20th October 2018, Afghanistan finally held its long-awaited parliamentary elections, which had been repeatedly delayed over recent years amid political disputes and wrangling over voter registration. The elections, originally scheduled for 2014, were marred by violence including the killing of 10 candidates in the months leading up to the poll, the majority carried out by the Taliban. The late introduction of the biometric system also caused major delays at many polling stations. At the time of writing, the outcome of the elections was not known, and the electoral body has until December 20 to release the final results. Meanwhile, presidential elections are expected to take place in April 2019, although there is little guarantee that the deadline will be met.

Regardless of the results of the elections, the political situation in Afghanistan is unlikely to improve significantly. In its most recent annual assessment of the country, Freedom House characterised Afghanistan as a country in which “political rights and civil liberties are curtailed in practice by violence, corruption, and flawed electoral processes”. Four years after the inception of Afghanistan’s power-sharing National Unity Government’s (NUG), the country continues to experience ongoing political turmoil. The NUG remains “a fragile coalition nearly paralyzed by corruption and infighting”, with continued disagreement between President Ghani and CEO Abdullah on their respective roles and powers.

Rising insecurity and internal displacement

The security situation has also worsened in recent years. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), civilian casualties are at their highest since 2002, with an unprecedented level of conflict-induced displacement. A surge in returnees from Iran and Pakistan (almost 300,000 in 2017 alone) has brought mounting pressure on humanitarian assistance.

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, in 2017 there were a total of 474,000 new displacements in Afghanistan due to conflict, bringing the total number of people living in displacement at the end of 2017 to 1,286,000. Meanwhile the UN Secretary General changed its assessment of Afghanistan, for the first time since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, from a country in a situation of ‘post-conflict’ to ‘a country undergoing a conflict that shows few signs of abating’.

Amid this atmosphere of political instability and insecurity, the influence and reach of the Taliban is once again on the rise. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) estimates that the Taliban and other militant groups now control or influence 14.5 percent of Afghanistan’s 407 districts, while the Afghan government controls or influences on 56.3 percent, with the 29.2 percent contested, that is to say controlled by neither the Afghan government nor the insurgency. Another study by the BBC found that the Taliban are now in full control of 14 districts (representing 4 percent of the country) and have “an active and open physical presence” in a further 263 (66 percent of the the country).

3 Ibid
In 2018 President Ghani took steps to instigate peace talks with the Taliban, proposing a ceasefire and prisoner release and suggesting the Taliban might take part in the official elections\(^13\). However, the Taliban has insisted on the withdrawal of foreign forces as a pre-condition for any peace talks, preferring to engage in direct talks with the U.S.\(^14\). Since then, senior U.S. officials have met with Taliban representatives in Qatar\(^15\), while Russia has hosted a landmark international meeting on Afghanistan in Moscow in attempt to re-energise the peace process\(^16\).

**Stagnant economy**

The continuing levels of insecurity have affected Afghanistan’s prospects of economic recovery, curtailing private investment and consumer demand. While GDP growth was estimated at 2.6 percent in 2017, slightly up on the 2.2 percent in 2016, the Government remains heavily reliant on donor funding. Rising insecurity, along with disruptions to services and poor agricultural performance mean that poverty levels continue to increase\(^17\), while unemployment in 2017 was estimated at just under 9 percent\(^18\).

2017 also saw opium cultivation in Afghanistan at a record high. From 2016 to 2017, the area under opium poppy cultivation grew by 63 percent and the estimated total production of opium by 87 percent. Most of the expansion took place in Helmand province, long a Taliban stronghold, which accounts for more opium than the whole of Myanmar, the world’s second largest producer of opiates\(^19\).

**Anti-corruption**

According to a recent report by Transparency International the Afghan government has made some progress in its anti-corruption efforts, particularly with regards to anti-money laundering, access to information and public procurement transparency, but still lacks a comprehensive anti-corruption legal framework which is compliant with the UN Convention against Corruption. Moreover, the report notes that Afghanistan’s multiple anti-corruption agencies do not constitute an effective, comprehensive system and civil society is not meaningfully included in the development and implementation of governance and anti-corruption legislation and policies\(^20\).

This assessment is shared by SIGAR which noted in its July 2018 quarterly report that the Anti-Corruption Justice Center (ACJC), established by President Ghani in May 2016 as a new judicial body targeting corruption, has shown little ability to function as intended, with more than 100 ACJC warrants outstanding, while nearly 40 percent of the prosecutors assigned to the ACJC have failed polygraphs, seriously undermining the new agency’s legitimacy\(^21\). The most recent SIGAR quarterly report, in October 2018, further noted that “the ACJC is attempting to placate donors by pursuing a number of low-level corruption cases, rather than the high-level corruption cases that are its mandate”\(^22\).

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\(^{18}\) World Bank Data: Unemployment, total (% of total labour force), data retrieved in September 2018 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=AF


1. GENERAL TRENDS

Part One of this report begins by examining recent trends in Afghan citizens’ views on the direction the country is taking both generally and in terms of the political situation in their own area and nationally, as well as their views on most serious problems facing the country. It then explores people’s perceptions of the role of other key actors in the country including the international community’s support to good governance and the role of corruption in facilitating the expansion of the Taliban. Finally, it looks at Afghans’ views on the prospects for peace and reconciliation. For a number of these areas the report explores how Afghans’ views differ across regions and according to gender in order to offer a more nuanced understanding of their perceptions and attitudes. This first section of the report thus offers important background information to place the subsequent analysis of trends in Afghan citizens’ perceptions and experiences with corruption in its broader context, which is critical given the deep and reinforcing interaction of corruption with other social and political challenges in the country.

1.1. General Perceptions of the direction the country is taking

Overall, Afghans remain surprisingly positive about the overall situation in their province although most consider that progress over the past 12 months has stagnated. On the whole, women are more positive than men about the direction the country is taking.

Despite the persistent challenges outlined in the previous section of the report, including a deteriorating security situation and rising levels of internal displacement, Afghans remain surprisingly positive about the overall situation in their home province. Indeed, the level of satisfaction has improved slightly since 2016. Currently 61 percent of respondents state that they are either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the situation, compared to 54 percent in 2016. A similar trend was identified by a 2018 survey conducted by the Asia Foundation, which found that the number of Afghans who say the country was moving in the right direction was the same as 2017 and higher than 2016, reversing a decade-long downward trend.

Our survey results also demonstrate that women tend to be slightly more positive than men, with 66 percent of women expressing some level of satisfaction with the situation in their area, as compared to 58 percent of men.

Figure 1: How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the overall situation in your province?

When it comes to assessing progress over the past 12 months, there is little change as compared to 2016. Currently, 44 percent of those surveyed believe that very significant or somewhat significant progress has been made in their area. This compares to 45 percent in 2016.

Again, women tend to be more positive than men, with 49 percent of women compared to 42 percent of men noting either significant or somewhat significant progress.
In terms of regional breakdown, respondents in the Northeast and Central Highlands - areas where the government has stronger representation and greater influence – as well as the Southern region - which, in contrast is traditionally a Taliban stronghold - are the most positive, with more than 50 percent in each case reporting that their area has witnessed either very significant or somewhat significant progress over the past 12 months. In contrast, respondents in the West and Central regions are the least positive, with only 40 percent and 42 percent respectively noting this kind of progress.

**Figure 5: Generally speaking, how much progress, if any has been made in your area within the last 12 months?**

In terms of regional breakdown, respondents in the Northeast and Central Highlands - areas where the government has stronger representation and greater influence – as well as the Southern region - which, in contrast is traditionally a Taliban stronghold - are the most positive, with more than 50 percent in each case reporting that their area has witnessed either very significant or somewhat significant progress over the past 12 months. In contrast, respondents in the West and Central regions are the least positive, with only 40 percent and 42 percent respectively noting this kind of progress.

**1.2. Perceptions of Political Situation**

Afghans are generally more positive about the political situation in their own province than they are about the country as a whole. The assessment of the political situation at both the provincial and national level is particularly pessimistic among respondents in the Central region.

Afghans views on the political situation in their own province is largely in line with their views on the overall situation in their province, although the regional differences are more notable when it comes to their assessment of politics. Respondents in the Central Highlands and Southern regions were the most positive, with 59 percent and 53 percent respectively describing
Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption

Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption in their province as either very good or somewhat good. This contrasts most notably with the Central region, which includes the capital Kabul, where a mere 26 percent of respondents gave any kind of positive assessment. This might partly be explained by the fact that respondents in the Central region are closer to the centre of power and hence have greater exposure to the political infighting within the National Unity Government as well as to the frequent attacks carried out by militants in the capital.

Respondents’ assessment of the political situation in the country as a whole is much less positive, with only a quarter (25 percent) of all respondents describing the political situation in Afghanistan as either very good or somewhat good. This sense of pessimism is particularly acute in Central and Western regions, where only 16 percent and 18 percent respectively made this positive assessment. Indeed, the Southern region is the only region where more than 50 percent of respondents described the political situation in Afghanistan as a whole as either very good or somewhat good. This may partly be attributable to the fact that Taliban influence has spread to parts of the country which were previously the most secure areas, such as the Northern, Eastern and Western regions. However, the result may also reflect the fact that the survey was limited to government controlled and contested areas.

As is the case with the general perception of the direction the country is taking, women are slightly more positive than men about the political situation in Afghanistan as a whole (with 27 percent of women surveyed describing the situation as either very good or somewhat good, as opposed to 23 percent of men).

The level of pessimism is consistent with the findings of a recent Gallup poll, in which Afghans, on average, rated their own lives at 2.7 percent - down from 4.2 percent in 2016 - on a scale where “0” represents their worst possible life and “10” their best possible life in 2018. Asked to predict where their lives will be in five years on the same scale, Afghans’ average response was even lower, at 2.3 percent. This makes Afghans’ ratings of their own lives lower than any other population’s worldwide.

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1.3. Major Problems Facing Afghanistan

Afghans continue to view insecurity as the main problem facing the country followed by unemployment and corruption and remain critical of the government’s efforts to tackle these problems. Paradoxically, citizens in the South where the insurgency is at its strongest are the most positive about the government’s efforts.

Consistent with previous surveys, respondents across Afghanistan most commonly identify insecurity as among the three most serious problems facing the country, with unemployment and corruption as the second and third most common responses. These results are also largely consistent with the Asia Foundation’s 2018 survey of the Afghan people which found that insecurity and crime (73 percent), economic concerns (38 percent) and governance issues (33 percent) topped the list of citizens concerns.

Afghans' Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption
Compared to 2016, the proportion of respondents who consider insecurity to be among the three most serious problems remains largely constant (78 percent in 2018 as compared to 79 percent in 2016), while the proportion of those who feel that either unemployment or corruption are among the three most serious problems has declined from 66 percent to 58 percent and from 47 percent to 33 percent respectively. However, this does not necessarily indicate that corruption is on the decline. Instead it is more likely that the deteriorating security situation and other key challenges such as the rise in illegal drugs’ cultivation\(^\text{28}\), the presence of armed groups and the lack of access to justice are at the forefront of peoples’ minds. Moreover, as has been noted by various commentators, it is widely accepted that corruption is a key driver of these and other ills in Afghanistan and that the prioritisation of short-term security concerns over longer-term strategies to combat corruption has often exacerbated the problem\(^\text{29}\). Indeed, corruption is believed to have fuelled grievances against the Afghan government and led to the channelling of support to the insurgency, among other things\(^\text{30}\).

In this context, it is perhaps not surprising that citizens view the government’s efforts to address the country’s main problems as far from effective. Across Afghanistan, 62 percent of those surveyed feel that the government has not done enough in this regard over the past two years. While this is a slight improvement on the 67 percent of respondents who felt the same in 2016, it is still a sad indictment of the government’s efforts to tackle the country’s major challenges including insecurity, unemployment and corruption.

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\(^{28}\) According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, the total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was estimated at 328,000 hectares in 2017, a 63% compared to the previous year a new record high which exceeds the formerly highest value recorded in 2014 by 46% https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghan_opium_survey_2017_cult_prod_web.pdf


\(^{30}\) Ibid.
While the overall picture is very bleak, citizens’ views on how the government is faring in addressing these problems does vary across the country. Interestingly, respondents in the more insecure Southern region are significantly more positive about the government’s efforts to address Afghanistan’s major problems than those in the more strongly government-controlled areas. Thus 55 percent of respondents in the South feel that the government had done enough in this respect over the past two years, in sharp contrast to a mere 14 percent of respondents in the Central Highland region who feel the same. Once again, this may be partly explained by the coverage of the survey which was only carried out in government-controlled and contested areas, but it may also partly be a reflection of limited interaction between citizens and the state due to insecurity in the more insecure parts of the country.

1.4. Perceptions of Public and Civil Institutions in Society

Respondents view national army and police officers as most likely to act in the interests of all people and the Taliban and other armed groups as the most likely to act in their own interests. The negative perception of international actors, and of members of parliament and NGO workers is a worrying sign.

When asked in whose interest different groups of individuals act, respondents are most positive about national army officers and national police officers. Nationally, 74 percent and 61 percent respectively believe these groups to act for the benefit of all people, rather than for the benefit of only some people (14 percent and 21 percent respectively) or for their own benefit (10 percent and 16 percent respectively). Respondents are also relatively positive about the President of Afghanistan, with...
50 percent stating that they believe he acts in the interest of all Afghans.

At the other end of the spectrum, as many as 63 percent and 52 percent of respondents believe the Taliban and other armed groups respectively act purely in their own interests, with a minuscule 3 percent of respondents holding the view that the Taliban act to the benefit of all people. While this finding is not surprising, it should be noted that this may partly be a reflection of the fact that the survey was only carried out in areas under government control. More worrying perhaps is the negative perception of international forces, local and national politicians (ministers and legislators) and community and NGO workers. All of these groups are seen as acting predominantly in the interests of either a small group of people or themselves. This suggests that Afghanistan’s young democracy remains in a precarious state and, as discussed further below, that external actors continue to be viewed as more harmful than helpful to Afghanistan’s stability and development.

Figure 12: In your opinion, do the people mentioned here (in the table below) work for the benefit of all people, for the benefit of some, or only for their own benefit?

1.5. Perceptions of the International Community

The views of Afghan citizens regarding the role of the international community in Afghanistan in fighting corruption are increasingly negative. In some parts of the country up to a third of citizens do not believe the international community is supportive of honest local government officials.

More than half (52 percent) of those surveyed now do not believe that the international community wants to fight corruption in Afghanistan. This compares to 45 percent in 2016, 36 percent in 2014 and 37 percent in 2012. While the number of respondents who believe the government does want to fight corruption has remained fairly constant over this time (fluctuating between 29 percent in 2012 and 32 percent in 2018), it is noticeable that the proportion of people who state that they do not have an opinion on the matter has declined considerably from 34 percent in 2012 to 15 percent in 2018. This suggests that awareness among citizens of the international community’s role in Afghanistan has increased over time, but that with this awareness has come increasing scepticism about what value the international community has to offer. This may well be linked to the growing realisation that the huge inflow of international assistance has contributed
to widespread corruption\(^ {31}\) including through the use of payments to different armed groups and Afghan civil servants to ensure cooperation in security efforts\(^ {32}\).

![Figure 13: Do you believe that international community wants to fight corruption?](image)

A similar picture emerges when it comes to the international community’s role in strengthening local governance. More than half of respondents (52 percent) believe that the international community is not supportive of honest government officials in their province. Respondents are particularly sceptical in the Eastern and Southern provinces, where 67 percent of respondents felt this to be the case.

![Figure 14: Do you believe the members of the international community are supportive of honest government officials in your province?](image)


1.6. Perceptions of the Taliban

Afghans are increasingly worried about the role of corruption in facilitating the expansion of the Taliban. Provincial and district police and provincial and district governor offices are seen as important drivers of the phenomenon.

The fact that Afghans consistently rate insecurity as one of the major problems facing the country is not surprising given their views on how the state is dealing with the Taliban insurgency. Indeed Afghans feel that the situation is only getting worse. 62 percent of respondents across the country agree with the statement that corruption within the state is facilitating the expansion of the Taliban. This is a significant increase on the 51 percent who believed this to be the case in 2016 and should act as a wake-up call to the National Unity Government. As one commentator recently suggested: “Extensive predatory criminality, corruption, and power abuse—not effectively countered by the Afghan government—have facilitated the Taliban’s entrenchment.”

As a result, according to the BBC, as of January 2018, the Taliban were openly active in 70 percent of the Afghan territory.

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Respondents in the South, where the insurgency is at its strongest, were the least likely to say that corruption within the state was facilitating the expansion of the Taliban, while those in the North and Central Highland regions were the most likely to agree. While some provinces of the North have seen an increase in Taliban activity over recent years, the Central Highlands is one of the most strongly government-controlled areas, suggesting that there may be a mismatch between what people experience in their day-to-day lives and what they perceive to be the case in other parts of the country. This would appear to echo the finding above that respondents in Afghanistan’s more insecure areas tend to be more positive about the government’s efforts to address Afghanistan’s problems, although, as noted earlier, this may also be partly explained by the fact that the survey was only conducted in area under government control.

When asked about which government institutions were responsible for the expansion of the Taliban, a substantial proportion of respondents (29 percent) feel that corruption within the provincial and district police is at fault, followed by provincial and district governor offices (22 percent) and the courts (16 percent). This suggests that corruption within the local security and justice sector in Afghanistan remains a key driver of insecurity in the country and something which needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency. This would appear to contrast somewhat with Afghans’ views of the security sector at the national level where, as noted above, national army and police officers are seen to act largely in the interests of all citizens rather than in their own interests.
1.7. Perceptions of Peace Talks and Reconciliation

Despite widespread insecurity, Afghans remain overwhelmingly optimistic about the potential for successful peace talks and reconciliation between the government and armed groups to bring about greater stability and stronger governance in the country.

Despite the deteriorating security situation and the ever-increasing influence of the Taliban over previously government-controlled areas, Afghan citizens remain stoically optimistic about the prospects for peace and the potential this would have for a more well governed state. 71 percent of respondents believed that the successful completion of peace talks would result in the strengthening of good governance in Afghanistan. This sense of optimism may partly be linked to President Ghani’s offer in February 2018 to initiate a political process that could lead to eventual peace talks with the Taliban (although the Taliban declined to respond to the offer)\textsuperscript{35}. Since the survey was conducted, senior U.S. officials have met with Taliban representatives in Qatar\textsuperscript{36} and Russia has hosted and international meeting on Afghanisan in Moscow\textsuperscript{37}, in an attempt to re-energise the peace process. Interestingly, citizens were most optimistic in the Eastern and Southern regions, the same regions where citizens were most sceptical about the international community’s role in supporting good governance at the local level.

Figure 19: Do you believe that the successful completion of peace talks will result in the strengthening of good governance in Afghanistan?

\begin{figure}
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\end{figure}

Citizens are even more optimistic when it comes to the prospects for reconciliation efforts between the government and armed opposition groups, with 80 percent of respondents of the view that such efforts can help stabilize the country. Interestingly, whereas women tend to be more positive than men about the general level of progress and the political situation in their region (see above), the opposite is true when it comes to levels of optimism about reconciliation efforts, with 79 percent of women surveyed feeling that such efforts can stabilise the country compared to 84 percent of men.
Figure 22: Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can help stabilize the country?

![Bar chart showing the percentage of responses by gender.]

- **Male**
  - Yes: 83%
  - No: 11%
  - Do not know: 5%
  - Refused: 1%

- **Female**
  - Yes: 78%
  - No: 10%
  - Do not know: 11%
  - Refused: 1%
2. ATTITUDES TOWARDS, AND EXPERIENCES WITH, CORRUPTION

Part Two of this report explores Afghan’s attitudes towards and experiences with administrative corruption and bribery over the past two years. It first examines citizens’ perceptions of corruption and progress made in reducing corruption in public institutions generally. It then explores citizens perceptions of corruption within specific institutions as well as their views on the underlying reasons and drivers of institutional corruption, before taking a more in depth look at citizens’ actual experiences of administrative corruption and bribery. Finally, it examines Afghans’ attitudes towards bribery and their views on and experiences with nepotism. As with the previous section, the report examines how views differ across regions and according to gender, where these differences are considered significant.

2.1. Perception of Corruption Generally

Overall, Afghans perceive the level of corruption in the country to be consistently high. However, there has been a slight decrease in the proportion of citizens who feel the problem is “very serious” and a corresponding decrease in the proportion of Afghans who feel there has been no improvement in reducing corruption in any public institution. Perceptions among men and women are largely the same in these regards.

Afghans’ perception of the level of corruption in the country remains largely consistent with the previous survey in 2016. Although the proportion of respondents who feel that the issue of corruption is very serious has declined slightly from 55 percent to 48 percent, overall the proportion of citizen who feel that it is either very or somewhat serious has remained stubbornly constant (77 percent in 2018 as compared to 79 percent in 2016). In other words, less than one fifth of respondents feel that the issue is not too serious or not at all serious.

Meanwhile, almost the same proportion of respondents in 2018 (72 percent) feel that corruption has become a more significant problem over the past two years as they did in 2016 (71 percent). Interestingly, whereas women tend to be more optimistic about the level of progress in Afghanistan as a whole (see Part One), they are equally as pessimistic as men when it comes to views on whether corruption is becoming a more significant problem.
When asked to also consider the level of corruption in their local area as well as in Afghanistan generally, 56 percent of respondents feel that level of corruption is either much higher or somewhat higher than previous years, suggesting that citizens tend to see the problem as more serious in the country as a whole than in their own area. This is consistent with Afghans’ perceptions of the political situation, as discussed in Part One, whereby citizens are generally more positive about the political situation in their own province than they are about the country as a whole. Again, perceptions among both men and women are largely the same with 55 percent of men surveyed and 57 percent of women of the view that the level of corruption was either much higher or somewhat higher than previous years.
In light of these findings, it is not surprising that only a quarter (25 percent) of respondents believe that there has been some progress in reducing corruption in any public institution. While this is a small proportion, it is nevertheless slightly higher than the 19 percent who were of this opinion in 2016. And the overall proportion of respondents who feel that there has not been any improvement has declined from 74 percent in 2016 to 60 percent in 2018, with a larger proportion now saying that they are not sure. This decline may suggest that, overall, Afghans’ are becoming slightly more optimistic about the fight against corruption within the public sector, albeit cautiously so.
2.2. Perception of Corruption Within Specific Institutions

Consistent with previous surveys and with other research, Afghans consider the justice and education sectors to be the most corrupt. Afghans are more likely to base these perceptions on conversations with family and friends and information presented by the media than on their personal experience.

When asked to name what they consider to be the most corrupt institutions in Afghanistan, the largest proportion of respondents name the courts and judges, including courts in the provinces (14 percent), Ministry of Education (10 percent) and the Attorney General’s offices (9 percent) among the top three, by a significant margin.

This largely mirrors the responses given in 2016, although in a slightly different order, when courts (10 percent), judges and prosecutors (8 percent) and Ministry of Education (6 percent) were most often considered among the top 3 most corrupt institutions.

In the case of Ministry of Education, this negative perception is echoed by a recent report by Afghanistan’s Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) which found vulnerabilities ranging from school-level issues, such as bribes to modify school certificates, through to Ministry-level issues such as corruption in school construction and textbook distribution. Of all the vulnerabilities identified in the report, the appointment of teachers “on the basis of influence, or nepotism and bribery, not on the basis of merit” was considered to be the most serious (see discussion on nepotism below). In the case of the Courts and Attorney General, meanwhile, the finding would appear to be consistent with the Asia Foundation’s 2018 Survey of the Afghan People which found that Afghans report giving the largest bribes on average to the judiciary/courts. Interestingly, in our survey, respondents identified courts and judges as the first most corrupt institution (14 percent) while, in between the courts and judges, the proportion of respondents who identified judges as the most corrupt is significantly lower than those who identified the courts as the most corrupt which suggests that citizens may be more likely to face corruption when visiting the courts for administrative or bureaucratic purposes (e.g. for documents or certificates) rather than for legal reasons. Unsurprisingly, it would appear that citizens’ perceptions of which institutions are the most corrupt is to some extent correlated with the institutions with which they are likely to have more regular interaction. This may help explain why institutions like the Parliament do not appear among the most corrupt institutions according to citizen perception.

38 Taken together, a similar proportion (7% of respondents) considered a combination of the police headquarters, Ministry of Interior and National Police as the most corrupt institutions.
40 Ibid.
When the respondents were asked to name the least corrupt institutions in Afghanistan, a large number of the respondents identified schools and universities (19 percent out of 20) followed by Hospitals (11 percent) and Ministry of Hajj and Religious affairs (6 percent) respectively as the least corrupt institutions in Afghanistan.

*Figure 29: Perception of Corruption Within Specific Institutions*

[Chart showing the percentage of respondents who perceive the least corruption in various institutions]

When asked on which information they base their assessment of the level of corruption in the institutions mentioned above, respondents most commonly cite relatives/family and friends/people around them (37 percent) followed by the media (32 percent). Only 20 percent of respondents cite personal experience of corruption as the main source of information.

*Figure 30: Least Corrupt Institutions*

[Chart showing the percentage of respondents who consider various institutions the least corrupt]
2.3. Drivers of Administrative Corruption

Most Afghans consider corrupt leadership and corrupt employees to be the key reasons for institutional corruption. Women are more likely than men to consider cultural and educational factors as important reasons, although overall this is still a minority view. More generally, Afghans consider firstly “need” and then “greed” to be the most important drivers of corruption in the country as a whole, as opposed to more bureaucratic causes such as long or unclear procedures for accessing services or unfair recruitment processes.

When asked to describe the reasons for which they consider the above-mentioned institutions to be corrupt, a significant majority feel this is either due to corrupt leadership (44 percent) or corrupt employees (25 percent). Interestingly, the views of women and men vary quite considerably in this regard. Thus, of those who believe that corrupt leadership is the key reason, 61 percent are men and 39 percent are women. In contrast, women are more likely than men to blame lack of awareness among employees (70 percent of those who feel this to be the case are women) or to believe that “corruption has become a culture” (75 percent of those who feel this to be the case are women). This suggests that men are more likely than women to consider issues related to leadership and power as the key reasons for institutional corruption, while women are more likely than men to see cultural and educational factors as key, although the number of women who believe this to be the case is still relatively small.
When considering the factors responsible for corruption in Afghanistan more generally, respondents most commonly cite the ambition to become rich as quickly as possible (25 percent) as the key driver, followed by the need for money to make a living (22 percent), weak rule of law (18 percent) and the fact that salaries are lower than everyday needs (15 percent). This would suggest that, at the aggregate level, Afghans consider “need” (i.e., the need to make a living combined with low salaries) to be the most important driver of corruption, but that “greed” (i.e., the desire to become rich) is also an important driver. More bureaucratic and procedural causes, such as long or unclear procedures for accessing services or unfair recruitment processes are considered to be less important drivers, suggesting that technical fixes alone are unlikely to have any significant impact on reducing levels of corruption.
2.4. Personal Experience of Corruption

More than a quarter of respondents report having personally experienced corruption over the past 12 months, with slightly more men experiencing corruption than women. While there has been a slow but steady increase in reported levels of corruption as experienced by citizens over the past 8 years, this may in fact be due to a greater willingness to report, rather than an actual rise in corruption incidence. At the same time, although the proportion of respondents who report experiencing corruption on a regular basis (more than ten times) and the proportion who report having paid large bribes are both relatively low, they are significant enough to suggest that administrative corruption is both widespread and imposes a heavy financial cost in certain sectors of Afghan society. In terms of bribery, while the proportion of individuals who report having paid a bribe has increased, the overall frequency of bribe payments per person and the average size of bribes have both decreased since 2016.

26 percent of respondents state that they have personally experienced corruption over the last 12 months. This is comparable to the 27 percent of citizens who said the same in 2016 and a significant increase on the 21 percent and 18 percent who stated they had experienced corruption in 2014 and 2012 respectively. On the other hand, the percentage of respondents who say they have not experienced corruption over the past 12 months has remained fairly constant over the last four surveys (2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018). Indeed, if we add the percentage of respondents who stated that they did not know if they had experienced corruption to those who stated they had not experienced corruption, then this total has only fluctuated between 72 percent and 74 percent over the past 8 years, which is not a significant variation. At the same time, the number of respondents who refused to answer the question has gradually declined over time from 10 percent in 2012 to 0 percent in 2016 and 1 percent in 2018. This rate of decline is almost identical to the rise in the number of respondents who state they have experienced corruption, suggesting that the rise may in fact be due to a greater willingness of respondents to report corruption rather than an actual rise in corruption incidence.

The results also suggest that men are more likely to experience corruption than women, with 30 percent of men having done so as compared to 22 percent of women. This may be because men have more interaction with public officials than women, and hence their exposure to day to day administrative corruption is greater.
Almost half (48 percent) of those respondents who have experienced corruption have faced it once in the last 12 months, with a further quarter (25 percent) having faced corruption twice. While this is clearly a worry, far more concerning is the small but nevertheless significant proportion (7 percent) of those who have experienced corruption who have faced it more than 10 times over the past 12 months. While this may partly be a reflection of the higher levels of interaction and contact that certain groups have with public officials, for these individuals corruption represents an important burden on their day-to-day lives.
In terms of Afghans’ experience with bribery specifically, the estimated number of Afghan adults who report having paid a bribe has increased significantly since the previous survey, with 4,638,909 respondents reporting having paid at least one bribe in the 2018 survey as compared to 3,449,588 in 2016. However, while the number of individuals who report having paid a bribe has increased, the overall frequency of bribe payments per person has decreased significantly. The average number of bribes paid per adult per year in 2018 is 2.75 percent, as compared to 4.02 percent in 2016 and 4.05 in both 2014 and 2012.

As well as a decrease in the overall frequency of bribes paid per person, there has also been a decrease in the average size of bribes paid since 2016. Thus, of those who reported paying a bribe:

- 14 percent paid more than 10,000 AFN ($145) in 2018, compared to 23 percent who paid the same in 2016;
- 43 percent paid between 500 AFN ($7) and 10,000 AFN ($145) in 2018, compared to 48 percent who paid the same in 2016; and
- 43 percent last paid less than 500 AFN ($7) in 2018, compared to 29 percent in 2016.

The net result is that the total value of bribes has fallen substantially from 196 billion AFN ($2.88 billion) in 2016 to 114 billion AFN ($1.65 billion) in 2018.

There may be a number of reasons for this significant decrease in both the frequency and quantity of bribes paid, including:

(a) the fact that the survey covers only provincial and district centres; (b) the deteriorating economic situation - with a significant increase in the proportion of Afghans living below the national poverty line from 38 percent in 2011/12 to 55 percent in 2016/17; - which may mean that citizens ability to pay bribes has been reduced; or (c) and possibly the successful implementation of government anti-corruption reform strategies. It may also be a result of the worsening security situation which has meant weaker government influence in certain parts of the countries and hence more limited citizen interaction with government services leading to a drop in the frequency of bribes. However, it is not possible to determine which of these factors is the most important in driving these changes.

In terms of Afghans who experience having paid a bribe to different institutions, a significant amount of the bribes are paid at courts (22 percent) followed by Attorney General’s Office (16 percent) and Ministry of Education (8 percent) respectively. The direct experience of the respondents with different institutions highlights that, many Afghans visiting government institutions are asked to pay a bribe for basic government services.

![Figure 38: Breakdown of actual amount of bribes payment by respondents to different institutions](image)

![Figure 39: What was the amount of the bribe paid the last time you personally paid a bribe?](image)
Interestingly, almost half of bribe payments are now in the form of cash (47 percent), a notable increase compared to 2016 when only 38 percent of payments were in the form of cash. The proportion of bribes paid in the form of gifts or “shereeni” on the other hand has remained largely constant (11 percent in 2018 as compared to 10 percent in 2016), while other forms of bribes have become less prominent, such as payment in the form of livestock (down to 4 percent from 8 percent in 2016) and demand for favours (down to 3 percent from 7 percent in 2016). The proportion of respondents who state that they do not what form the bribery took has remained at 21 percent, the same proportion as in 2016. This may be explained by the fact that the question asked respondents to answer in relation to “you or a member of your household”, therefore in many cases respondents did not experience the bribery first hand.

![Figure 40: You said that you or a member of your household has had to pay a bribe, which form of bribe have you experienced?](image)

### 2.5. Attitudes Towards Bribery

One third of respondents now say that they would pay a bribe if asked to. The results suggest that women and men would be equally likely to do so. However, substantially more respondents in the Northern and North-eastern regions reported that they would pay a bribe as compared to those in the Central and Central Highlands regions. At the same time, respondents across the country overwhelmingly report experiencing negative feelings when paying a bribe, with the vast majority citing that they would pay a bribe because there is no other way to obtain a service or because everyone else pays bribes.

Afghans’ response to the hypothetical question of whether they would pay a bribe if asked to do so is broadly commensurate with their actual experience of corruption. 33 percent of respondents now say they would pay a bribe, as compared to 62 percent who say they wouldn’t. This compares to 21 percent who said they would in and 72 percent who said they wouldn’t in 2016. This significant increase in the number of respondents who say they would pay a bribe may indicate an increasing tolerance to petty corruption among Afghan citizens. But it could also be an indication of their increasing willingness to discuss corruption more openly, as identified above. Either way, the fact that a third of citizens now admit that they would pay a bribe if expected to do so is a matter which warrants the urgent attention of policy-makers.

Interestingly, while the response rate is almost identical for men and women, there are important regional differences. While only 23 percent of citizens in the Central and Central Highlands regions say they would pay a bribe if asked to do so, as many as 52 percent and 45 percent of citizens in the Northern and Northeastern regions respectively give the same response.
Figure 41: How would you react if you were asked to give a bribe? Would you give the bribe or would you not give it?

Figure 42: How would you react if you were asked to give a bribe? Would you give the bribe or would you not give it?
When asked why they would pay a bribe, a clear majority (63 percent) state that it would be because there is no other way to obtain a service, while 16 percent state that it would be because everyone else pays bribes. Far fewer state that they would pay a bribe to speed up a process (12 percent) or to negotiate a lower price (3 percent). This would appear to support the suggestion, as discussed above, that administrative corruption and bribery is largely a “demand-side” phenomenon to the extent that citizens tend to pay bribes out of necessity (because they are demanded), rather than to help speed up bureaucratic processes or to gain an advantage.

At the same time, citizens overwhelmingly experience negative feelings when paying a bribe, with 79 percent of those who have paid a bribe reporting feeling sinful, guilty or sad when doing so. The emotions Afghans experience when engaging in bribery tallies with their perception of how society views corruption, with more than 90 percent of respondents stating that corrupt people are perceived in negative terms in Afghan society (sinful, venal, guilty or nasty). Such negative feelings when accessing basic services and dealing with public officials can dangerously erode support for the state over time and lead citizens to consider placing their loyalties elsewhere. This is particularly troubling in a context where non-state actors, such as the Taliban, are gaining increasing influence.

Figure 45: How do you feel when you pay bribe?

- Guilty: 43%
- Sinful: 21%
- Worried: 15%
- Poor: 4%
- Sad: 2%
- Relieved: 1%
- Honored: 1%
- Power: 0%
- Delicious: 0%
- Do not know: 1%
- Refused: 0%

Figure 46: In your opinion, how is a corruption person perceived in the Afghan society?

- Guilty: 39%
- Sinful: 13%
- Clever, smart: 39%
- Poor: 6%
- Nasty: 3%
- Selfish (self centered): 3%
- Venal: 3%
2.6. Personal Experience of Nepotism

One quarter of respondents stated they have been a victim of nepotism, with the practice most prevalent in the Northern region and least prevalent in the Central Highlands and Central regions. Of those who have experienced nepotism, the vast majority (more than 80 percent) state that it took place within a government institution. Overall, women and men are equally likely to rely on nepotism to secure employment.

Transparency International defines nepotism as a “form of favouritism based on acquaintances and familiar relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or favour to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving.”

One quarter of respondent’s report having been a victim of nepotism during the past 12 months, a small but nevertheless significant increase on the 18 percent who reported the same in 2016. Experience of nepotism is particularly prevalent in the Northern region where as many as 39 percent of respondents have experienced the phenomenon, as compared to the Central Highlands and Central regions where the figures are much lower (9 percent and 17 percent respectively).

![Figure 47: have you or a member of your household been victim of nepotism during the last 12 months?](image)

![Figure 48: have you or a member of your household been victim of nepotism during the last 12 months?](image)

Transparency International: Anti-Corruption Glossary [https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/nepotism](https://www.transparency.org/glossary/term/nepotism)
An overwhelming majority (more than 80 percent) of those who experienced nepotism did so in a government institution, with a much smaller number facing nepotism in NGOs (7 percent), private companies (5 percent) and international organizations (5 percent). While these figures may partly reflect the different levels of contact which citizens have with different types of institutions, they nevertheless suggest that nepotism is endemic within the Afghan public sector. A recent study of corruption within the Ministry of Education (MoE) – an institution which accounts for 68 percent of all of Afghanistan’s civil servants45 - provides a stark illustration of this reality. Among other things, the study found that there was “relentless and ubiquitous” pressure for the MoE to subvert its procedures to employ relatives, friends and favoured individuals, with reports of Members of Parliament intervening “at all levels of hiring and promotion, and in the placing of teachers in desirable locations”46. According to the report “(s)everal HR Heads stated that literally everyone in their area of responsibility was appointed on the basis of nepotism, regardless of whether the official procedures had been used or not.”47

Afghans’ response to the hypothetical question of whether they would rely on nepotism if necessary, to get a job, is consistent with their actual experience of nepotism. Nationally, 30 percent of respondents state that they would take this course of action, with citizens in the Northern region being the most likely to do so (57 percent). Overall, women and men are equally likely to rely on nepotism to secure employment.

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46 Ibid
Afghans’ Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption

Figure 51: Would you rely on nepotism if this is necessary to secure a job?

Figure 52: Would you rely on nepotism if this is necessary to secure a job?
3. IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND ON THE PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT

Having explored Afghans’ perceptions of and experiences with corruption over the past two years, Part Three of this report looks at how Afghans see corruption affecting society in general as well as the effect it has on their trust in public services. It also takes a more in-depth look at the kinds of tactics which Afghans believe their service providers are most likely to use in order to extract bribes from citizens.

3.1. Impact of Corruption on Society and on Public Service Delivery

The vast majority of respondents believe that corruption has negatively affected the life of people in their local area, with corruption seen as worse at the local level as compared to the provincial level. Almost three quarters of respondents do now not trust local public services because of corruption. A widespread sense that people in government, NGOs and international organizations are only out to benefit themselves is giving credence to the idea that people may be turning to the Taliban as an alternative source of leadership.

Given the findings of the previous sections of this report, it is unsurprising that as many as 83 percent of respondents either strongly agree or agree with the statement that corruption has negatively affected the life of people in their area. This demonstrates not only that corruption is pervasive, but that its effects are overwhelmingly seen as nefarious.

Interestingly, Afghans tend to see corruption as being worse at the local level than at the provincial level. Thus, 38 percent of respondents either agree or strongly agree with the statement that corruption is worse in their district than in their province as a whole, as compared to 22 percent who either strongly disagree or disagree with this conclusion. This may be because citizens are most likely to interact with service providers at the district level and are therefore more likely to experience corruption first-hand, as identified in Part Two of this report.

The net result is that the level of trust in public services has now been eroded to such an extent that 73 percent of respondents now either strongly agree or agree with the statement that “because of corruption I do not trust local public services anymore”.

*Figure 53: Corruption has negatively affected the life of the people in this area*
Figure 54: Corruption is worse in our district than the province

Figure 55: Because of corruption I do not trust the local public services anymore

It follows, therefore, that a significant majority of Afghans believe that civil servants and politicians are only in government service for their own benefit, with 61 percent of respondents either strongly agreeing or agreeing with the statement that people in government are only here to enrich themselves. Afghans’ views regarding NGOs and international organizations are also predominantly negative. While less than half of respondents (46 percent) agree with the statement that NGOs and international organizations are corrupt, a mere 15 percent state that they strongly disagree or disagree with that statement. This is consistent with the findings presented in Part One of this report which noted that Afghans see NGO workers as acting predominantly in the interests of either a small group of people or themselves and which reported a decline in the proportion of respondents who believed that the international community wants to fight corruption in Afghanistan. Taken together, these two conclusions demonstrate a very low level of confidence in the motivations of both government and non-state actors.

In this context, it is perhaps to be expected that citizens increasingly find themselves looking for alternative sources of leadership. As a result, as many as 43 percent of respondents strongly agree or agree with the statement that “because of corruption people in our area refer to the Taliban” (up from 39 percent in 2016). Whether or not this is indeed the case or merely a widely held fear among citizens, it does appear to support the finding presented in Part One of this report that almost one third of citizens feel that corruption within the state is facilitating the expansion of the Taliban. What is undeniable is that corruption continues to erode the public’s confidence in its democratically elected leaders and threatens to increase support for the insurgency.
Figure 56: People in the Government are only here to enrich themselves

Figure 57: NGOs and international organizations are corrupt

Figure 58: Because of corruption people in our area refer to Taliban
3.2. Attitudes Towards Service Providers in Afghanistan

Citizens perceive that service providers employ a range of tactics when engaging in administrative corruption, chief among them the deliberate creation of difficulties or the use of delay tactics in order to request a bribe. However, directly asking for money is also seen as common practice.

When asked to assess the attitudes of the government service providers in Afghanistan, respondents are clear about which tactics they believe service providers are most likely to employ in order to extract bribes from citizens. While, the answers presented below are a measure of perceptions rather than actual incidence of such practices, they nevertheless paint a rather sorry picture of the level of cynicism which citizens perceive when accessing public services.

Most common among the tactics are those which involve some form of obstruction. 87 percent of respondents, for example, state that deliberately “creating difficulties in order to request a bribe” is either highly common, common or relatively common, while 73 percent say the same is true for “not performing official tasks in an appropriate time while expecting to be offered a bribe”. The same share of respondents (73 percent) state that the more direct approach of asking for money is either highly common, common or relatively common.

Other common tactics include asking for gifts in return for small services (71 percent state that this is highly common, common or relatively common) and reducing taxes and customs duties in exchange for taking a percentage of them (53 percent state that this is highly common, common or relatively common).

![Figure 59: How would you assess the following attitudes of the government service providers in Afghanistan?](image-url)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>High Common</th>
<th>Common</th>
<th>Relatively Common</th>
<th>Uncommon</th>
<th>Do not know</th>
<th>Highly Uncommon</th>
<th>Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reducing taxes and customs duties in exchange for taking a percentage of them</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not performing official task in an appropriate time while expecting to be offered a bribe</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asking for gifts in return for small services</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asking directly for money</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating difficulties in order to request a bribe</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. VIEWS ON EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION

Part Four of this report explores Afghan’s views on efforts to fight corruption in the country. It first examines what citizens see as the most effective ways to fight corruption, including what they feel they can personally do. It then looks in some detail at citizens’ level awareness of - and experiences with - the process of reporting corruption. It finishes by exploring the level of confidence that Afghans have that corruption can indeed be addressed, including the performance of the government as a whole, as well as key institutions at the heart of government. This final section of the report thus presents policy makers with some understanding of how Afghans perceive the fight against corruption to be progressing in order to help identify key areas for improvement.

4.1. Individual Behaviour and Attitudes to Fight Corruption

Most citizens cite the refusal to participate in corrupt acts and reporting corruption when they encounter it as the main tools which they have at their disposal to fight the problem. Worryingly the proportion of respondents who feel that there is nothing they can personally do to reduce corruption has doubled since the last survey in 2016.

When asked what they can personally do to reduce corruption, respondents most commonly cite the refusal to participate in corrupt acts, either by not paying bribes for public services or refusing to do favours to officials or relatives (36 percent in total). The second most commonly cited response is to report corruption (33 percent in total gave this response). Interestingly, a significant majority of those who gave this response state that reporting to the media (24 percent) can reduce corruption, with a mere 5 percent of respondents stating that reporting to public bodies can reduce corruption. An even smaller proportion of respondents (3 percent) believe that they can reduce corruption by filing a case against corrupt officials. These figures suggest a serious lack of confidence among Afghans that state and justice institutions will take action to address specific incidences of corruption.

At the same time, a small but significant proportion of respondents (16 percent) state that there is nothing they can do to reduce corruption. This is a significant increase on the 8 percent who stated the same in 2016. Women are more pessimistic than men in this regard: 61 percent of those who gave this response are women and 39 percent are men. This signals a worrying trend; if citizens believe that they are powerless to effect change, they are more likely to accept the status quo and engage in petty corruption without questioning it.

Figure 60: In your opinion, what can you personally do to reduce corruption in Afghanistan?
4.2. Process of Reporting Corruption

Awareness among citizens of where to report a corrupt act by a public official has increased significantly since 2016 and 14 percent of respondents now state that they or someone in their household has reported such an act during the past 12 months, compared to 9 percent in 2016. Citizens are most likely to report corruption to the police or attorney general’s office, although a small but significant proportion prefer to use non-state channels such as the media. Around half of those who reported corruption voiced some level of dissatisfaction with the process, with men tending to express higher levels of dissatisfaction than women. The most commonly cited reasons for not reporting corruption are the lack of confidence that any action will be taken and the fear that those who report corruption will be subject to retribution/revenge.

Across Afghanistan, 44 percent of respondents state that they know where to report a corrupt act by a public official. Awareness is lowest in the Eastern and Southern regions, where this is the case for only 25 percent and 32 percent respectively. This is a significant improvement on the 27 percent who stated that they knew where to report corruption in 2016 and suggests that awareness of the correct channels to use is increasing. Nevertheless, much more awareness-raising is needed, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions.

When asked what channels they would use to report a corrupt act or file a complaint, half of respondents (51 percent) mentioned the police, followed by the attorney general (16 percent) and the media (14 percent). The fact that the media is the third most common response would appear to be a further indication of the lack of confidence in state institutions to take action on incidences of corruption, as noted above.
Figure 62: Do you know where to report a corrupt act of an official?

![Bar Chart](chart1.png)

Figure 63: Do you know where to report a corrupt act of an official?

![Bar Chart](chart2.png)
When asked about their actual experience of reporting corruption, 14 percent of respondents state that they or someone in their household has reported a corrupt act by a public official during the past 12 months. This is up on the 9 percent who said the same in 2016. This is up on the 9 percent who said the same in 2016. This is consistent with the apparent increase in awareness on the channels to report corruption as noted above. However, given the high levels of experienced and perceived corruption in Afghanistan as reported in Part Two of this report, this still represent a small proportion of those who have faced corruption.
In 36 percent of cases where corruption was reported, complaints were made to the police. This is followed by the media, courts, and attorneys/the attorney general’s office in almost equal proportion (13 percent, 12 percent and 12 percent respectively). Thus, the actual practice closely mirrors Afghans’ responses to the question above regarding which channels they would use to report a corrupt act or file a complaint.

When asked to rate their level of satisfaction when reporting corruption, 47 percent of respondents state that they were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied, as compared to 51 percent who reported being somewhat satisfied, very dissatisfied or receiving no feedback at all. Overall, men tend to express higher levels of dissatisfaction than women.
When asked to discuss their views on the reasons for not reporting corruption, the most common response is that no action will be taken even if corruption is reported (32 percent of respondents). This would appear to confirm that Afghans have little confidence regarding the willingness of justice and state institutions to address corruption complaints, as suggested above. The second most common response, given by almost the same proportion of respondents (30 percent), is that those who report corruption will be subject to retribution/revenge. This may at least in part be attributable to the limited protections afforded to date those who denounce acts of corruption. However, the recent approval of a whistle-blowers protection law offers some hope that those who report corruption will now be able to do so without fear of reprisal.

48 Anis Newspaper (2018), In extra ordinary meeting of the cabinet, whistleblower law was approved, 14 September
4.3. Level of Confidence that Corruption Can Be Addressed

Although 40 percent of respondents now feel that corruption cannot be reduced at all (as compared to 37 percent in 2016), two-thirds of respondents nevertheless rate the government’s efforts to fight corruption as being very effective or somewhat effective. Women and respondents in the Central Highlands and Southeastern regions tend to be more optimistic in this regard. More specifically, 64 percent, 54 percent and 44 percent of respondents respectively believe that the Office of the President, the NUG and the Office of the Chief Executive have “a sincere desire and will to combat corruption”, which is a small but significant improvement on 2016.

The level of pessimism among Afghans with regards to tackling corruption as identified above, is confirmed by the fact that 40 percent of Afghans now feel that corruption cannot be reduced at all, as compared to 37 percent who felt the same in 2016. Meanwhile 32 percent feel that it can be reduced to a certain extent and only 15 percent believe it can be reduced substantially. Again, women tend to be more pessimistic than men about the extent to which corruption can be reduced: 56 percent of those who believe that it cannot be reduced at all are women, while 44 percent of those who believe that it cannot be reduced at all are men.
Despite this level of pessimism, and somewhat counter-intuitively, two-thirds (66 percent) of respondents rate the government’s efforts to fight corruption as being very effective or somewhat effective. Also, counter-intuitively, is the fact that while women tend to be more pessimistic than men about the extent to which corruption can be reduced overall, they tend to be more optimistic than men about the government’s efforts in this regard, with as many as 73 percent of women rating these efforts as being very effective or somewhat effective. Respondents in the Central Highlands and Southeastern regions were the most positive, while those in the Northern and Western regions were the least positive. Overall, this suggests a sense of realism among Afghan citizens, insofar as they tend to believe that the government is doing a reasonable job at fighting corruption within the limits of what they think can be achieved in very challenging circumstances.

Meanwhile a similar percentage of those who rated the government’s efforts to fight corruption as being very effective (14 percent) also stated that they were aware of specific corruption measures being undertaken by the government (17 percent), suggesting that respondents views on government performance are to a large extent based on evidence of action rather than merely on general perception.
This surprisingly positive assessment among Afghans of their government’s performance in the fight against corruption is supported by their views regarding specific public institutions at the heart of the Afghan government. In this regard, the Office of the President comes off best, with 65 percent of respondents either strongly agreeing or somewhat agreeing with the statement that the Office of the President has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption. This is a notable increase on the 51 percent of respondents who felt this way in 2016 and suggests a step in the right direction. Second comes the National Unity Government. 54 percent of respondents agree or somewhat agree that the NUG has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption, similar to the proportion who shared this view in 2016 (52 percent). A smaller proportion (44 percent) of respondents agree or somewhat agree that the Office of the Chief Executive has a a sincere desire and will to combat corruption, which is nevertheless a slight improvement on the 39 percent who held this view in 2016.
In sum, it would appear that Afghan citizens are slightly more confident in the will of their leaders to fight corruption than they were two years ago. However, as evidenced by the findings earlier in this chapter, there is no room for complacency. While there may be a sense of quiet optimism at the general direction the government is taking in the fight against corruption, the continued reluctance on the part of Afghans to report corruption and their lack of confidence in the processes for reporting corruption suggest that there is still an urgent need to improve specific anti-corruption mechanisms in the country. This is supported by recent research carried out by Transparency International which found that despite a clear commitment on the part of the National Unity Government to fighting corruption, and a spate of institutional reforms to support the government’s efforts, Afghanistan’s multiple anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) are not forming an effective, comprehensive ACA system. 49The report identifies a number of key weaknesses within the anti-corruption system including duplication and overlapping functions, a lack of independence, a weak legal basis, limited budgets, weak staff capacity and a lack of coordination. 50 A recent report by IWA reaches the same conclusion, noting that the NUG has “failed to establish an overarching institutional design that would lead to an accountable and institutionalized approach towards fighting corruption”51 and that “the newly established institutions have not been provided the much needed political and financial support to enable them to achieve their mandate.”52

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The National Corruption Survey 2018 paints a very mixed picture with regards to progress in addressing Afghanistan’s key challenges including the fight against corruption. The findings of the survey point to some areas for cautious optimism. For example, since 2016, there has been an increase in the proportion of respondents that are either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with the situation in their home province and a slight decrease in the proportion who feel the government has not done enough to tackle Afghanistan’s main problems over the past two years. Likewise, there has been a slight decrease in the proportion of citizens who feel that corruption is very serious and a more positive assessment of the political will of key government institutions, including the Office of the President, the NUG and the Office of the Chief Executive, to fight corruption as compared to two years ago. Awareness among citizens of where to report corruption has increased significantly since 2016 as has the proportion of citizens who have reported such an act during the past 12 months.

Yet there are also some areas of real concern. Citizens are increasingly of the opinion that corruption is driving people to, and facilitating the expansion of, the Taliban. And the number of citizens who report having personally experienced corruption over the past 12 months, has remained at more than a quarter of the population, which is broadly the same as 2016 and above 2014 and 2012 levels. Particularly worrying is the fact that the proportion of citizens who feel that there is nothing they can personally do to reduce corruption has doubled since 2016. At the same time the number of respondents who say they would pay a bribe has also increased significantly.

The 2018 survey has also revealed some interesting gender and regional differences in terms of how individuals perceive and experience corruption and other key issues in the country. For example, women appear to be more positive than men about the general level of progress over the past 12 months and the political situation in their region, but less positive about the prospects for peace and reconciliation. Women are also significantly more pessimistic about what they can do personally to reduce corruption, despite the fact they are less likely to experience administrative corruption than men. In contrast, women tend to be more positive when it comes to assessing the government’s efforts to fight corruption than men.

In terms of regional differences, respondents in the Northeast and Central Highlands regions - areas where the government has stronger representation and greater influence as well as in the Southern region - which, in contrast is traditionally a Taliban stronghold - are the most positive about progress over the past twelve months, while respondents in the West and Central regions are the least positive. Indeed, the Southern region is the only region where more than 50 percent of respondents described the political situation in Afghanistan as a whole as either very good or somewhat good. Likewise, respondents in the South are most positive about the government’s efforts to address Afghanistan’s major problems, and those in the Central Highlands, Central and Western regions are least positive. Nepotism, meanwhile, would appear to be most prevalent in the Northern region and least prevalent in the Central Highlands and Central regions, while more respondents in the Northern and Northeastern regions reported that they would be more pay a bribe, as compared to the Central and Central Highlands regions where citizens were least likely to give this response.

In sum, it would appear that, overall, Afghan citizens are slightly more confident in the will of their leaders to fight corruption than they were two years ago. However, the increasing influence of the Taliban, the continued high levels of both perceived and experienced corruption and the apparent increasing pessimism regarding what citizens themselves feel they can do to tackle the problem suggest that much more work is required to raise awareness of, and improve the effectiveness of, specific anti-corruption mechanisms in the country.
RECOMMENDATIONS

▪ **Prosecutions:** To give confidence to the people that the Government is really serious about tackling corruption, the Government must prosecute a much higher number of more serious corruption cases & carry out these prosecutions in a timely & efficient manner.

▪ **Asset recovery:** Use the existing legislation on illicit enrichment to seize assets unlawfully obtained.

▪ **Staffing:** The Attorney General’s and Anti-Corruption Justice Centre (ACJC) office must be properly staffed with suitably qualified personnel to allow a much higher level of prosecutions in corruption cases both in number & seriousness of cases.

▪ **Penalties:** As a proper deterrent, the penalties for conviction of persons involved in corruption cases, particularly the more serious ones, must be reviewed so that those persons so convicted will face the penalties of losing their jobs, their pensions, serving a prison sentence and paying substantial fines.

▪ **Accountability systems:** The government should establish robust accountability mechanisms within the public service, including the use of complaint mechanisms and citizen-led monitoring systems in key service delivery ministries.

▪ **Whistleblowing:** The government must take urgent action to ensure that those who report corruption are afforded protection through the active enforcement of Afghanistan’s new whistle-blower protection law.

▪ **Awareness-raising:** All actors should work to strengthen public engagement in the fight against corruption by supporting the use of tools to anonymously report and track corruption such as Integrity Watch Afghanistan’s Efshagar platform.

▪ **Anti-Corruption Law:** The government should urgently reconsider its decision not to form a joint governmental and civil society selection committee for the proposed Anti-Corruption Commission. Without a joint selection committee, the independence of the Commission will be seriously compromised.

▪ **Civil service reform:** The government should push through key civil service reforms, including installing & enforcing a system of recruitment & promotion on merit, ensuring the verification of asset declarations of all senior public officials and the imposition of sanctions for failure to register.

▪ **Business sector:** The government should continue its recent progress in simplifying business processes and reducing red tape in order to further reduce the opportunities for administrative corruption. Areas which require further simplification include registering property, dealing with construction permits and enforcing contracts.

▪ **Working Together:** Encourage government departments, business, civil society organisations and donors to work together in the fight against corruption and to promote a culture of integrity within the civil service and society in general.
ANNEXES

Annex I: Methodology

This survey was a countrywide survey of the Integrity Watch Afghanistan on Afghans’ perceptions and experiences of corruption and assessment of how corruption impacts their lives and communities. Since 2007, this is the sixth biannual survey of its kind by Integrity Watch. The survey offers insights to the high-level government authorities, political leaders, CSOs, think tanks and public officials about Afghans’ perception of corruption and their expectations from the state and political leaders of the country.

The target population for this survey was Afghans age 18 years or over the age of 18. According to population data from Central Statistics Organization (CSO) of Afghanistan (Settled Population by Sex and Age Groups -2016-17), around 48 percent of provincial population is 18 or over the age of 18. That number will be the target population for this research project (total population 18/+ = 13,558,493 and total population of Afghanistan is = 29,2 million (estimated). In this study, the sampling frame was list of villages or nahias, using different village database, in each of the selected districts as research location. The representative sample villages were drawn at random process from the list in each district.

Sample Size Calculation

Integrity Watch Afghanistan administered a country level public opinion survey in one hundred forty (140) sample districts including Nahias and thirty-four (34) provinces of Afghanistan. The sample size for the whole country was calculated to obtain 1.1 percent margin of error at 95 percent confidence level with an estimate of 50 percent response distribution (among male and female). The total surveys accounting to 8130. To increase demographic variation and taking into account the budget considerations, research team distributed 10 surveys per sampling point which accounts for a total of 813 sampling points in all one hundred and thirty-seven districts of thirty-four provinces.

Province and District Selection

Integrity Watch arrived out a security assessment of all 34 together with the security committee and research team, considering the security permissibility and based on a four-part, color-based security ranking system. The system/classifications outline the level of access survey teams can achieve and the relevant survey methodology, including clustering and possible bias, at each level. Security classifications were determined through consultation with field coordinators and provincial networks.

- **Green**: Green districts were completely open to survey teams. All villages were included in sampling lists.
- **Amber**: In amber districts, all villages within approximately two hours of the district center were surveyed. Travel times beyond two hours from the district center meant that survey teams had to make multiple trips to each remote village. In semi-permissive districts, making repeated visits to the same area increases the risk that survey teams could be intercepted by anti-government elements. Therefore, sampling points in these districts were clustered within two hours of the district center.
- **Red**: Red districts were highly insecure, meaning surveys could only conduct survey in the district centers. This can consist of household surveys of residents of the district center and villages surrounding the district center. The higher degree of clustering in red districts introduces a correspondingly higher degree of selection bias than was the case with amber districts.
- **Black**: Black districts were those where the absence of GIRoA control made even district centers too dangerous for survey teams. Moreover, extensive Anti-Government elements checkpoints in these districts made it impossible to transport survey materials to the district centers, even when survey teams travel in separate vehicles. In this research districts with Black color were not covered and no one from our team traveled for survey purposes to this class of the districts.
Urban-Rural Stratification

According to the municipality administration, populations living within municipal boundaries are classified as urban, and those living outside municipal boundaries are classified as rural. In some provinces, municipal boundaries are not clearly defined. According to the CSO population yearbook for 2016-17, urban populations are mostly oriented in provincial centers and very rarely in a few major districts. However, not necessarily all parts of the provincial centers and districts are within the municipal boundaries. Even in the provincial capital/city, some villages lie out of the municipal boundary. Urban areas are divided into nahias by the municipality administration, and in this study urban participants were representative of nahias and were drawn from nahias within the municipal boundaries. The sample is distributed proportionally to urban-rural population size of each district using population data from the CSO 2016-17.

Settlement-Village/Sampling Point Selection

In this survey a village in rural area and a nahia in urban area are called a sampling point. At this stage, within districts the sampling frame was the list of all villages in rural area and list of all nahias in urban area. Sampling point selection for urban areas: As described earlier, urban areas are divided into nahias within municipal boundaries. Because there was no population data available about nahia sizes within the municipal boundaries, the survey distributed equally among nahias. Sampling point selection for rural areas: Within districts, villages were assigned a number on a serial number list. Using a simple random-sampling generator (Random.org), the village numbers are chosen at random until the desired sample size reached. Because the CSO lacks accurate population counts for rural villages, villages/sampling points cannot be drawn proportionally.

Gender Stratification

The research team stratified gender breakdown in each province proportionally to male/female ration in the population. According to the CSO population yearbook 2016-17 this ratio is 51:49. In each province, equal number of female and male respondents are allocated per sampling point. In order to meet the gender-split in each sampling point and to minimize gender gap, equal number of male and female enumerators were deployed at each sampling location.

Household Selection

In order to randomly select the households in a sampling point, a Systematic Random Sampling (SRS) method is used. Information on the list of households at the sampling point level were not available with the CSO, households are selected according to the following systematic random procedure. For each sampling point, interviewers assigned a starting point. Generally, for both urban and rural areas, a recognizable location such as Masjid, basic health centers, bazaars or schools were selected as a starting point. In urban areas, the interviewer moved to the assigned direction from the starting point and stops at the fifth street/lane on the right-hand side of his/her route and start interviewing at one randomly selected liveable household which was within the first five households on the right from the beginning of the street/lane. From then on, each fifth inhabitable household was interviewed. In blocks-of-flats, the selection routine was each fifth apartment. In rural areas, the interviewers started from a Masjid or the bazaar which were usually located in the center of the village and moved through the village from right to the left interviewing each fifth inhabitable wall in a compound (qala), in these compounds; households are counted in an anti-clock wise direction starting from the gate to the qala.

Training and Field Work

For this survey, only those enumerators were selected who had extensive experience of research and familiarity with the field methodology in quantitative survey methods. All enumerators were recruited from the same districts where field work was taking place. This was because of three reasons; first, the local interviewers may be familiar with local issues so they could administer the instrument more effectively. Second, participants on occasion would feel more comfortable with local interviewers than those coming from Kabul. Third, local enumerators and facilitators were more insulated from potential security threats.
In order to meet the representative sex ratio at each sampling point, couples or a team including persons of both genders were recruited from each district.

The enumerators, supervisors and field coordinators were selected on a written test from our nationwide network of field staff across the country who had passed successfully at least ten research and survey projects. They had worked in different survey projects with different research areas such as gender, governance, health, socioeconomic, public opinion and security. They were already familiar with basic technical and practical issues of a survey. The criteria for the selection of enumerators is follow;

- They should be from the local area/province where the survey is taking place.
- They must have prior experience in survey work and higher education background.
- They should not be under the age of 18.
- They must be able to travel to villages/district far from the district/provincial center.
- They must not be a member of the police, provincial council, or any other element of local government.
- They must not be relatives of the managerial staff of the project and of the HQ staff of Integrity Watch.

A two-step training program was conducted to prepare the field staff prior to the fieldwork. As a first step, a task-specific methodology (TSM) training session was conducted to train eight (8) field coordinators for two days by the research manager. Field coordinators were from the various parts of the country familiar with the culture norms and geographical situation of the research locations. They were briefed on the nature of the study and were trained in topics ranging from the specific sampling methodology to interview techniques.

As second step, research manager and field coordinators from the headquarter travelled to the provinces to conduct training of 166 local male and female enumerators for the two-days period in eight (8) zonal locations including 1) Kabul, 2) Nangrahar, 3) Paktia, 4) Bamyan, 5) Kandahar, 6) Herat, 7) Mazar-e-Sharif and 8) Konduz provinces. The surveyors were training in the main and predominant languages of the areas in which they were sent to conduct the fieldwork. The research manager and field coordinators conduct the training sessions which were designed to contribute the following skills set;

- Day 1: Basic concepts of survey and interviews, introduction and rapport-building, sampling techniques, and sampling-point and respondent selection;
- Day 2: Familiarization with each question, using follow-up questions, recording data, consistency in interview technique, and role-playing, Quality-control discipline, including supervision of surveys, spot-checking, and back-checking.

Security Issues

The field work was conducted with prior permission from the local provincial governments. The field coordinators prior to data collection shared a letter from Integrity Watch and sectorial government departments for the field work permission. The safety of the field staff was the highest priority. Integrity Watch security committee and research team assessed the security situation from all available sources before field team were deployed to the locations of the study. The team analyzed on-the-ground situation before teams were deployed to the field and in each district, facilitators were required to check in with field coordinators or provincial supervisor if cell phone connections are available. Each field coordinator reported to the Research department every day during the field work.

Confidentiality

Ensuring respondents and field team confidentiality is a top priority to Integrity Watch. All staff members were trained on the ethics involved in survey research. Integrity Watch personal including local researcher and survey team are abide by the highest standards of the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR). Under the guidelines of the AAPOR, disclosure of the projects data without the managers and client’s permission, and use of respondent-identifiable data beyond the specific survey, is prohibited.
Annex II : Questionnaire

General

1. **How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the overall situation in your province?**
   1. Very satisfied
   2. Somewhat satisfied
   3. Somewhat dissatisfied
   4. Very dissatisfied
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused

2. **Generally speaking, how much progress, if any has been made in your area within the last 12 months?**
   1. Very significant progress
   2. Somewhat significant progress
   3. Not much progress
   4. No progress at all
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused

3. **How do you describe the political situation in your province?**
   1. Very good
   2. Somewhat good
   3. Neither good nor bad
   4. Somewhat bad
   5. Very bad
   6. 98) Do not know
   7. 99) Refused

4. **In general, how would you describe the current political situation in Afghanistan?**
   1. Very good
   2. Somewhat good
   3. Neither good nor bad
   4. Somewhat bad
   5. Very bad
   6. 98) Do not know
   7. 99) Refused
5. In your opinion, what are the most serious problems facing Afghanistan as a country today? [multiple answer: accept 3, do not read the list]
   1. Insecurity
   2. Lack of access to education services
   3. Corruption
   4. Lack of access to health services
   5. Illegal drugs
   6. Lack of access to justice
   7. Presence of armed groups
   8. Poor access to water and electricity
   9. Lack of development
   10. Lack of political freedoms
   11. Unemployment
   12. Other, please specify ……………………………………………………………………
   13. 98) Do not know
   14. 99) Refused

6. Do you think the government of Afghanistan has done enough to address these problems over the last two (2) years?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. 98) Do not know
   4. 99) Refused
7. In your opinion, do the people mentioned here (in the table below) work for the benefit of all people, for the benefit of some, or only for their own benefit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>People</th>
<th>For the benefit of all people</th>
<th>For the benefit of some people</th>
<th>For their own benefits</th>
<th>Don’t know / Haven’t heard enough to say of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>President of Afghanistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief Executive of Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Ministers</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Provincial Governor of your province</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Governor of your district</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Police Commander of your province</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Police Commander of your district</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>National Police Officers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>National Army Officers</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Members of Provincial Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Members of Community Development Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Local Elders (Malik, Arbab, Wakel Guzar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NGO workers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>International Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Other Militant Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. In your opinion, which branch or power of the government (executive, legislative and judiciary) is more corrupt?53

53 Executive: The President is the head of the executive branch. The President serves as the head of state and the Command-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan. He or She is elected by receiving more than 50 percent of the votes cast through free, general, secret, and direct voting. Legislative: The legislative branch is the National Assembly or Parliament. The National Assembly consists of an upper and lower house. The lower house is the Wolesi Jirga (the House of People) and the upper house is the Meshrano Jirga. (House of Elders). Judicial: The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court (Steraj Mahkama), High Courts, and Appeal Courts.
Corruption [Ask all]

9. **In your opinion, how serious is the issue of corruption in Afghanistan?**
   1. Very Serious
   2. Somewhat Serious
   3. Not too Serious
   4. Not at all Serious [Go to Q12]
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused

10. **In your opinion, has corruption become a more significant problem over the last two years?**
    1. Yes 98) Do not know
    2. No [Go to Q12] 99) Refused

11. **What do you think, are factors causing corruption in Afghanistan?** [do not read the options]
    1. Need for money to making living
    2. The ambition to become rich as quickly as possible
    3. The salaries are lower than the everyday needs
    4. Weakening of ethics or morals
    5. Weak role of law
    6. Abuse / misuse of power
    7. Long or unclear procedures of the services
    8. Others: .................................................................
    9. 98) Do not know
    10. 99) Refused

12. **How would you compare the level of corruption in your local area and in Afghanistan generally, today with the level of corruption past years? Is the current level of corruption...?** [choose from the options]
    1. Much higher than past years
    2. Somewhat higher than past years
    3. Same as the past years
    4. Somewhat lower than past years
    5. Much lower than past years
    6. 98) Do not know
    7. 99) Refused
13. Do you believe there have been some improvements in reducing corruption in any public institution during the last 12 months?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. 98) Do not know
   4. 99) Refused

14. Which Government institutions do you think are the MOST corrupt? [select three (3) most corrupt institutions]
   1. ____________________________________________
   2. ____________________________________________
   3. ____________________________________________
   4. 4: None
   5. 98) Do not know  Go to Q16
   6. 99) Refused

15. Why do you think these institutions are the most corrupt? [do not read the options]
   1. Leadership is corrupt
   2. Employees are corrupt
   3. Leadership is ineffective or have no interest in doing good for the citizens
   4. Employees are not effective or do not have interest in doing good for the citizens
   5. Lack of awareness among employees
   6. Salaries of employees are too low
   7. Internal controls are weak
   8. No effective external oversight
   9. Public are not engaged
   10. Politicians and power holders’ interferences in the work of institutions
   11. Corruption has become a culture
   12. Other, please specify ..........................................................
   13. 98) Do not know
   14. 99) Refused

16. Which Government institutions do you think are the LEAST corrupt? [select three (3) least corrupt institutions]
   1. ____________________________________________
   2. ____________________________________________
   3. ____________________________________________
   4. None
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused
17. **On which information source do you base your assessment of the level of corruption in the institutions mentioned above? Please choose top three resources, ranking the most important first.** [Interviewer: prompt respondents to rank top 3 sources by importance]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience (you have had to provide cash, gifts or favor)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk with relatives or family</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk with friends and people around</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information about corruption given by NGOs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information provided by the media (TV, radio, newspaper, internet, Facebook, etc...)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, please specify .....................................................................</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

98) Do not know

99) Refused

---

**Personal Experience**

18. **Have you personally as an individual experienced corruption over the last 12 months?**

1. Yes  
2. No [Go to Q20]
3. 98) Do not know
4. 99) Refused

19. **If yes, how many times have you personally faced corruption over the last 12 months?**

1. Once  
2. Twice  
3. Three times
4. 4) Four times
5. 5) Five to ten times
6. 6) more times
20. In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family, had contact with the following institutions? If yes, did you have to pay a bribe? What was the amount, gift or Shereeni? [read each institution name and fill in the columns]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutions / organizations / individuals</th>
<th>Contacted services in last 12 months (Yes / No)</th>
<th>If contacted, asked to pay bribe? (Yes / No)</th>
<th>If paid bribe, then how much? [Interviewer: if DK or refused, use codes 98 &amp; 99 in a circle]</th>
<th>Amount paid last time</th>
<th>Total amount paid during past 12 months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population registration and Tazkira</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Health (Clinics, Hospitals)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education (Schools)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Higher Education (Institute and University)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
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<td>Brisna, Afghanistan Electricity</td>
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<td>Provincial Government of your province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial Governor</td>
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<td>District Government of your district</td>
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<td>District Governor office of your district</td>
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<td>Police of your district</td>
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<td>Police of your province</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Courts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attorney General</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other anti-government military groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>National/International NGOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Elders (Malik, Arbab, Wakel Guzar)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member of Community development Councils</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Military</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other, please specify</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
21. You said that you or a member of your household has had to pay a bribe, which form of bribe have you experienced? [multiple responses]

1. Paid cash 98) Do not know
2. Offered a gift or Shereeni 99) Refused
3. Paid in livestock (goat, cow, sheep etc)
4. Paid in harvest (wheat etc)
5. Exchange of favor or service
6. Other, please specify ……………………………………………………………………………………………

22. What was the amount of the bribe paid the last time you personally paid a bribe??

1. Less than 100 Afs
2. Between 100 Afs and 500 Afs
3. Between 501 Afs and 2,000 Afs
4. Between 2,001 Afs and 10,000 Afs
5. More than 10,000 Afs

23. Whenever you have contacted officials in the public sectors, government institutions, how often did the following happen? Did this happen in all cases, most cases, rare cases or no cases at all? [read all categories]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>All Cases</th>
<th>Most Cases</th>
<th>Rare Cases</th>
<th>No Cases at all</th>
<th>Has not contacted officials</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The official directly demand cash, gift or favor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The officials did not demand directly but showed that they</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expect a cash, gift or favor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You give cash to the officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You give a gift to the officials</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You do the official a favor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are asked to do a favor to relatives of the official</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You use personal connections to get the issue done</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24. Where did they get the bribe from you? [multiple answers if more than one]

1. At Hawala office
2. At home
3. At work place
4. Other, please specify ……………………………………………………………………………………………
5. 98) Do not know
6. 99) Refused
25. Have you or a member of your household been victim of nepotism during the last 12 months?  
[definition of nepotism: the practice among those with power or influence of favouring relatives or friends, especially by giving them jobs for which outsiders might be better qualified]  

1. Yes 98) Do not Know  
2. No [Go to Q27] 99) Refused

26. In which institution did you face Nepotism?  
1. Government Institution  
2. International Organization  
3. National / International NGOs  
4. Private Companies  
5. Other, please specify .................................................................  
6. 98) Do not know  
7. 99) Refused

27. Would you rely on nepotism if this is necessary to secure a job?  
1. Yes 98) Do not know  
2. No 99) Refused

28. How would you react if you were asked to give a bribe, Would you give the bribe or would you not give it?  
1. I would give it 98) Do Not Know  
2. I would not give it [Go to Q30] 99) Refused  
3. Other, please specify .................................................................

29. Why would you give it? [do not read pre-coded responses options]  
1. Because everyone gives it  
2. Because there is no other way I can obtain the service  
3. I would be able to negotiate a lower price  
4. To speed up the process  
5. To be sure I get what I need  
6. Other, please specify .................................................................  
7. 98) Do not know  
8. 99) Refused

30. How do you feel when you pay bribe? [do not read pre-coded responses options]  
1. Guilty  
2. Sinful  
3. Sad  
4. Relieved  
5. Worried  
6. Poor
7. Honored
8. Powerful
9. Other, specify ___________________________
10. 98) Do not know
11. 99) Refused

31. In your opinion, how is a corrupt person perceived in the Afghan society?
   [do not read pre-coded responses options]
   1. Guilty
   2. Sinful
   3. Poor
   4. Powerful
   5. Clever, smart
   6. Nasty
   7. Selfish (self-centered)
   8. Venal
   9. Other, specify ___________________________

Individual Behaviour  [ASK ALL]

32. In your opinion, what can you personally do to reduce corruption in Afghanistan? List concrete actions you would be willing to undertake to help combat corruption. [multiple responses; do not read responses]
   1. Not paying bribes for public services
   2. Reporting corruption to media
   3. Refuse to do favors to officials or to their relatives
   4. Reporting corruption CSOs
   5. Reporting corruption to public bodies
   6. File a case against corrupt officials
   7. Participate in awareness campaigns against corruption
   8. There is nothing I can do
   9. If other, please specify .................................................................
   10. 98) Do not know
   11. 99) Refused

33. Do you know where to report a corrupt act of an official?
   1. Yes
   2. No  [Go to Q35]
   3. 98) Do not know
   4. 99) Refused
34. **What channel would you contact to report a corrupt act or to file the complaints?** [do not read the options; Accept all possible responses]

1. Police
2. The attorneys or the attorney general
3. District courts, provincial courts or the Supreme court
4. The special commissions of upper or lower house (Meshrano or Wolesi Jirga)
5. Ministers or deputy ministers
6. CSOs
7. Media
8. Taliban
9. Other, please specify ..............................................................
10. 98) Do not know
11. 99) Refused

35. **During the past 12 months, have you or anyone in your household reported a corrupt act by a public official?**

1. Yes 98) Do not know
2. No [Go to Q38] 99) Refused

36. **To which organization/s was the complaint reported?** [multiple answers]

1. Police
2. The attorneys or the attorney general
3. District courts, provincial courts or the Supreme court
4. The special commissions of upper or lower house (Meshrano or Wolesi Jirga)
5. Ministers or deputy ministers
6. CSOs
7. Media
8. Taliban
9. Informal / Tribal leaders
10. Other, please specify ..............................................................
11. 98) Do not know
12. 99) Refused

37. **How would you rate your level of satisfaction with the feedback you received as a result of your corruption report?**

1. Very satisfied
2. Somewhat satisfied
3. Somewhat dissatisfied
4. Very dissatisfied
5. No feedbacks received
6. 98) Do not know
7. 99) Refused
38. Some people in Afghanistan are unwilling to report corrupt actions because of various reasons. I will list some of these possible reasons, please tell me which of the following you personally consider as a reason for not reporting corruption to the relevant authorities.

[Do not read the options, single answer only]

1. Those who report corruption will be subject to retribution/revenge
2. No action will be taken even if corruption reported
3. It’s not worth reporting corruption if I am not personally hurt by it
4. Most people who indulge in corruption only do so because of economic hardship
5. Our society does not reward those who report corruption
6. Lack of evidence to prove
7. Lack of clarity about corruption proceedings
8. Do not know the relevant institution responsible for corruption cases
9. Official would delay the corruption reporters work
10. Other, please specify …………………………………………………………………………
11. 98) Do not know
12. 99) Refused

39. Would you protect your interests through bribery if you had an opportunity to do so?

1. Yes 98) Do not know
2. No 99) Refused

40. Now I would like to read you a list of statements, based on your experience, please tell me if you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or strongly disagree.

[Interviewer: please read each statement and circle the appropriate number]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neither Agree not disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Corruption has negatively affected the life of the people in this area</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of corruption I do not trust the local public services anymore</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption is worse in our district than the province</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs and international organizations are corrupt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People in the Government are only here to enrich themselves</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Because of corruption people in our area refer to Taliban</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Hamid Karzai was more corrupt than the current Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
41. On a scale of one to five where one is highly common and five highly uncommon, how would you assess the following attitudes of the government service providers in Afghanistan?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Highly Common</th>
<th>Common</th>
<th>Relatively common</th>
<th>uncommon</th>
<th>Highly uncommon</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creating difficulties in order to request for a bribe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asking directly for money</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asking for gifts in return for small services</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not performing official task in an appropriate time while expecting to</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be offered a bribe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing taxes and customs duties in exchange for taking a percentage</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of them</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Anti-corruption [Ask all]

42. To what extent you think corruption can be reduced in Afghanistan?

[Read the options select only one]

1. Corruption cannot be reduced at all
2. Corruption can be reduced to a certain degree
3. Corruption can be substantially reduced
4. Corruption can be completely eradicated
5. 98) Do not know
6. 99) Refused

43. Are you aware of any anti-corruption measures being taken by the Government of Afghanistan?

1. Yes 98) Do not know
2. No [Go to Q46] 99) Refused

44. Please state which one?

____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________________________________

45. How well or badly is the government doing in the fight against corruption?

1. Very effective
2. Somehow effective
3. Not very effective
4. 98) Do not know
5. 99) Refused
46. Do you agree or disagree that the National Unity Government of Afghanistan has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Somewhat agree
   3. Somewhat disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused

47. Do you agree or disagree that the office of the President has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Somewhat agree
   3. Somewhat disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused

48. Do you agree or disagree that the office of the Chief Executive has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption?
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Somewhat agree
   3. Somewhat disagree
   4. Strongly disagree
   5. 98) Do not know
   6. 99) Refused
49. Are you aware of the following agencies? How effective has this agency [read from the list] been in fighting corruption?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aware?</th>
<th>Effectiveness in Fighting Corruption?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General’s Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Council of Rule of Law and Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Corruption Justice Center</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary / Supreme Court</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Audit Office</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Directorate of Security</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Councils</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Commission</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity Watch Afghanistan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society Organizations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Community</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Companies</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal and local influential</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other, please specify;</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50. Do you believe that international community wants to fight corruption?

   1. Yes 98) Do not know
   2. No 99) Refused

51. Do you believe the members of the international community are supportive of honest government officials in your province?

   1. Yes 98) Do not know
   2. No 99) Refused
52. Have you heard any member of the international community speaking against corruption in Afghanistan over the last 12 months?

1. Yes 98) Do not know
2. No [Go to Q55] 99) Refused

53. If yes, who have you often heard speaking? [do not read the options, select one]

1. United Nations officials
2. ISAF
3. Officials of other international organizations
4. United States government officials
5. European government officials
6. Others, please specify .................................................................
7. 98) Do not know
8. 99) Refused

54. Have you heard the Taliban denouncing corruption in the Afghan state?

1. Yes
2. No
3. 98) Do not know
4. 99) Refused

55. In your view, is corruption within the state facilitating the expansion of the Taliban?

1. Yes 98) Do not know
2. No [Go to Q58] 99) Refused

56. If yes, corruption within which institutions is helping the most expansion of the Taliban?

1. Provincial and District Governor Offices
2. Provincial and District Police
3. Courts
4. Attorney’s General Office and prosecutors
5. Customs
6. Central government
7. Other, specify_____________________________________

57. What is your perception about the role of the Taliban in relation to corruption?

1. They promote corruption
2. They help in the fight against corruption
3. Fight against corruption is not a priority for them
58. Do you believe that the successful completion of peace talks will result in the strengthening of good governance in Afghanistan?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. 98) Do not know
   4. 99) Refused

59. Do you think reconciliation efforts between the Afghan Government and armed opposition groups can help stabilize the country?
   1. Yes [Go to Q61]
   2. No
   3. 98) Do not know
   4. 99) Refused

60. If not, why? [open ended question]

   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________
   ____________________________________________

61. Do you have a family member or close relative who works for...?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>DK</th>
<th>Refused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorney General Office</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supreme Court</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other: ....................................</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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